

The heart and cultural embodiment in Tunisian Arabic

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Abstract

The Muslim concept of the heart as an instrument of understanding is evident in the teachings of the Koran (the Holy Book of Muslims). The heart in present-day T. Arabic, however, is almost exclusively the seat of emotions and cultural values, but hardly ever the instrument of thought and understanding, which are relegated to the *3aql* 'intellect'. Compared to other parts of the body, the heart is one of the most productive source domains for cultural conceptualizations in present-day T. Arabic. It is a CONTAINER for emotions, people, and objects that can enter it and leave it (IN-OUT schema). It is also capable of movement as in UP-DOWN (fear, panic, and worry), and WIDE-NARROW (worry, anxiety) image schemas. The heart provides metaphoric conceptualizations for love and sadness, and is also involved in conceptualizations of cultural values such as compassion, cruelty, courage, encouragement, generosity, hard work, kindness, laziness, meanness, (in)tolerance, conscience, remembrance, and so forth. The metonymic model of the heart's Idealized Cognitive Model describes the HEART FOR PERSON metonym, where the heart stands for the person. Compared to the conceptualizations of the heart in English, the heart in present-day T. Arabic is fairly restricted in scope. Indeed, while the heart in English describes a wider range of emotions, mental faculties, and cultural conceptualizations – equating this organ with the mind, thinking, understanding, etc. – in present-day T. Arabic the *qalb* 'heart' is largely dissociated from the mind, thinking, and understanding.

Keywords: heart, metaphor, metonymy, cultural model, cultural values, emotions, Tunisian Arabic.

1. Introduction

In the West, three models of the relation between body and mind can be isolated: (i) the humors model, which originated in the Greek culture and medicine and dominated Western thought up to the middle ages, with remnants still felt in some language use nowadays (Geeraerts and Grondelaars 1995); (ii) the body-mind split model, which was staunchly defended by Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle and systematized by Descartes, and which dominated Western philosophy for many centuries (Lakoff and Johnson 1999); and (iii) embodied thought model, which called

for a body-mind conflation (Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). In particular, the embodied model recently questioned the other two models, especially the body-mind split model.

The embodiment thesis is the backbone on which cognitive linguistics rests, and, perhaps, also on which its future will greatly depend. Drawing on the foundational work by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987), the literature on embodiment is growing bigger with the addition of specific volumes (Gibbs 2005; Ziemke et al., in press) and papers in journals (Sinha and Jensen de López 2000; Ziemke, 2003; Maalej 2004, 2007; Rohrer in press). Treatments of embodiment range from “embodiment as the physical substrate” (Rohrer in press) to structural coupling, historical embodiment, physical embodiment, ‘organismoid’ embodiment, organismic embodiment, and social embodiment (Ziemke 2003).

Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 102–4) investigated embodiment by distinguishing it into neural, phenomenological, and cognitive unconscious levels, which are all useful biological, experiential, and psycho-philosophical dimensions to embodiment. However, why do we have, for instance, to move in the direction of abstract forms of embodiment such as some of the types distinguished by Ziemke (2003) while rudimentary physiological and cultural forms of embodiment are out there awaiting treatment and recognition? It may seem a proliferation of terminology to add new concepts to the already existing ones (developed by Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Rohrer 1998 2001, Wilson 2002, Ziemke 2003). But cultural embodiment (Sinha and Jensen de López 2000; Maalej 2004), as another addition to the list, may turn out to be a promising alley into research on embodiment.

The conception of “cultural embodiment” offered here can be contrasted with the more physiological kind of embodiment. For instance, emotions are known in brain studies to be regulated by the hypothalamus brain structure, and controlled by the limbic system, which inhibits and excites them. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) call this kind of correlation between emotions and their correlative brain structures “neural embodiment.” Cultural embodiment occurs when physiological embodiment is departed from in significant ways, thus constructing a culturally-situated form of embodiment. Cultural embodiment in the sense used here is when the neural synchronization between emotions, on the one hand, and the hypothalamus and the limbic system, on the other, is ignored in a given culture, and when the control of experience and its conceptualization is permeated by culture. An important type of cultural embodiment is when the physiology, function, and neural basis of body parts are imaginatively exploited and hijacked by

culture. This conception of embodiment runs counter to “Lakoff & Johnson’s companion formulation that the physiological body grounds cultural thought and never the reverse” (Maalej 2007: 91).

Bodily organs used in emotions and endearment are commonplace in present-day T. Arabic. For instance, in the conceptualization of anger, body parts such as stomach, brain, nerve, bone, and testicle represent different degrees of anger such as *fqa3-l-i ma3id-ti* (He burst open my stomach), *Haraq-l-i muxx-i* (He caused my brain to burn), *Haraq-l-i 3Saab-i* (He burnt my nerves), *digdig-l-i 3Daam-i* (He broke my bones into small bits), and *nfaxx-im-l-i* (He inflated my testicles) (Maalej 2004). On the other hand, organs such as the heart, liver, and eye are commonly used in endearment in present-day T. Arabic, offering conceptualizations such as *ya ruH qalb-i* (hey, soul of my heart), *ya kibd-i* (hey, my liver) or *ya mamm-u 3ayn-i* (hey, pupil of my eye). Such conceptualizations show how the dearness of children is motivated by and correlated in present-day T. Arabic with the centrality of organs such as the heart, liver, and eye to perception.

The eye, in particular, is involved in a panoply of cultural conceptualizations such as love (e.g. *fiaan fi 3ainayya*: X is in my eyes: I love X so much), perseverance (e.g. *3mill l-milH fi 3ainay-h w bana daar*: He put salt into his eyes and built a house: He worked hard/persevered and managed to build a house), ambition (e.g. *3ain-ha kbiira/waas3a*: her eye is big/spacious: She is very ambitious), over-ambition (e.g. *l-3ain ma yimlaa-ha kaan d-dud w traab*: only worms and sand can fill the eye: Her/His ambition is outrageous), desire of coveting (e.g. *3ain-u 3ali-ha*: His eye is on her/it: He covets her/it), with the object of the desire of coveting being a woman, a car, a house, a plot of land, etc. The eye can also be found in memory-related conceptualizations as in *xalli-ha bain 3ainay-k* (Keep it between your eyes: Don’t forget it) or *jaat bain 3ainayya* (It came between my eyes: I remembered it). Remembrance is also conceptualized with the ear as in *xalli l-Hkaaya xirS fi wiDnik* (Keep that story as an earring: Never forget that story). However, except for eye and ear, bodily organs used as bearers of mental faculties are rare in present-day T. Arabic.

Each of the body parts used in the conceptualization of emotions, endearment, and cognitive faculties does not, however, constitute a cognitive/cultural model as complex and elaborate as that of the heart in present-day T. Arabic. The heart as a source domain has been attested in the expression of emotions in many cultures, including Chinese (Yu, 1995, 1998, 2003), English (Niemeier 1997, 2000), Hungarian (Kövecses, 2000, 2002), and Persian (Sharifian this volume), and so forth. Building on Maalej (2004,

2007), the present chapter shows the heart to be one of the most productive source domains in present-day T. Arabic for the conceptualization of emotions and feelings, describing a complex Idealized Cognitive Model (Lakoff 1982, 1987). Its image schematic structure shows the heart both as a static container for emotions, people, and objects, and a dynamic entity moving in space. Its metaphoric model establishes the heart as a repository for emotions and cultural values while its metonymic model describes the HEART FOR PERSON metonym, where the heart stands for the person.

The data on which this chapter is based comes from conventionalized expressions that take the heart as a target domain in present-day T. Arabic. It is based on the author's intuition as a native speaker, and it is crossed-checked informally by other natives of T. Arabic to minimize the risk of interference from English expressions. There exist for T. Arabic no sizeable written documents such as dictionaries, nor even oral corpora recorded or transcribed. Since T. Arabic is only a spoken language variety of Arabic, few documents¹ are found in written form. The only book that discusses Tunisian culture and traditions in the author's sub-dialect is Zouari and Charfi (1998), which has very little to offer about the heart in present-day T. Arabic.

The structure of the present chapter is as follows. Section 2 discusses conceptions of the heart in the Arab-Islamic culture, isolating a religion-based model and a secular one, arguing that present-day T. Arabic has opted for the latter as the basis of an Idealized Cognitive Model. Section 3 addresses the conceptualizations of the heart in present-day T. Arabic in light of the humoral doctrine, which is shown to offer very little toward accounting for the Idealized Cognitive Model of the heart in present-day T. Arabic. Section 4 deals with the image schematic conceptualizations of the heart in present-day T. Arabic, especially the CONTAINER schema with regard to anger, fear, and love emotions and some cultural values. Section 5 is devoted to the metaphoric conceptualizations of the heart in emotions, cultural values, and mental faculties. Section 6 discusses the metonymy of the HEART FOR PERSON.

2. The heart in the Arab-Islamic culture

In the Koran, the holy book of Muslims, the heart is a bearer of the mental faculty of understanding, though it is not used to think with as, for instance, is the heart in Chinese (Yu this volume). Consider the following examples from the Koran:

- (1) a. Many are the Ginns and men we have made for Hell: They have hearts wherewith they understand not, eyes wherewith they see not, and ears wherewith they hear not.²
- b. Do they not travel through the land, so that their hearts (and minds) may thus learn wisdom.³
- c. Verily in this is a Message for any that has a heart and understanding or who gives ear and earnestly witnesses (the truth).⁴

In (1a), it is clear through the use of the instrumental conjunction (where-with) that the heart is for understanding. Emphasis is added between brackets “(and minds)” by the translator in (1b) to the translation of *qulubun* (hearts), though it does not have a counterpart in the source text. The intention of the translator is to make sure that through this added (and conjoined) parallel to “their hearts” the heart in translation is interpreted by the reader as “their minds.” But the translator could have done away with the addition as understanding the heart as a mental faculty is very obvious in the cognitive verb “learn” predicated of hearts. The translator did the same in (1c), whereby he translated the word *qalb* (heart) by “heart and understanding.” This extra care on the part of the translator to render “heart” as “heart and understanding” in the translated text is taken to ensure that “heart” triggers the right translation equivalent intended in the Koran.

The heart-as-instrument-of-understanding metaphor is brought out more clearly when the heart is said to be veiled/locked/covered, thus precluding it from performing its main function of understanding, signaled in many places in the Koran:

- (2) a. But we have thrown veils on their hearts, so they understand it not.⁵
- b. Do they not then earnestly seek to understand the Qur’an, or are their hearts locked up by them?⁶
- c. And We put coverings over their hearts (and minds) lest they should understand the Qur’an, and deafness into their ears.⁷

There is, therefore, a relation of causality between lack of understanding and the heart being veiled, locked up, and covered, whereby the heart is clearly held responsible for the understanding task.

In (2c), the heart also shares the hearing function with the ear as an instrument of understanding. This is clearly understood if we add the necessary material to the elliptical construction used to avoid repetition: "... and [put] deafness into their ears" [lest they should understand the Koran]. Further confirmation of the involvement of audition and sight with the heart in the Koran, can be seen in the following contexts:

- (3) a. We could punish them (too) for their sins, and seal up their hearts so that they could not hear.⁸
- b. Truly it is not their eyes that are blind, but their hearts which are in their breasts.⁹

The heart in the Koran, therefore, does part of the mind's work as in Western culture. This can be inferred from the conceptual metonymy CONCRETE FOR ABSTRACT, which subsumes the specific conceptual metaphor, UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING AND HEARING, with the heart as the organ of understanding. This perceptive metaphor for understanding has been attested for Indo-European languages by Sweetser (1990: 28), who studied it under the generic Mind-as-Body metaphor.

Alongside the conceptual metaphor CONCRETE FOR ABSTRACT, where the heart qualifies as an organ of understanding, the Koran also makes use of the more universal heart-as-container metaphor. The container is signaled by the preposition *fī* (in) as in:

- (4) "And God knows (all) that is in your hearts: And God is All-Knowing, Most Forbearing."¹⁰

Obviously, the logic of the container presupposes contents filling it, which can be positive or negative. Man's heart, thus, may be filled with faith (Suras XLIX, LVIII), hypocrisy (Sura IX), ignorance (Sura XLVIII), indignation (Sura IX), peacefulness (Suras XLVIII), perversity (Sura III), rancor (Suras LIX), regret (Sura III), sickness (Suras V, VIII, IX, X, XXIV, XLVII, LXXIV), terror (Suras III, VIII, XXXIII, LIV). In particular, the heart being filled with sickness is very frequent in the Koran, whereby sickness is metaphorically conceptualized. As will be seen later on in the chapter, Tunisian culture conceives of the heart as being filled with different contents than does the Koran.

The prevalent religious system in Islam (which it shares with Christianity and Judaism) can be captured in the soul-body dichotomy, where the soul is heavenly, immaterial, and eternal while the body is earthly, material, and ephemeral:

(5) Body		Soul
Religious system		

Believers should aspire to shun things bodily in favor of things heavenly. As seen in the Koran, the heart and the intellect overlap at the bodily member of the dichotomy since both heart and intellect have biological foundations. However, compared to the Western body-mind dichotomy, Islam not only does not dichotomize the heart and the intellect, it explicitly states that both heart and intellect are bodily-based. As stated by al-Jawziyya (1998: 81), “according to Islamic medicine, the primary connection of the spirit (rûh) with the body is by the heart from which the spirit arises and is sent forth into the parts of the body” (quoted in MacPhee 2003: 66):

(6) <i>ruH</i>	<i>qalb</i>	<i>jasad</i>
(soul)	(heart)	(body)

Thus, under this religious model the heart acts like a mediator between the body and the soul.

The Arab culture has certainly been impacted by the teachings of Islam, which explains the existence of the heart-as-intellect metaphor in olden times. Indeed, the heart among Arabs had come to stand for the intellect as attested in *The Tongue of Arabs* (Ibn ManDur 1994), one of the famous books that documents linguistic practices in Arabic history. Reporting from authorities, Ibn ManDur (1994 Book I: 687) mentioned that “it is permissible in Arabic to say: ‘You have no heart’ and ‘Your heart is not with you’, i.e., ‘Your intellect/reason/mind is not with you,’ and ‘Where did your heart go?’, i.e. ‘Where did your intellect/reason/mind go?’ Others said: He who has a heart, i.e., understanding and reflection.”¹¹ There are certainly relics of ancient conceptions surviving in deeply religious communities, as documented by MacPhee (2003: 57) for the rural province of Errachidia, Morocco, where the heart is seen as “an organ and symbol that links spiritual, emotional, and physical experience.” However, the religious model of body versus soul and the medical body-spirit-heart model have been abandoned in present-day T. Arabic, thus giving rise to a secular system where

heart and intellect find themselves dichotomized. The heart and intellect have gradually been separated in the Arab culture probably under the influence of western philosophy, especially ancient Greek philosophy and rationalist-oriented Enlightenment in Europe, which was overwhelmingly translated and adopted into Islamic philosophy and Arab culture.

The religious conceptualization of the heart-as-understanding that existed in Arab-Muslim culture, therefore, seems to have been short-lived in many of the dialects of Arabic. As documented by MacPhee (2003: 65) for Morocco, “the growing influence of secularism and capitalist sentiments in the Sahara” are responsible for social disunity. Probably for similar political reasons, the religious component was lost in Tunisian culture, giving way to the secular heart-intellect dichotomy. The heart and the intellect in present-day T. Arabic have come apart so completely that those who think with their hearts are deemed irrational as in:

- (7) *flaan* *yxammim* *b-qalb-u*
 X think-IMPERF with heart his
 X thinks with his heart.
 ‘X is quite irrational.’

As a result, the heart has kept a very low profile in the conceptualization of mental faculties in present-day T. Arabic, but occupies a preponderant place in the conceptualization of emotions and cultural values, describing an Idealized Cognitive Model of the heart image schematically, metaphorically, or metonymically.

Curiously enough, thinking to the self is achieved with the help of the soul or between the self and the soul as in the following examples:

- (8) a. *xammimt* *bain-i* *w bain* *ruH-i*
 [I] think-PERFECT between myself and between soul my
 ‘I thought between myself and my soul.’
 I thought to myself.
- b. *xammimt* *m3a* *ruH-i*
 [I] think-PERFECT with soul my
 ‘I thought with my soul.’
 I thought to myself.

The “with” in (8b) expresses the notion of instrumentality rather than that of accompaniment, where the soul is conceptualized as carrying some of the burden of thinking with the self. Such a soul-as-understanding metaphor seems to be the only religious survivor in present-day T. Arabic.

3. The heart in Islamic medicine

Burnett (2004), a professor of the History of Islamic Influences in Europe, presents Avicenna’s medicine as built on the four humors:

The basis of this medicine was ‘humoral pathology’, i.e. an understanding that the human body consisted of four humours: blood, yellow bile (choler), phlegm, and black bile (melancholy), which were related to other ‘quaternaries’: the elements air, fire, earth and water; the seasons spring, summer, autumn and winter; the ages of man, childhood, youth, middle age and old age; and the triplicities of the signs of the zodiac. Good health depended on the four humours being well-balanced in respect to each other (the Greek term is ‘eukrasia’ – a ‘good mixing’, ‘temperament’ or ‘complexion’).

Winsvold (2005) argues that “the success of the Arabian medicine can be credited for their endorsement of Greek and Roman medicine at a time when this knowledge was lost to the West.” Winsvold (2005) adds that medicine was practiced according to the:

Six Necessities’: *Air* (including climate, soil etc.), *Food, Bodily rest and movement, Sleep, Emotional rest, Excretion and retention*. Any of these were believed to influence the temperament. This meant that people living in one climate would have a different temperament than others. Food or even substances surrounding a man, such as wood, brick or metal, would influence his health, and thus both be potential explanations for disease and form the basis of a cure.

However, the question that must be raised is whether the theory of the four humors can be traced back in cultural conceptualizations of the heart in T. Arabic.

As presented by Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995: 156) and Yu (this volume), the humoral tradition includes physiological, psychological, and medical aspects. Physiologically, the four humors (yellow bile, black bile, phlegm, and blood) regulate the body’s well-being. Psychologically, they

generate corresponding temperaments (angry, fearful, phlegmatic, and sanguine), depending on the dominant humor available to the body. Medically, the humoral theory identifies diseases and their symptoms and prescribes therapies to regulate the body's imbalance. Arguing against the conceptualization of anger as the HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995: 174) claim that anger "has undergone the influence of the humoral doctrine, but that the original set of humoral expressions has been subjected to a process of reinterpretation and obsolescence," whereby the humoral expressions have been, under scientific influences, corrected as physiological ones.

To address the heart in present-day T. Arabic, the system of humoral correspondences is reproduced from Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995: 158) in the following table:

Table 1. The system of humoral correspondences

	Phlegm	Black bile	Yellow bile	Blood
Characteristic	Cold and moist	Cold and dry	Warm and dry	Warm and moist
Element	Water	Earth	Fire	Air
Temperament	Phlegmatic	Melancholic	Choleric	Sanguine
Organ	Brain/bladder	Spleen	Liver/stomach	Heart
Color	White	Black	Yellow	Red
Taste	Salty	Sour	Bitter	Sweet
Season	Winter	Autumn	Summer	Spring
Wind	North	West	South	East
Planet	Moon	Saturn	Mars	Jupiter
Animal	Turtle	Sparrow	Lion	Goat

Originating in translations of western concepts, names for the four humors do exist in Modern Standard Arabic as *?an-nafsu l-balRamiyyatu* (phlegmatic self), *?an-nafsu is-Safraawiyyatu* (choleric self), *?an-nafsu s-sawdaawiyyatu* (melancholic self), and *?an-nafsu d-damawiyyatu* (sanguine self). However, unlike English and French, present-day T. Arabic does not seem to include the nominal concepts that stand for the humors (except, of course, blood), nor any of the adjectives derived from the four humors that designate the temperaments in the theory. Practically, the humoral theory no longer has an existence in the mind of speakers of T. Arabic.

Present-day T. Arabic does include expressions such as *damm-u sxun* (His blood is hot/He is hot-blooded), to mean that he is easily irritable, and *damm-u baarid* (His blood is cold: He is not irritable). Such expressions might be argued to evoke the humoral doctrine. However, a close scrutiny reveals a skewing of correspondences. For instance, in *damm-u sxun*, although blood is hot not just warm, the person having that kind of disposition is not sanguine but choleric in present-day T. Arabic. In *damm-u baarid*, there is a problem fitting the expression either under phlegm or black bile since both of them are cold (and it does not fit under blood as blood does not associate with coldness). Granting that it can fit under either one, there is still a problem of correspondence between blood, on the one hand, and phlegm or black bile, on the other. Blood associates with the heart while phlegm as coldness associates with the brain/bladder and black bile with spleen. If one believes, as do Geeraerts and Grondelaers (1995: 163), that blood here stands for yellow bile and phlegm because blood carries all humors, then it can be argued that these expressions have come into being under the influence of the humoral theory, and have subsequently been reinterpreted physiologically later on in history. The same problem persists with expressions using the heart as a landmark as in the following expressions describing various degrees of heartburn: *3and-i n-naar 3ala qalb-i* (I have fire on my heart), *qalb-i yaHraq ki n-naar* (My heart is burning like fire), *3and-i sihraaja naar 3ala qalb-i* (I have a flame of fire on my heart). Fire (and its derivatives burning and flames) associates with liver and stomach in the theory while in these expressions in present-day T. Arabic it is in/on to the heart.

There also exists in present-day T. Arabic the expression *qalb-u baarid* (His heart is cold: He is a lazy person) discussed earlier in connection with laziness/idleness. The laziness-as-coldness metaphor does not evoke phlegmatic placidity, which is often contrasted to the choleric temper associated with yellow bile. Rather, coldness here is contrasted to dynamism and activity. This may be attributed to the metaphor INTENSITY IS HEAT (LACK OF INTENSITY IS COLDNESS), as discussed in Kövecses (2005: 27). Coldness acts as a source domain for many experiential domains in present-day T. Arabic such as in *riiq baarid* (cold saliva: silly talk), *janab-ha baarid minn-u* (Her side is cold about him: She does not trust him), *ydai-h baarda* (His hands are cold: He does not have the courage to do anything), *wja33 baarid* (cold labor: intermittent pain during labor), *3iiša baarda* (cold life: spice-free food), *wTaa baarda* (cold land: fairly infertile land), *s-suq baarda* (cold market: bear market), *liqma*

baarda (cold mouthful: food that one does not work or tire for), *s-tiqbaal baarid* (cold welcome), and so forth. (Zouari and Charfi 1998: 33–4). Presumably, such expressions do not suggest phlegm or any synonym of it, especially those expressions that talk about food, life, labor, market, and land. The lack of correlation between coldness in these conceptualizations and phlegm suggests cultural mappings between coldness and expected qualities of food, welcome, life, labor, market, and land that are experienced and judged to be below a certain level of normalcy in the culture. As a result, the humoral theory does not seem to motivate or predict emotions and cultural values addressed in the current chapter.

Such a cultural explanation of these well-established correlations between the experiential domain of coldness and various experiences points to cultural specificities. In other words, if it were the case that the four humors governed conceptualizations, all cultures would have had the very same conceptualizations of experience, and we know this is true of only a restricted number of experiences across cultures. For instance, English-speaking people conceptualize the present-day T. Arabic “cold talk” as stupid or silly talk, “cold side” as distrust, “cold land” as fairly infertile land, “cold labor” as having little labor pain, “cold market” as bear market, and so on. These conceptualizations are evidence that our cognition is fundamentally “built for encultured variation” (Levinson 1996: 177). However, this does not mean that cultures do not share some conceptualizations as in *s-tiqbaal baarid* and *s-tiqbaal Haarr* in present-day T. Arabic and “cool welcome” and “warm welcome” in English.

The following sections present cultural conceptualizations of the heart in present-day T. Arabic following Lakoff’s (1982, 1987) theory of categorization known as Idealized Cognitive Model.

4. The image-schematic model of the heart in T. Arabic

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff and Turner (1989) isolated four semantically autonomous domains that serve as metaphoric grounding for semantically non-autonomous concepts. Such cognitive domains, which seem to be pervasive in many cultures, include spaces, substances, objects, and containers. In many (if not all) cultures, the heart is not only associated with emotions but receives them as its contents, which makes it a CONTAINER for them. The preposition *fi* (in) in present-day T. Arabic shows the heart’s containment dimension in:

- (9) a. *qult* *fi qalb-i*
 [I] say-PERFECT in heart my
 ‘I said in my heart.’
 I said to myself.
- b. *yxalli/yxabbi/yaxzin* *fi qalb-u*
 [he] keep/hide/store-IMPERF in heart his
 ‘He keeps/hides/stores everything in his heart.’
 He is too secretive.
- c. *HaaTiT/3aamil* *fi qalb-u*
 [he] keep/do-IMPERF in heart his
 ‘He keeps things in his heart.’
 He is anxious/worried.

In (9a), things that are said to the self are kept in the heart as a secret chamber. In (9b-c), the heart is a storehouse or hiding place, tightly preserving positive and negative emotions and information.

The logic of containers predicts that the heart can be full or empty of some contents as in:

- (10) a. *qalb-u* *m3ibbi* *3aliy-ya*
 heart his full on me
 ‘His heart is full about me.’
 He strongly picks at me.
- b. *qalb-u* *ma fi-š* *raHma*
 heart his no in not compassion/mercy
 ‘There is no compassion in his heart.’
 He is/is not compassionate/merciful.

In (10a), the heart is full of bias against the speaker while in (10b) the heart is empty of mercy.

In Maalej (2004: 59–60), it was shown that in present-day T. Arabic the heart, alongside the body, is a container for anger. Because anger is considered a liquid filling the body or the heart, anger as a liquid in a container may slosh, fill up, or may explode as a consequence of incapacity to take it in, etc, as in:

- f. *Haal-u yDawwib* *l-qalb*
state his melt-IMPERFECT the heart
‘His condition makes the heart melt.’
- g. *qalb-i* *miswi (w miqli)* *3alii-ha*
heart my roast and fry-PERFECT-PASSIVE on her
‘My heart is roasted and fried about her.’
I am very sad about her condition.

Caring for others in present-day T. Arabic is imagined to occasion a split between the heart and the body or the self as in (15a), whose conceptual metaphor is CARING FOR OTHERS IS LEAVING ONE’S HEART BEHIND FOR THEIR SAKE. Based on the metonymy HEART FOR THE PERSON, this conceptualization creates a Divided-Person metaphor (Lakoff 1996: 103).

In present-day T. Arabic, the mildest form of compassion for others is represented by the conceptual metaphor, HAVING PITY IS FEELING PAIN IN ONE’S HEART, whose linguistic counterpart is in (15b). Having pity for someone is not something that one does for them but it is something that happens to one’s heart as a result of its being affected by people’s states or situations. Various other ways to express one’s pity/compassion towards people may include the conceptualizations in (15c-f) above. No English equivalents are provided for them because these conceptualizations are highly culturally-constructed. It takes a lot of imagination to conceptualize pity in the way it is done in present-day T. Arabic. In (15c), the kind of pain felt as a result of pity is the result of a knife cutting the heart into pieces, which presupposes the letting of blood that is at the origin of pain. In (15d), the pain comes as a result of the heart turning into small crumbs, which suggests a painful disintegration of the heart. In (15e), the heart undergoes a further transformation turning it into henna powder – a fine form of grinding, suggesting extreme pain and concern. In (15f), the pain to the heart caused by pity simply makes it melt. Clearly, these expressions reflect the metaphor, PITY CAUSES CHEMICAL/MECHANICAL TRANSFORMATIONS TO THE HEART, where the degree of pain felt by the speaker is proportional to the degree of sufferance the affected person endures.

Another transformation of the heart occurs to it in sadness/sorrow in (15g), whereby it is profiled as undergoing a mutation that usually occurs to food while it is cooking. Interestingly, roasting and frying presuppose heat of fire in the heart, which is a way of imagining one’s heart as cooking by

roasting and/or frying. Such roasting and frying of the heart may evoke the conceptual metaphor, BEING SAD IS HAVING ONE'S HEART COOKED, not in the sense that we eat it as food, but in the sense that what happens to it in sorrow is similar to what happens to food as it is being prepared. As a structuring domain, food has been attested in many areas of experience such as sex and lust (Emanatian 1995), and women in many cultures (Maalej 2001), and so forth.

While the image-schematic model of the heart in present-day T. Arabic involves containment and movement in space, the metaphoric model with emotions mainly describes transformations, which occasions changes of state to the heart ranging from being cooked by roasting or frying, being cut into pieces, or ground into powder, to completely melting away.

5.2. The heart in the target domain of cultural values

Apart from featuring as an important source domain in the conceptualization of emotions in present-day T. Arabic, the heart is at the center of the conceptualization of many cultural values, which manipulate the heart according to various pairs of antonyms such as soft/tough, strong/weak, small/big, black/white, cold/warm, live/dead, and so forth. Niemeier (2000: 205) captures the transformations that occur to the heart in English in the conceptual metaphor, THE HEART IS A MANIPULABLE OBJECT.

Before dealing with these pairs, it is useful to address the polysemy of the heart in present-day T. Arabic as in the following metaphor:

- (16) *ma 3and-him-š qalb*
 no with them not heart
 'They have no heart.'
 They are heartless.

Contextualized, heartlessness represents either laziness or indifference. Laziness is invoked in the following proverbs:

- (17) a. *l-qalb* *ma ySiir* *kaan l-ir-rHa*
 the heart no become-IMPERF only to the grinder
 'The heart can only be made to the hand-operated grinder.'

- b. *illi ma fii-h qalb ymut smiin m3aš3aš*
 who no in him heart die-IMPERF fat fatten-PASSIVE
 'He who does not have a heart will die so fat.'

The moral of the proverb in (17a) is that love for work can only be self-generated. In (17b), an idle person is teased about his fatness, which is a metonymy for lack of physical exercise.

However, to profile other moral/cultural values, the heart is manipulated in various ways. Compassion, for instance, is conceptualized as softness of the heart while cruelty is conceptualized as hardness or toughness:

- (18) a. *qalb-u rqiiq*
 heart his affectionate
 'His heart is affectionate.'
 He is kind.
- b. *qalb-u SHiiH*
 heart his hard
 'His heart is hard.'
 He is unfeeling/cruel.

Compassion and affection are, thus, correlated with softness of the heart in present-day T. Arabic, and cruelty correlates with different degrees of toughness. In (18b), the degree of toughness is mild, giving rise to a moderate kind of cruelty. But cruelty can be conceptualized as having *qalb kaasaH* (a tough heart) or *qalb Hjarr* (a heart of stone), which are shared by English's *hardness of heart*, *heart of marble*, *heart of iron*, *heart of stone*, and so forth. (Niemeier 2000: 201) and Hungarian's hardness or toughness of the heart (Kövecses personal communication). The experiential mapping of soft/tough things (such as foods and non-foods) in the socio-physical environment onto affection/cruelty is captured in the conceptual metaphors, SOFT IS GOOD and TOUGH IS BAD.

Apart from softness and toughness, the heart is conceptualized as changeable in degree of strength or weakness as in the following cases:

- (19) a. *qalb-u qwiyy*
 heart his strong
 'His heart is strong.'
 He is courageous/He has a lot of courage.

- b. *qalb-u D3iif*
 heart his weak
 ‘His heart is weak.’
 He lacks courage.

If the material the heart is made of is strong, a person is said to have courage to confront hardships as in (19a). Weakness in the heart profiles lack of courage as in (19b).

The heart in present-day T. Arabic is not only conceptualized as changeable in texture (toughness/strength, softness/weakness), but also in size as in the following cases:

- (20) a. *qalb-u kbiir*
 heart his big
 ‘His heart is big.’
 He is generous.
- b. *qalb-u SRIir*
 heart his small
 ‘His heart is small.’
 He is mean.

Bigness of the heart as in (20a) is conceptualized as generosity, and smallness as meanness as in (20b). This correlation between bigness and generosity and smallness and meanness owes its existence to the conceptual metaphors, BIG IS GOOD and SMALL IS BAD. The heart changing in size was also noted for English by Niemeier (2000: 200), who captures it in CHANGEABLE IN SIZE.

Beside the change of texture, strength, and size, the heart in present-day T. Arabic is also conceptualized as changing in color as in:

- (21) a. *qalb-u abyad*
 heart his white
 ‘His heart is white.’
 He is tolerant.
- b. *qalb-u akHal*
 heart his black
 ‘His heart is black.’
 He is spiteful (Maalej 1999).

Along with change of texture, strength, size, and color, the heart in present-day T. Arabic is also conceptualized as changing in temperature as in:

(24) a. *qalb-u baarid*

heart his cold

‘His heart is cold.’

He is idle/lazy.

b. *qalb-u*

heart his

yaHraq

burn-IMPERFECT

3ala

on

xidmt-u

work his

‘His heart is burning for his job.’

He is a conscientious worker.

In (24a), coldness is a metaphor for lack of life or death, which stands for laziness. The phenomenological, felt sense of the physiological warmth of the heart is turned into a cultural metaphor for laziness as coldness. The laziness-as-coldness-of-the-heart metonymy-motivated metaphor dispenses with the heart’s warmth as a physiological necessity, thus profiling lack of warmth in the heart as a typically cultural value. As Fauconnier and Turner (2002: 300) showed convincingly, HEAT OF THE BODY is not physiological, but a metaphor transferring heat to the human body.

In (24b), however, the conceptualization of industriousness takes advantage of the phenomenological, felt sense of physiological warmth of the body, turning it into fire burning in the heart. The industriousness-as-fire-in-the-heart augments, so to speak, the heart’s warmth as a physiological necessity, thus profiling it as a typically cultural value. Burning as industriousness, however, is sometimes profiled ironically as in:

(25) *qalb-u*

heart his

yaHraq

burn-IMPERFECT

barša

a lot

‘His heart is burning a lot.’

He could not care less about work.

The ironical use of *yaHraq barša* (burning a lot) in fact suggests its total opposite – that the heart is not burning with industriousness. Fire that metaphorically is supposed to power a person’s heart can be extinguished, extinguishing with it the cultural value of industriousness.

In all the aforementioned conceptualizations where the heart’s texture, strength, size, color, and temperature are manipulated, the heart is concep-

tualized as effecting a change of state, which profiles it culturally as a passive participant. However, the heart can also assume a more active role, thus controlling the self as in:

(26) a. *qalb-i* *kalaan-i*
 heart my eat-PERFECT me
 ‘My heart ate me.’
 I had a pang of conscience.

b. *qalb-i* *ma* *kalaan-i-š*
 heart my no eat-PERFECT me not
 ‘My heart did not eat me.’
 I had no pang of conscience.

In (26a), the physiological experience of eating is mapped onto the more mental experience of conscientiousness, where the heart becomes the eater and the body the object of the eating process. Inferentially, the phenomenological, felt sense of the physiological rest (i.e. the non-eating state) of the heart is when the self is doing things conscientiously. However, when the self starts doing things non-conscientiously, the heart finds itself in the physiological necessity of eating the self, profiling this physiological eating as a typically cultural value, which can be captured in the conceptual metaphor CONSCIENCE IS WHEN THE HEART EATS THE SELF or CONSCIENCE IS WHEN THE SELF BECOMES EDIBLE TO THE HEART. The counterpart of conscientiousness is rendered via the negative as in (26b), where the self does not think that it is being lazy.

Another conceptualization of laziness versus conscientiousness/industriousness is profiled through the death/life of the heart, where the heart stands for the person having that heart, as in:

(27) a. *qalb-u mayyit*
 heart his dead
 ‘His heart is dead.’
 He is idle/lazy.

b. *qalb-u Hayy*
 heart his alive
 ‘His heart is alive.’
 He is industrious.

Abiding by the metonymy of HEART FOR PERSON, the conceptual metaphor in (27a) could be LACK OF ENERGY/INDUSTRIOUSNESS IN AN INDIVIDUAL IS BEING DEAD and in (27b) PRESENCE OF ENERGY/INDUSTRIOUSNESS IN AN INDIVIDUAL IS BEING ALIVE.

To sum up this section, as Niemeier (2000: 200) captured regarding size in CHANGEABLE IN SIZE for English, a characteristic of the Idealized Cognitive Model of the heart in present-day T. Arabic is its manipulability in terms of degree of texture, strength, size, color, temperature, status, and vitality. Owing to the gradable nature of the linguistic categories used to conceptualize cultural values metaphorically in present-day T. Arabic, the values themselves should not be seen as absolute pairs with two poles, the negative and the positive. Rather, the values are graded so that they constitute a cline, and are modified by quantifiers such as *barša* (a lot) and *šwayya* (a little bit). For instance, laziness can be talked about in terms of degree as in *qalb-u baarid šwayya* (He is a bit lazy), *qalb-u baarid* (He is lazy), *qalb-u baarid barša* (He is very lazy). Sometimes, the quantifier *barša* (a lot) is reduplicated to create another degree of laziness such as in *qalb-u baarid barša barša* (He is extremely lazy).

6. The metonymic model of the heart Idealized Cognitive Model in T. Arabic

As seen so far, the picture of the Idealized Cognitive Model drawn by the heart in present-day T. Arabic profiles it image schematically not only as a CONTAINER, but also as MOVING and MOVABLE in the bodily space, capable of IN-OUT and UP-DOWN movements. This dynamism is captured via directional metaphors that extend the IN-OUT and UP-DOWN image schemas metaphorically. Metaphorically, the heart's characteristic property is CHANGEABILITY and MANIPULABILITY. This kind of understanding is termed "indirect understanding via metaphor" by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 178), who argue that directional structure is imposed via directional metaphors as projections of image schemas such as the ones dealt with in Section 4 above, whereas the structure of experience is imposed via structural metaphors as in Section 5 above.

To complement the discussion of the MOVABILITY and the CHANGEABILITY or MANIPULABILITY of the heart Idealized Cognitive Model in present-day T. Arabic, we need to address its inherent metonymic model. But before doing that, some reflection about metonymy as a

conceptual phenomenon is needed. Metonymy is not simply a matter of reference or words substituting for others in the lexicon as traditional accounts had it. Langacker (2000: 199) argues that “a metonymic expression serves as a reference point affording mental access to the desired target (i.e. the entity actually being referred to).” Kövecses and Radden (1998: 39) define metonymy as “a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or ICM.” Talking about the cognitive and communicative function of metonymy, Langacker (2000: 199) argues that “metonymy allows an efficient reconciliation of two conflicting factors: the need to be accurate, i.e. of being sure that the addressee’s attention is directed to the intended target; and our natural inclination to think and talk explicitly about those entities that have the greatest cognitive salience for us.”

Thus, MENTAL ACCESSIBILITY realized via metonymy can be added to the picture. Indeed, the most prevalent metonymy is the HEART FOR PERSON, where the heart provides this mental accessibility to the person possessing the heart as in:

(28) a. *l-qalb* *3al l-qalb*
 the heart on the heart.
 ‘The heart is on the heart.’
 Two hearts that beat as one.

b. *qalb-u* *baahi/Tayyib*
 heart his good/fine
 ‘His heart is good/fine.’
 He is kind.

c. *qalb-u xaayib*
 heart his bad/ugly
 ‘His heart is bad/ugly.’
 He is unkind/cruel.

The HEART FOR PERSON metonymy is motivated by the fact that the heart in (28a) is “salient and easily coded” (Langacker 2000: 199) in the sense that the heart inhabits an individual, which it can evoke. In (28b–c), the question is not about the metaphoricity of the heart as good or bad, but the salience between the heart and its possessor.

In the context of emotional conceptualization, an important candidate for the metonymy of HEART FOR PERSON is love in present-day T. Arabic as in:

- (29) *ʒand-i* *qalb illi* *yHibb-ha*
 With me heart that love-IMPERF her
 ‘I have a heart that loves her.’
 I love her so much.

It is socially motivated to avoid talking directly about one’s love in public in the Tunisian culture. Using a metonymy violates “the need to be accurate” (Langacker, 2000: 199), and allows speakers to hide behind it, knowing that the heart has “the greatest cognitive salience” with the person (Langacker 2000: 199). Conversely, present-day T. Arabic does not have the metaphor ‘breaking someone’s heart,’ although Tunisians talk of “broken heart” in cases of disappointment such as in the proverb, *?in-naaSri l-maxSur w l-qalb l-miksUr* (lost money and broken heart), which means that money wasted brings disappointment.

Very often the relation between metaphor and metonymy is indeterminate (Riemer 2002: 386), that is the demarcation line between the two may be fuzzy. Metonymy and metaphor may co-occur, creating MENTAL ACCESSIBILITY and MANIPULABILITY of the heart in present-day T. Arabic as in the conceptualization of greed and gratification (sexual or other):

- (30) a. *qalb-u jiiʒaan*
 heart his hungry
 ‘His heart is hungry.’
 He is greedy/He is insatiable.
- b. *qalb-u ſibʒaan*
 heart his satiated
 ‘His heart is satiated.’
 He is satiated.

MENTAL ACCESSIBILITY is captured through the metonymy, HEART FOR PERSON. Metonymically, the heart’s hunger and gratification stand for the hungry or gratified person. However, when the person is substituted for the heart, this creates metaphors such as, *The person is hungry*. The

linguistic metaphor can be captured in the conceptual metaphor, GREED IS HUNGER or the more generic metaphor DESIRE IS HUNGER. Conversely, social gratification is profiled in hunger terms as in (30a). The negative evaluation of a socially greedy person is captured in the T. Arabic proverb, *xuḏ-ha min yidd šib3aan iḏa jaa3 w ma taaxiḏhaaš min yidd jii3aan iḏa šbi33* (Take it from the hand of a satisfied person if he gets hungry and don't take it from a hungry person if he becomes satisfied). Inferentially, the heart here becomes the stomach for greed and satisfaction.

One dimension of this indeterminacy has been interpreted as metonymic motivation for metaphoric mappings (Barcelona 2000). Forgetfulness is a form of malfunction of the mind, leading up to a defective memory, but in present-day T. Arabic one forgets with one's heart as in:

- (31) *qalb-i ?a3ma*
heart my blind
'My heart is blind.'
I am forgetful.

It should be noted that in the metaphoric interpretation the blindness of the heart in present-day T. Arabic is forgetfulness, which presupposes that one of the heart's function is its capacity to remember. This can be captured in the conceptual metaphor, REMEMBERING IS SEEING, which is related to the more generic KNOWING IS SEEING; if my heart is blind, I do not remember things. In the metonymic interpretation, the heart is interpreted as contiguous with the person as in HEART FOR PERSON. This seems to be consistent with the conception of blindness as encoded in the Koran in (3b) above, which is repeated here for the sake of convenience:

- (32) Truly it is not their eyes that are blind, but their hearts which are in their breasts.¹²

However, blindness of the heart in the Koranic conception is incapacity to understand while this Tunisian conception has to do with forgetfulness. Niemeier (2000: 208) expressed fascination as to how memory, which is normally associated with the head/brain comes to be associated with the heart in expressions like "learn something by heart." If this unscientific match between heart and memory means something, it serves to suggest that this model of the heart in English and present-day T. Arabic has a cultural basis.

In sum, the metonymic model of the heart is realized via simple metonymy having potential metaphoric counterparts, or via a metaphor-metonymy continuum. The correlative work that these do is ACCESSIBILITY via the HEART FOR PERSON metonymy or metonymic ACCESSIBILITY in conjunction with metaphoric CHANGEABILITY.

7. Conclusion

The chapter has tried to demonstrate that the heart in present-day T. Arabic is a productive source domain, profiling most emotions and culture-specific values. The cognitive/cultural model of the heart reflects these cultural conceptualizations exploiting image schema, metaphor, and metonymy. Logically, since the heart is seen as the locus of emotions and values, it is culturally affected by these emotions and values.

The cultural model of the heart, therefore, qualifies as an Idealized Cognitive Model (Lakoff 1982, 1987). Its propositional structure shows the heart to be an affected participant in interpersonal relations and an affecting participant across the image schemas, metaphors, and metonymies that profile it. As seen in the body of the chapter, the heart is conceptualized image schematically as a CONTAINER and in UP-DOWN and IN-OUT schemas. This has been captured in the directional metaphor, THE HEART IS MOVING/MOVABLE. It also offers various metaphoric conceptualizations that profile emotions in terms of CHANGEABILITY or MANIPULABILITY of the heart. Apart from these conceptualizations, the heart yields a HEART FOR PERSON metonymy, providing ACCESSIBILITY of the body/self through the heart.

As a source domain for emotions and cultural values, the heart is an excellent illustration of the cultural embodiment of the mind. If Johnson (1987) is right in claiming that the embodied mind yields embodied meaning, imagination, and reasoning, the present chapter extends embodiment to culture, thus suggesting that cognition is not just embodied but culturally embodied. Imaginative structures such as image schemas, metaphor, and metonymy contribute to cultural imagination, which motivates what Maalej (2004, 2007) called “cultural embodiment,” which is a kind of embodiment mediated and motivated by cultural imagination.

To further corroborate the import of culture in conceptualization, reference has to be made to Palmer (1996: 36), who considers cultural linguistics as “primarily concerned not with how people talk about some objective

reality, but with how they talk about the world that they themselves imagine.” The present-day T. Arabic culture has imagined generosity to be bigness of the heart, meanness smallness, tolerance whiteness, spite blackness, compassion/mercy softness, indifference toughness, and so forth. But cultures do not randomly talk about the world as they imagine it; each culture organizes itself according to “its own priorities of grouping and differentiation” (Palmer 1996: 227).

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Notes

1. As far as I know, the only written documents in T. Arabic that exist are a few plays by Taoufik Jebali (*Night's Talk*, 1997), Mohamed Idriss (*Ismail Pacha*, 1997), Fadhel Jaidi (*Familia*, 1997), etc.
2. Sura VII (A'raaf, or Heights), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), pp. 396–97.
3. Sura XXII (Hajj, or The Pilgrimage), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 863.
4. Sura L (qaf, or The Matter has been decreed), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 1417.
5. Sura VI (An'am, or Cattle), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 289.
6. Sura XLVII (Muhammad, or The Prophet), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 1385.
7. Sura XVII (Bani Isra'il, or The Children of Israel), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 707.
8. Sura VII (A'raaf, or Heights), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 371.
9. Sura XXII (Hajj, or The Pilgrimage), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 864.

10. Sura XXXIII (Ahzab, or The Confederates), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 1123.
11. Translation mine.
12. Sura XXII (Hajj, or The Pilgrimage), translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali (1938), p. 864.

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