Language and ideology: some implications of Argumentation Theory's conception of utterance meaning.

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1. A foundational claim of Anscombre and Ducrot's Argumentation Theory (henceforth A.T.) is that the deep structure of utterances - as elements of discourse, rather than sentences in use – comprises certain types of constraints on sequencing, which correspond to the 'argumentative' content. This content not only appears alongside the informational (or objective) content, but is prior to it. In other words, language, as construed by A.T. may be described as 'inherently ideological', a characteristic, which, on Ducrot's own view (Ducrot 1993:12), makes it unsuitable for providing objective representations of reality. Although Ducrot takes this to be a fact[1] about language and appears to be in favour of a solution consisting in rethinking the function[2] of semantic theories, A.T. remains vulnerable to the charge that its conception of language is misconstrued and that it wrongly predicts that the latter cannot be used as an objective medium of representation.

For reasons that will become clear in due course, I will not begin by addressing[3] the issue of whether A.T.'s conception of Language (Ld) conforms to reality (in this instance, language). In what follows, my main priority will be to examine whether the view that Ld cannot provide objective representations of reality - if correct - constitutes a serious challenge to A.T. (the main assumption behind this view, one may want to bear in mind, is that objective representations of reality are a sine qua non to the pursuit of objective knowledge). I will begin by listing samples of various types of data A.T. is concerned with, as these will help readers unfamiliar with the framework to appreciate in what sense Ld might be regarded as inherently ideological. Next, I will ask whether it necessarily follows from the fact that Ld possesses certain features that it cannot provide objective representations of reality. This step will also involve specifying what objective representations are. Only then shall I return to the initial objection and attempt to assess its seriousness.

2. As a theory of discourse, A.T.'s descriptive goal is to provide an account for what it calls 'argumentative' phenomena. Consider the following examples[4]

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Metaphor Making and Processing

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For a long time, metaphor has been considered "as a sort of happy extra trick with words" (Richards, 1936: 90) - a device of the poetic imagination in which the poet coats his feelings to bestow on the language in which they are wrapped a touch of beauty or unfamiliarity. Accordingly, it has been relegated within this tradition to an ancillary function of mere embellishment. It is only in the early 1970s that its status started to be rethought, thanks to the progress made in the fields of the philosophy of language, psychology, linguistics, stylistics, discourse analysis, and pragmatics. This period has actually witnessed a proliferation of symposia and publications such as Black's *Models and Metaphors* (1962), *Shibles's Metaphor. Annotated Bibliography and History* (1971), Sacks's *On Metaphor* (1979), Ortony's *Metaphor and Thought* (1979), and Lakoff & Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* (1980), to name only a few. The outcome of this research has been the questioning of the view of metaphor as an achievement of the unordinary mind. Hence, it has been claimed that "to be able to produce and understand metaphorical statements is nothing to boast about" (Black, 1979: 181), and that "children do not learn to speak metaphorically as a kind of crowning achievement in the apprenticeship of language learning" (Cohen & Margalit, 1972: 723). It has also been claimed that metaphor is not only not a mark of excellence, but also "an incurable infirmity of the human mind"[2] to perceive reality as it is (Bally: 1951:188).

The paper is divided into sections, each studying a pair of dualities. The justification for dealing with metaphor in these terms could be found in the nature of metaphor itself which has been claimed to be "no different from any other kind of duality of meaning" (Morgan, 1979: 139), such as ambiguity, irony, and indirect speech acts. The first section will be devoted to dealing with the review of the massive literature about metaphor and the framework. The second section includes the pair *imagination-rationality*, which is at the heart of metaphor making and processing. The third pair, *assertion-speech act*, investigates the logical status of metaphor, and argues that metaphor cannot be approached in terms of truth claims. The fourth couple, *convention-intention*, seeks to draw a line between what is conventional and what is intentional in metaphor. The fifth, *speaker meaning-sentence meaning*, exploits the traditional distinction between literal and figurative meaning to show the continuum between the two. The sixth section, *world-to-words fit-words-to-world fit*,

investigates the kind of relation metaphor entertains with the world. The last section, *dictionary-encyclopaedic knowledge,* shows the amount of knowledge required both in metaphor making and processing.

1. Review and Framework

1. 1. Review of some theories of metaphor

Theories of metaphor are quite numerous. Space here does not allow for justice to be done to the huge literature about metaphor. However, some of the most influential views will be reviewed. One dominant theory is called **Deviation,** which consists in thinking that violating selection restriction rules is "a necessary and sufficient condition for distinguishing metaphor from non-metaphor" (Matthews, 1971: 424), and that to be processed, metaphor should be "interpreted by a direct analogy to well-formed sentences that observe the selection rules in question" (Chomsky, 1965: 149). Criticisms of this conception come from its inadequacy to account for all classes of metaphor. First, there are many instances of language use that we recognise as metaphors, and yet they involve no such a violation. Reddy's (1969: 242) now famous example, "The rock is becoming brittle with age," can admit both literal and nonliteral readings. Second, there are instances of violating selection restriction rules that are not metaphor, such as e.e.cummings' "love is less always than win."

Another conception, known as **Simile** or **Controversion,** argues that "every metaphor is implicitly of the form 'X is like Y in respect of Z,'" and that "for each metaphor, we can devise a roughly corresponding simile" (Leech, 1973: 151-156). This conception has been criticised for two weaknesses. First, it considers metaphor and simile as stylistic variants, reducing metaphor to a paraphrase in simile form, which destroys its compactness and suggestiveness. For instance, is there a possible paraphrase for Virginia Woolf's metaphor of a highbrow as "a man or a woman of thoroughbred intelligence who rides his mind at a gallop across country in pursuit of an idea,"[3] or a paraphrase at all in case a metaphor cancels a simile as in, "John is not just like a tree, he is a tree"?[4] Second, it assumes that metaphor is built on similarity only, whereas it has been shown that it could build on "disparities" (Richards, 1936: 108), "association" (Searle, 1979: 109), and "dissimilarities" (Eco, 1983: 228).

The third view of metaphor, known as **Substitution**, stipulates that an author substitutes M (metaphorical utterance) for L (literal utterance), and it is up to the reader to reverse the process, and use the literal as a clue for interpreting the metaphor nonliterally. This view is associated with the formalist, Roman Jakobson (1956: 60), and originates in a distinction between two modes of linguistic arrangement, namely, "combination" and "selection." It has been observed in cases of aphasic disturbances that patients suffering from the inability to choose elements from the axis of selection lose the power to create and understand metaphor. On the other hand, patients whose capacity to combine elements is impaired will be unable to use and interpret metonymies.

Mention should also be made of a fairly important theory of metaphor, known as **Interaction** or **Tension**, which does not regard it as a matter of words, but as involving " two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" (Richards, 1936: 93). Building on Richards' proposals, Black (1962: 44) commits the interaction version to the view that metaphor works by mapping "two distinct subjects" (a "principal" and a "subsidiary"), which should be regarded as "systems of things," with the subsidiary system's "associated implications" (consisting of "commonplaces") being projected on the principal subject, making possible selection, emphasis, suppression, and organisation.

To crown this brief survey, a fairly recent approach, known as **Experiential** or **Cognitive,** should be reviewed. It grounds metaphor in our experience, and claims that it is our way of knowing about the world. This theory rejects two myths that have dominated Western thought for a long while, namely, "objectivism" and "subjectivism." Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 186-189) offer a view based on a synthesis of the two. On this view, "the language of the imagination, especially metaphor [is] the most significant" aspect of our experience as it "transcends rationality and objectivity." The experiential alternative is a reaction against the view that metaphor is a matter of use of words. Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 3) claim that metaphor is "pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action," and that our "ordinary conceptual system ... is fundamentally metaphorical in nature."

Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 14) isolate three fundamental types of metaphor: structural, orientational, and ontological. Structural metaphors are cases where "one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another." For example, Your claims are *indefensible,* I *demolished* his argument, He *attacked* every weak point of my argument, which are all structured by the underlying conceptual metaphor, ARGUMENT IS WAR (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 4). Orientational[5] metaphors have to do with spatialization or directionality, namely that, (i) language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person to another; (ii) in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in the words; (iii) words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and conveying them to others; and (iv) in

listening or reading, people extract the thoughts and feelings once again from the words. One important orientational metaphor, mentioned by Reddy (1979: 286-89), relates to our language about language, or metalanguage, very much used by language instructors in their reports to their students, such as "Try to *get* your thoughts *across* better, Try to *pack* more thoughts *into* fewer words, Don't force your meanings *into* the wrong words, and Can you actually *extract* coherent ideas from that prose." All these metalinguistic metaphors are governed by the conceptual metaphor, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS. Ontological metaphors, however, are "ways of viewing events, activities, emotions, ideas, etc., as entities and substances" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 25) to make them more graspable to the human mind. One ontological metaphor views inflation (which is an event) as an entity in the following utterance, We need to *combat inflation,* etc. (26).

1. 2. Framework

This paper offers a view of metaphor which draws on two frameworks, namely, a cognitive or "experiential" component (developed by Lakoff & Johnson (1980) and Lakoff & Turner (1989)), and a pragmatic component (initiated by Austin (1962), Grice (1975) and Searle (1969)). The experiential component is a synthesis of objectivism and subjectivism, borrowing reason from objectivism, which includes "categorisation, entailment, and inference." In our experience, "categories are not homogeneous," and "have fuzzy boundaries" (Ungerer & Schmid, 1996: 38). For us a canary, a parrot, and an ostrich are all birds by entailment because they share essential features such as flying, having feathers and wings, laying eggs, etc. even though there are peripheral features that they do not share. But *a bird*[6] is used, at least occasionally, to refer metaphorically (or polysemously) to *a pretty girl* by inference.

From subjectivism, however, it selects imagination, which involves "seeing one kind of thing in terms of another kind of thing." On this view, metaphor is "imagined rationality" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 193). What enables us to draw upon previous experience is the fact that "in every act of categorization we are more or less consciously referring to one or several cognitive models that we have stored," which we can use to talk about our new experiences (Ungerer & Schmid, 1995: 49). Roughly, a cognitive conception of metaphorizing grounds our views of various phenomena into our world of experience with people, objects, and events, by conceptualising the most abstract phenomena in terms of the most intelligible. Cognitive linguists call this transfer "mapping" from a source cognitive model to a target domain, which means that "metaphor operates *between* domains" (Sweetser, 1990: 19). According to this model, the Dead Metaphor Theory dies away,

since it is precisely these so-called dead metaphors that constitute the basis of our conceptual system. Lakoff & Turner (1989: 129) claim that the metaphors "that are most alive and most deeply entrenched, efficient, and powerful are those that are so automatic as to be unconscious and effortless."

The pragmatic component, on the other hand, draws upon Speech Act Theory, the best known version of pragmatics. On this model, "a theory of language is part of a general theory of action" (Searle, 1969: 17), since "there is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person uttering" (Austin, 1962: 60). One of the views of pragmatics defines the latter as "much concerned precisely with such mechanisms whereby a speaker can mean more than, or something quite different from, what he actually said, by inventively exploiting communicative conventions" (Levinson, 1983: 26-7). The relevance of such a conception of pragmatics to metaphor processing does not need demonstrating since metaphorizing is a case of exploitation of communicative resources available for speakers. Obviously, owing to the richness of their resources, the cognitive-pragmatic frame has more to offer for a study of metaphor than linguistic rules and principles. One of the most important combinations between cognitive and pragmatic phenomena is reflected in the co-extensive duality imagination-rationality.

2. A Matter of Imagination and Rationality

In the history of Western thought, reason has always been equated with knowledge. Imagination, on the other hand, has aroused mixed feelings of acceptance or outright rejection. Hume, for instance, argues that "[nothing is more dangerous to reason than flights of the imagination." [7] Recall, however, that the definition of metaphor offered by Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 193) is "*imaginative rationality.*" [8]

2. 1. Imagination

Just as possessing language constitutes our humanness, imagination is a property of the human species. Kant describes it as "a blind but indispensable function of the soul without which we should have no knowledge whatsoever." Along this line of thought, Ricoeur (1974: 110) suggests that it "should be treated as a dimension of language," since it is at the origin of "emerging meanings." Moreover, stressing its power, Mac Cormac (1985: 176) argues that "the imagination can convert almost any combination of words into a meaningful expression." The role of imagination in metaphor making and processing is central. Imagination projects itself onto the structure of language to make metaphorizing possible. Because of this, it has been highlighted by many a student of metaphor. Davidson (1980: 239), for

instance, claims that metaphor is "brought off by the imaginative employment of words and sentences." On the other hand, Ricoeur (1979: 146) points out imagination's functions of seeing, picturing, and suspending in a theory of metaphor. The "seeing" role is crucial to metaphor making. It is "this *ability* to produce new kinds by assimilation and to produce them not *above* the differences, as in the concept, but in spite of and through the differences."

Basically, imagination seeks fresh relations between entities formerly seen as distinct. In other words, it is a creative process, whereby an area of intersection is postulated between a source domain (SD) and a target domain (TD). Accordingly, in the making phase, metaphor is not constructed on pre-existing similarities or inherent properties, but, as Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 215) argue , on "similarities [which] arise as a *result* of conceptual metaphors."[9] Similarly, Glucksberg & Keysar (1990: 11) explain that "the similarity that is thereby perceived among category members is thus a product of that categorisation, not an antecedent of it. That is, the categorisation produces the similarity, not the other way round." To exemplify, one fresh similarity is created between an inanimate entity and an animate one, when Madame Grandier is described as "looking out of a window at remorseless mountains,"[10] which were responsible for her husband's death. The conception of mountains as humans likely to commit crimes and have no remorse about them has been at the origin of an ontological metaphor, where mountains are personified and assigned a negative attribute to downgrade them and show apathy towards them. During processing, imagination is basic in reconstructing the intended relation between *mountains* (SD) and *remorse* (TD) which is created by this metaphorical utterance.

However, it is not always the case that metaphor is a function of similarity. Searle (1983: 149), for instance, argues that "it just seems to be a fact about our mental capacities that we are able to interpret certain sorts of metaphor without the application of any underlying 'rules' or 'principles' other than the sheer ability to make certain associations." He mentions spatial metaphor for temporal duration (e.g. "the hours crawled by"), temperature metaphors for emotional states (e.g. "warm welcome," "cool reception," "lukewarm friendship," "heated argument," and "hot love affair"), and taste metaphors for personality traits (e.g. "sweet person," "sour disposition," and "bitter personality"). In short, imagination is responsible for creating similarity, association, and even dissimilarity as a ground for metaphor. But imagination alone is not enough to account for metaphor; it needs to be balanced by rationality.

2. 2. Rationality

Rationality may be regarded as a check to unrestrained imagination. In other

words, it is there to ensure that only a reasonable amount of imagination is invested in the creation of metaphor. If not for rationality, no boundary would exist between, for instance, science-fiction, fantasy, dreamwork, and metaphor. In restraining imagination, rationality lays the foundation for possible processing. Kasher (1976: 210) argues that linguistic communication is steeped in a *Rationalization Principle,* namely that, "[t]here is no reason to assume that the speaker is not a rational agent; his ends and his beliefs regarding his state, in the context of utterance supply the justification of his behavior." The assumption that the maker of a metaphor is being rational provides the first step in a heuristics of processing. Basically, the assumption about the maker's rationality entails his/her cooperativeness vis-à-vis the receiver. If (s)he is co-operative, then (s)he can't be trying to lie or convey falsehood. Thus, on hearing "Bureaucracy drives a paper clip through man's soul,"[11] we assume that the maker of this utterance could not be trying to mislead us or talking nonsense simply because we take them to be rational agents, trying to communicate co-operatively. It is precisely this presumption of rationality that makes us seriously engage in processing. As may have become clear from previous evidence, this coextensive pair of imagination-rationality is an exemplar of the bidimensional nature of metaphor making and processing, without which no metaphorizing is possible. However, there is a sense in which metaphor may run the risk of being called a statement, which would be detrimental to its function in discourse. To remedy this, appeal will be made to a speech act status for it.

3. A Matter of Statement or Speech Act

In spite of the element of rationality to restrain imagination, metaphor might run the risk of being processed as a nonserious thought instantiation. To cope with this, provisions have to be made to ensure that its purposefulness is not destroyed by classifying it as a statement subject to truth and falsity. Instead, a speech act status for it will be proposed.

3. 1. What is a Statement?

Traditionally, a statement is one of the functions of language, and part of the trichotomy statement/question/order, which are grammaticalised as the affirmative, the interrogative, and the imperative respectively. Making a statement commits the speaker/writer to laws of logic. It, for instance, commits him/her to the truth of it, and to an intentional state Lyons (1981: 190) calls "epistemic commitment," i.e. the fact that "subsequent statements ... must be consistent with the belief that it is true." Bergmann (1991: 487) claims that using a metaphor is making an assertion, arguing that metaphor-as-

assertion enables us to process it with no reference to its literal counterpart. Two objections could be raised against such a view. First, to consider metaphor a statement is to equate it with an intentional communication of falsity. If an assertion is assigned the value TRUE or FALSE, therefore metaphor should automatically be regarded as untrue both semantically and conversationally, which is missing the whole point about its communicative import. Intuitively, makers of metaphor do not intend their metaphors to be regarded as statements of untruth or even as nonserious attempts on their part to communicate. As Loewenberg (1975: 232) suggests, "metaphorical utterances are not used to make truth claims;" rather, they are intended as a "proposal m" (or a metaphorical proposal), offering a different conception of the world and reality. As a way out of the assertion's hook, Mac Cormac (1985: 170) argues that the locutionary force of *asserting* becomes an illocutionary force of *suggesting* only on the basis of recognising that the maker of metaphor is not speaking literally. In other words, asserting becomes suggesting with metaphorizing, since the latter is not a function of truth and falsity, but a function of *"Infelicities"* (Austin, 1962: 14).

Second, the view of metaphor-as-assertion entails that what is asserted can be falsified in the real world. This conception is counterintuitive, since it is in the nature of metaphorizing to offer descriptions/views that tend, at least theoretically, to bring changes to the world, manipulate it, and even contradict it. In other words, while a true statement is coincident with reality, metaphor is different from reality as it imaginatively transcends it. In Harries's (1979: 78) words, "metaphors become weapons directed against reality, instruments to break the referentiality of language, to deliver language from its ontological function..." One such deliverance came from Alice[12] in the form of a request for pretence when she addressed her nurse as follows: "Do let's pretend that I am a hungry hyaena, and you are a bone." This pretence has the effect of suspending reality and proposing an imagined substitute instead, and nobody can invalidate Alice's address by saying that it is false. In short, metaphor should not be regarded as a statement; it invites a speech act investigation.

3. 2. What is a Speech Act?

Traditionally, the sentence is said to be the minimal unit of linguistic communication. Searle (1969: 16-17), however, claims that "the unit of linguistic communication" is the speech act, i.e. "the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions." For him, "a theory of language is part of a theory of action," and speaking a language is "performing speech acts" in accordance with "certain rules for the use of linguistic elements." Austin (1962: 94), on the other hand, argues that the performance of a speech act necessarily involves other acts, namely, a *locutionary* act (Searle calls it an

utterance act), an *illocutionary* act (Searle's *propositional* act or the act of reference and predication), and a *perlocutionary* act.

Applications of pragmatic theory to metaphor are too many to review here. However, some of the salient ones will be briefly considered. For instance, Grice (1975) applies his own maxims of conversation to metaphor, and argues that it is a case of maxim (of quality) flouting. Searle (1979) studies it as a case where utterance meaning and sentence meaning diverge. Mack (1975) applies Austin's Felicity Conditions to metaphor, arguing that it is a case of conjoining an assertion and a presupposition. Levenston (1976) investigates metaphor in terms of the kinds of illocutionary acts it is used to perform, linking linguistic forms to pragmatic functions. Finally, Huttar (1980: 400) applies Searle's speech act categories (utterance act, propositional act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act) to metaphor.

Following MacCormac (1985: 175), in this paper the use of metaphorical utterances is named "metaphorizing."[13] The acts we perform in metaphorizing are:

(i) Locutionary act: suggesting a particular state of affairs.
(ii)Illocutionary act: stimulating emotions, producing perplexity, destroying complacency in the use of language.
(iii) Perlocutionary act: creating a sense of intimacy in view of changing the others' beliefs.

For an instance of metaphorizing such as, "Ambulance attendants rush victims through the doors of bankruptcy,"[14] (i) the locutionary act suggests equating hospitals with bankruptcy; (ii) the illocutionary act seeks to produce perplexity in the interactant by breaking the complacent barriers between hospitals and bankruptcy; and (iii) the perlocutionary act depends on the hearer's cultural experience with, and associations between, hospitals and bankruptcy. If his/her cultural experience happens to be coincident with that of the user of metaphorizing, intimacy obtains fully. However, if the two experiences are somewhat in conflict, creating an intimate bond is harder to attain.

Clearly, this assertion-speech act duality is crucial to the processing of metaphorizing. If taken as an assertion, metaphor will be self-defeating, in that the interactants will not start the imaginative act of reconstructing the utterance as an instance of metaphorizing, i.e. as "imaginative rationality." But before reconstructing it, Mey (1993: 64-5) claims, "[t]he task of pragmatics is to 'deconstruct' the metaphor, to unload the 'loaded weapon' of language" in order to defeat its "uncritical acceptance," which constitutes a danger on the passive user. However, what actually ascertains this status for metaphor is its reliance, like any other linguistic occurrence, on the conventional resources of language, and extralinguistic factors such as intention.

4. A matter of Convention and Intention

For metaphor to be made, the non-assertive, imaginative, and rational dimensions of metaphorizing need to be complemented. The pair convention-intention is not metaphor-specific; language is partly governed by social convention, and language use is explained by intentional states users are assumed to possess in using language. Metaphorizing creates its own CONTEXTUAL CONFIGURATIONS and intentional states, the absence of which makes metaphor infelicitous.

4. 1. Convention and Metaphor

It has been claimed that metaphorizing occurs "unmarked" within GENRES and PRE-CODED LANGUAGE PROCESSES, which function as conventional procedures. GENRES include poetry, fables, parables, fairy tales, children's stories, advertisements, myths, dreams, etc. PRE-CODED LANGUAGE PROCESSES involve Synaesthesia, Personification, and Animalization. The use of metaphorizing within such procedures requires for its happiness those particular procedures to be used by the right person in the right context (Mack, 1975). However, it is dubious that these genres are metaphor-specific. Everyday language and prose literature are also a fertile hunting ground for metaphor.

My claim, however, is that metaphorizing does not make use of any linguistic resources other than the conventional syntactic forms employed in any other non-metaphorical use of language. Metaphorizing could be said to create its own CONTEXTUAL CONFIGURATIONS (Halliday & Hasan, 1989: 55), i.e. the possible combinations between *field* of discourse (i.e. what the text is about), *tenor* of discourse (i.e. participants in the text), and *mode* of discourse (i.e. the role played by language as a medium in favouring process sharing or disfavouring it). For instance, metaphorizing in a fairy tale (field) requires a parent or an educator and a child (tenor) for telling (mode) it at bedtime or any other convenient time. The procedure must be executed in full, in that the metaphor maker should construct one that is a suggestion to share with a processor, who would accept to calculate it as such. The intention that the maker of metaphorizing is not asserting anything, lying, or joking should be clear to the interactant, who accepts to take it as a serious attempt on the part of the user to change his beliefs and attitudes. However, there is more to metaphorizing than the notion of convention.

4. 2. Intention and Metaphor

The notion of intention in meaning is highly controversial. For instance, Grice (1990: 76) offers an intentional view of meaning, which is formulated as, "A meant something by x" is (roughly) equivalent to "A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention." Reacting to Grice's account of meaning, Searle (1969: 45-47) argues that "meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also at least sometimes a matter of convention." He also claims that "the characteristic intended effect of meaning is understanding." On the other hand, Austin (1962:105) rightly acknowledges the importance of intention, but makes reservations as to its occurrence, namely that, "(i) when the speaker intends to produce an effect it may nevertheless not occur, and (ii) when he does not intend to produce it or intends not to produce it it may nevertheless occur."

Grice (1975: 45-46) offers an ostensive-inferential model of communication in which metaphor processing could well be accommodated. This rational model draws on a view of meaning which locates it in a recognition by participants in conversation of one's intentions. The major assumption of this theory is a COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE which participants are expected to abide by, namely, "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." Realising the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE are conversational MAXIMS and their sub-maxims. According to Grice, metaphorizing is a case of flouting of the maxim of QUALITY. i.e. "a categorial falsity." But this is not the most original thing about his view. Assuming the COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE, incoherence, which is born out of the impossibility of reconciliating what is said (i.e. the conventional meaning of the surface linguistic form) with the context (both linguistic and extralinguistic), gives rise to a "Conversational Implicature," i.e. to an intention to implicate something different from what is said.

There is another conception of "Intentionality" developed by Searle (1983: 9-10), according to which in the performance of speech acts language users have "intentional states" in order for the speech acts to be felicitous. The list of verbs that could be used for intentional states is fairly long, but for the purposes of this paper only three of them are judged to be relevant as intentional states for metaphorizing, namely:

> (i) believe: the user of metaphorizing has the belief that (s)he is suggesting (and not asserting) a state of affairs;
> (ii) desire: the user of metaphorizing has the desire to share(i) with the interactant; and

(iii) intend: the user of metaphorizing intends the interactant to recognise (i) and (ii), i.e. to calculate metaphorizing as such. Mac Cormac (1985: 176) argues that "metaphorizing must produce the recognition in the hearer of an intentionality in the author that the language be meaningful." This recognition is facilitated by the "rationalization principle."

(i) and (ii) above constitute the sincerity conditions of metaphorizing, while (iii) is its condition of success or satisfaction.

The problem of metaphor processing is part and parcel of the theory of communication. Working within such a frame, Sperber & Wilson (1995: 24) argue that "communication involves the publication and recognition of intentions." Metaphorizing should be no exception to this rule. But how is it possible to make one's intentions of metaphorizing recognised by an interactant? Adopting Sperber & Wilson's (1995: 50) view, I will consider metaphorizing as a case of "*ostensive* behaviour," i.e. behaviour "intended to attract ... attention to some phenomenon," for which "recognising the intention behind the ostention is necessary for efficient information processing." Metaphor does not leave interactants indifferent to it; it will always draw attention to itself. Assuming the "principle of relevance," metaphorizing must carry with it its own intention to make something manifest. Just how metaphorizing is an *ostention* is determined when interactants engage in inferencing. But, since metaphorizing is a matter of convention and intention, how can metaphor, then, be worked out by jointly using the linguistic conventions of language and makers' intentions? This could be answered by reference to Searle's duality between *sentence meaning* and *speaker meaning*.

5. A matter of Speaker Meaning or Sentence Meaning

In *The Labours of Hercules,*[15] Poirot, addressing his assistant Georges, says, referring to gossip, which was ruining, in a case he was trying to resolve, the career of Dr Oldfield, who was strongly suspected of having murdered his wife, "[a]nd the purpose of our journey is to destroy a monster with nine heads." Surprised, Georges replied quite naively, "Really, sir?" Sensing that Georges put it into his head that they were going to kill a real monster, Poirot hastened to correct him by saying, "I did not refer to a flesh and blood animal, Georges," which made Georges apologise with, "I misunderstood you, sir."

This short interchange between Poirot and Georges deserves dwelling upon. When Georges took a *monster with nine heads* to refer literally to a real monster, he was duly corrected since he missed Poirot's intended meaning

and reference displacement. The significance of Poirot's added remark is that metaphor could not be taken at face value, and interpreted as if the words making it up referred directly to their usual referents in the real world. Metaphor by definition disturbs the language's system of reference by extending or transcending, as Reddy (1969: 247) suggests, "the limits of referentiality." Given enough contextual data, the receiver of a metaphorical utterance should be willing to work it out as such, because metaphor is not something given on the surface of discourse but something that requires effort to be recognised as one and calculated accordingly. In Searle's terminology, metaphor is a case where *speaker meaning* and *sentence meaning* come apart by virtue of the fact that "often we mean more than we actually say" (Searle, 1969: 19). This distinction between sentence meaning and speaker meaning is interesting because they stand for conventional meaning and non-conventional or intended meaning respectively. Commenting on this distinction, Searle (1979: 92-93) argues that metaphor is "a special case, that is, of the problem of how it is possible to say one thing and mean something else, where one succeeds in communicating what one means even though both the speaker and the hearer know that the meanings of the words uttered by the speaker do not exactly and literally express what the speaker meant," and that "metaphorical meaning is always speaker's utterance meaning."

It would be spurious, however, to argue that metaphor is exclusively a case of speaker meaning, and sentence meaning has got nothing to do with it. Rather, as Searle (1979: 100) himself points out, "the main problem of metaphor is to explain how speaker meaning and sentence meaning are different and how they are, nevertheless, related." Sentence or word meaning is the starting point or the springboard that both triggers a metaphorical reading, and helps work it out by providing avenues along which salient attributes associated with word meaning in the source domain are applied to the target domain. Davidson (1980: 242) offers a better characterisation of the coextensiveness of the literal/word meaning, which is located in the speaker/hearer's mind and deactivated in the context, and the figurative/speaker meaning, which is activated in the context. He proposes that we could "imagine the literal meaning as latent, something that we are aware of, that can work on us without working in the context, while the figurative meaning carries the direct load." But how does metaphorizing relate to the outside world? Does it affect it or is it affected by the world?

6. A matter of World-to-Words or Words-to-World Fit

Searle (1983: 166) isolates five categories of illocutionary acts fundamental to linguistic communication, namely,

(i) *assertives,* where we tell our hearers (truly or falsely) how things are;
(ii) *directives,* where we try to get them to do things;
(iii) *commissives,* where we commit ourselves to doing things;
(iv) *declarations,* where we bring about changes in the world with our utterances; and
(v) *expressives,* where we express our feelings and attitudes.

It is interesting to note that though metaphorizing is, like most of what we do with words, rather world-changing than world-preserving, it is none of Searle's illocutionary categories.

Generally, the relation language entertains with the world is bidirectional. There are situations where the words match the outside world or the inner world of our feelings and emotions. In this case, language is said to be coincident with reality (objective and subjective), and judgements are, therefore, truth-motivated. Assertives and expressives exemplify this kind of use of language, and are said to have a "words-to-world direction of fit;" therefore, they are world-preserving. On the other hand, there are other cases where words seek to bring changes to objective reality, and the fit with the world is not dependent on truth claims but it is a function of the satisfaction of acts in the world. Such cases include directives, commissives, and declarations, which are said to have "a world-to-words direction of fit" (Vanderveken, 1990: 28), hence their world-changing dimension.

Without being any of Searle's illocutionary categories, metaphorizing, however, as Cavell (19: 495) suggests, "functions to change not so much what we believe as what we see," and as such it is a case of world-to-words fit on a par with *directives* and *commissives.* Following Loewenberg (1975: 233), it will be reiterated that metaphorizing is best seen as a "proposal m" to change the world, or as Alice suggests in *Through the Looking Glass,* a kind of "let's pretend that" with a view to transforming the world by evading it. In Harries (1979: 78) terms, "metaphor no longer has its telos in reality,", and "it still invites us to take leave from familiar reality." Ricoeur (1979: 150), on the other hand, suggests that "... a metaphor may be seen as a model for changing our way of looking at things, of perceiving the world."

Let us consider the metaphorical utterance, "Nuclear power plants leech the wounds of a sick economy.[16] Changing the hearer's beliefs about nuclear plants from miracle remedies to economic sickness to phoney panaceas is its perlocutionary force, which is facilitated by (i) the use of the obsolete verb, *leech,* to suggest ironically the incapacity of *leeches* to do any good without causing side-effects, and (ii) the association made between the kind of cure expected for a given economy and the debilitating connotation carried through the use *of leech* (Mac Cormac, 1985: 172). The outcome of these

associations and connotations intends to point out the danger of nuclear plants to our society. Clearly, beside trying to change the world by influencing the beliefs of interactants, metaphorizing depends for calculating intended meaning on a source richer than simply word entries in a dictionary.

7. A matter of Dictionary or Encyclopaedic Knowledge

The view of metaphor as pertaining to dictionary or encyclopaedia is reminiscent of the age-old distinction between a semantics and a pragmatics of metaphor. If we admit that, following Groenendijk & Stokhof (1978: 51), a theory of meaning should consist of a semantic and a pragmatic component, "where semantics is a theory of truth, pragmatics is a theory of correctness," quite obviously the study of metaphor should be within pragmatic theory. Eco (1983: 229) rejects a semantics (i.e. dictionary view) of metaphor, for dictionaries only give conceptual meanings, and argues for an encyclopaedic conception, which takes the form of "a polydimensional network of properties, in which some properties are the *interpretants* of others" (243).

Since metaphorizing breaks the barriers of referentiality in language, it is not really from dictionary knowledge (i.e. conceptual literal meaning) that "metaphor is calculated, but from a complete understanding, an enriched sort of meaning with all the pragmatic gaps filled in" (Morgan, 1979: 139). In other words, the kind of knowledge required is encyclopaedic. In an exchange with Lady Carmichael, Poirot addressed her saying, "I emulate my great predecessor Hercules. One of the labours of Hercules was the taming of the wild horses of Diomedes," to which she retorted, "Don't tell me you came here to train horses." But he replied, "The horses, Madam, are symbolic. They were the wild horses who ate human flesh."[17] Poirot's metaphor is instructive since it teaches Lady Carmichael intertextual knowledge of mythology she did not know, otherwise she would not have taken his words literally. This lady is shown to be blatantly lacking in two kinds of knowledge: (i) mythological knowledge (intertextual knowledge of an encyclopaedic kind) relating to Diomedes's sending his mares to devour passers-by, and (ii) awareness that Poirot, through analogising, is exploiting mythology to build an instance of metaphorizing for her to process. In this connection, Eco (1984: 270) claims that "for too long it has been thought that in order to understand metaphors it is necessary to know the code (or the encyclopaedia). The truth is that the metaphor is the tool that permits us to understand the encyclopaedia better. This is the knowledge that the metaphor stakes out for us." This is precisely the encyclopaedic knowledge that Poirot's metaphor carries with it to Lady Carmichael.

Concluding note

We are drawn to the conclusion that metaphor is first and foremost an instance of language use that cannot be dealt with in alethic terms because it is not liable to the same truth-conditional judgements as assertions. It is, thus, a speech act of "metaphorizing" on a par with Searle's speech act categories. Its illocutionary force should count as a proposal or a suggestion, making interactants share the proposal or suggestion; its perlocutionary force has to do with acting upon their beliefs, feelings, and knowledge. Metaphor is beyond compare, for the battery of disciplines it brings into action, the images it calls to mind, the associations it compels us to enter into, the amount of shared knowledge it presupposes, and the meanings it conjures up. As an instrument of thought, metaphor is at the heart of most of our conceptions of the world and our daily transactions with others. As a case of duality of meaning, metaphorizing requires the implementation of a complex of coextensive and exclusive pairs of dualities for its making and processing. There are constitutive pairs of dualities such as imagination-rationality (coextensive), assertion-speech act (exclusive), speaker meaning-sentence meaning (exclusive), and world-to-words fit-words-to-world fit (exclusive). There are, on the other hand, interpretative pairs that are crucial for its processing such as imagination-rationality, convention-intention (coextensive), dictionary-encyclopaedia (exclusive). The fact that there is overlap between constitutive and interpretative pairs could be explained by the requirements of metaphor making and processing.

It is by no means my intention to claim that the pairs selected in this paper to exemplify the bidimensional nature of metaphorizing are exhaustive. On the contrary, the richness of metaphor, represented by its inexhaustible nature, will determine other potential dualities for discussion or investigation. Some of these may include pairings such as, competence-performance, syntax-semantics, langue-parole, paradigmatic-syntagmatic, linguistic-non-linguistic, etc. It is my hope that further studies of other features of metaphorizing, adopting a similar or different perspective, will shed more light on this perplexing dimension of language. In short, the view of metaphor that has been developed in this paper regards it as a non-assertive "imaginative rationality" which seeks to change the world by influencing the beliefs of interactants. To work it out, interactants have to engage in an inferential encyclopaedic search to arrive at the makers' meaning (or intention) via the assumption that (s)he is observing the relevance and rationality principles.

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ENDNOTES

[1] I owe special thanks to Dr Degachi and Ridha Salhi, who kindly accepted to read a first draft of the present paper. However, responsibility for the contents is incumbent on the author.

[2] Translation mine.

[3] Quoted by Donald Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean." (London: 1980). 244-45.

[4] J.L. Morgan. "Observations on the Pragmatics of Metaphor." (London: 1979), 140.

[5] M. Reddy (1979: 290) calls orientational metaphor "conduit metaphor."

[6] J.S. Neaman & C.G. Silver. *Book of Euphemism* (Hertfordshire: 1995), 245. note that "by 1300, a *bird* or *burd* was a maiden or a girl and the term came into full flower from two separate earlier words, *byrde* and *burd.*

[7] *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: 1967). 136.

[8] Authors' own italics.

[9] G. Steen, *Understanding Metaphor in Literature* (New York/London: 1994), argues that linguistic metaphors do not "require the retrieval of a conceptual analogical mapping from long-term memory or the on-line construction of a novel analogical mapping during processing." 17.

[10] Agatha Christie, *The Labours of Hercules* (Middlesex: 1955), 82.

[11] Earl R. Mac Cormac, *A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor* (Cambridge: 1985), 176.

[12] Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass* (London: 1993), 120.

[13] Levenston (1976: 380) suggests "a modification of speech act theory, which recognizes the possibility that some utterances - besides locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary force - may also have *metaphorical* force."

[14] Earl R. Mac Cormac, *A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor* (Cambridge: 1986), 161.

[15] Agatha Christie, *The Labours of Hercules* (Middlesex: 1955), 42.

[16] Earl R. Mac Cormac, *A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor* (Cambridge: 1958), 171.

[17] Agatha Christie, *The Labours of Hercules* (Middlesex: 1955), 170.