POLITICAL CONNECTIONS, ACCOUNTING QUALITY AND LOAN CONTRACTING: EVIDENCE FROM THE DYNASTIC MONARCHY GOVERNMENT SYSTEM OF THE GCC MONARCHIES

Thesis

2019

Published in: الرابط على الإنترنت لهذا المنشور

This study examines the association between political connections, accounting quality and loan contracting in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) monarchies. A key feature of the GCC government systems is the distinctive tie between ruling families and the states, forming the so-called dynastic monarchy government (DMG) system. An implication of the DMG system is that the power structure is expected to remain as defined by latest monarch over the period of his rulership, increasing political stability. This feature indicates greater predictability of future benefits or costs of political connections, a factor that may assist firms to reaching more informed corporate decisions. While most prior research has focused on an established or a developing democracy or on authoritarian regimes, few studies have analysed political connections using the DMG setting of the GCC monarchies. Thus, the DMG provides a unique setting to investigate the governance role of politically connected members and family owners and their impact on accounting quality and loan contracting.

• Publication Work Type: A thesis submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
• Publisher Name: Latrobe University
• Publishing City: Melbourne