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Translation of Metonymy in the Holy Qur'an:
A Comparative, Analytical Study

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جامعة الملك سعود

كلية الدراسات العليا

قسم اللغة الإنجليزية و آدابها

ترجمة المجاز المرسل في القرآن الكريم:

دراسة تحليلية مقارنة

قدمت هذه الرسالة استكمالاً لمتطلبات درجة الدكتوراه في قسم اللغة الإنجليزية و آدابها بكلية

الآداب بجامعة الملك سعود.

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
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المخلص

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى اكتشاف الطريقة المثلى لترجمة المجازات المرسلية القرآنية من خلال تقييم الطرق التي نقل بها المجاز المرسل في خمس ترجمات للقرآن الكريم. تتألف البيانات التي جرى تحليلها من ثلاثين مجازاً تمثل عشرة أنواع من المجاز المرسل. و يتبع تقييم الترجمات نهجاً لغوياً يركز على التحليل و المقارنة. ويتم تحديد مدى نجاح كل طريقة للترجمة على أساس دقة التركيب الناتج و مفهوميته.

و قد بينت الدراسة أن الترجمة الحرفية هي أفضل طريقة لترجمة المجازات المرسلية القرآنية لأنها تحافظ على المعاني المباشرة و غير المباشرة معاً، مع أن من الممكن لهذه الطريقة أن تمتنع بسبب قيود لغوية أو ثقافية، و في هذه الحالة يجب ترجمة المجاز المرسل إلى معناه المباشر مع مراعاة التعويض عن تأثيره المفقود. كما تؤكد الدراسة أهمية استخدام الملاحظات الهامشية في ترجمات القرآن لسد الثغرات الثقافية و ضمان الفهم الصحيح للمجاز المرسل المترجم.

تتألف الدراسة من ستة فصول شاملة المقدمة و الخاتمة. الفصل الأول هو مقدمة للدراسة. و يعرض الفصل الثاني منهجية الدراسة. يليه الفصل الثالث الذي هو مراجعة للدراسات السابقة حول المجاز المرسل و الترجمة الدينية. ثم الفصل الرابع الذي يعرض تحليل المجازات و تقييم الترجمات، في حين يعرض الفصل الخامس النتائج و الاستنتاجات. و أخيراً تنتهي الدراسة بالخاتمة التي تحلّل الفصل السادس.

Abstract

This study aims at finding out the best method for translating Qur'anic metonymies, through the assessment of the ways metonymy is rendered in five translations of the Holy Qur'an. The data analyzed consists of thirty examples representing ten types of metonymy. The evaluation of translations follows a linguistic approach based on analysis and comparison. The success of a translation method is determined on the basis of the accuracy and intelligibility of the resultant construction.

The study shows that literal translation is the best method for rendering Qur'anic metonymies because it maintains both the direct and indirect meanings of the metonymy. However, it can be blocked by linguistic and cultural constraints. In this case, the metonymy needs to be reduced to its sense, but the lost impact has to be compensated for. The study also stresses the need to use footnotes in Qur'an translations to provide the background information necessary for bridging the cultural gaps and ensuring the correct understanding of a literally-translated metonymy.

The study consists of six chapters including the introduction and conclusion. The first chapter is an introduction. The second chapter states the methodology of the study. Chapter three reviews the literature on metonymy and religious translation. Chapter four is a display of the

analysis of metonymies and the evaluation of translations. Chapter five displays the findings and conclusions. Finally, chapter six is a conclusion.

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List of Symbols used in Transcription and Transliteration

| Arabic letters | IPA symbols used in transcription | Symbols used in transliteration |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Consonants: | | |
| ء | | < |
| ب | b | b |
| ت | t | t |
| ث | | th |
| ج | d | j |
| ح | | <u>h</u> |
| خ | x | kh |
| د | d | d |
| ذ | | <u>th</u> |
| ر | r | r |
| ز | z | z |
| س | s | s |
| ش | | sh |
| ص | | <u>s</u> |
| ض | | <u>d</u> |
| ط | <u>t</u> | <u>t</u> |
| ظ | | <u>z</u> |
| ع | | |
| غ | | gh |
| ف | f | f |
| ق | q | <u>q</u> |
| ك | k | k |
| ل | l | l |
| م | m | m |
| ن | n | n |
| ه | h | h |
| و | w | w |
| ي | j | y |

Vowels:

| | | | |
|---|----|----|----|
| ا | æ: | : | aa |
| و | | u: | oo |
| ي | | i: | ee |

| | | | |
|-----|---|---|---|
| ... | æ | | a |
| ... | | | u |
| ... | | i | i |

Chapter One

Introduction

Since the late 20th century, there has been growing interest in Qur'an translations, and much research has been done to evaluate and improve them, and to determine the appropriate method to be used in them. Such research brings the fruits of linguistics into the field of Qur'anic study. In most cases, this has led to better understanding of the Qur'anic discourse, greater appreciation of its style, and more accurate expression of its meanings in other languages.

This is a Qur'anic linguistic study that investigates the problem of translating metonymy in the Holy Qur'an. It aims to uncover the ideal method (if any) for translating Qur'anic metonymies. This introductory chapter explains the problem investigated, and states the purpose of the study, research questions, definition of terms, limitations and delimitations.

Statement of the Problem

A translator aims to enable the writer/speaker to overcome cultural and linguistic barriers among different peoples, and by so doing, he provides readers with access to a wide variety of great works. The higher the quality of the source, the heavier the task of rendering it into other

languages. The translator not only has to render the meaning of the text, but also has to maintain its style and spirit, and produce a text that sounds natural to the target language readers.

Muslims consider the Qur'anic text to be of top quality. Although it poses a challenge to translators, regardless of their abilities, it has been translated over and over by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. According to Saab (2002), the first full translations of the Qur'an date back to the 16th century, and these were made by missionaries and were far from satisfactory, even misleading. The first Muslim translation, however, appeared only in the 20th century, precisely in 1905 by Abdulhaleem Khan. Then an abundance of translations followed, each attempting to be an improvement on existing ones. In fact, the Qur'an is believed to have been translated into 44 languages (Al- Awfiy, 2003). The total of the Qur'an translations is said to exceed 700 (Al-Laawindiy, 2001), some of which was carefully studied and reviewed by active investigators such as Kidwai (1998) who reviewed more than 35 translations of the Qur'an. Although he recommended a few translations, he concluded, just as many others did, that there is not yet a translation that is perfect at all levels, and there is always room for improvement. These translations were made by individuals who did their best, but their best cannot be enough simply because they are human. Over the past three decades, there has been

growing awareness of the importance of team work in carrying out a major project like the translation of the Holy Qur'an. The team is supposed to include bilinguals and experts in the different domains of life (Al-Fawzaan, 2002; Al-Bunayyaan, 2002; I. Al-Humaydaan, 2002). The Holy Qur'an is the Word of God, and some of its miraculous aspects can only be realized by knowledgeable people.

It has also become obvious that any new translation of the Qur'an should not start from scratch, for time is too precious to waste on redoing work that has already been done, almost successfully. A new translation should be attempted only after previous translations have been studied, not with the attitude of criticizing the translations or questioning the translators' intentions, but with the aim of uncovering the strengths and weaknesses of their work.

Some Muslim translators of the Qur'an have been very careful to adhere to the Qur'anic text, maintaining its structure and vocabulary as much as the target language systems allow it. This attitude emanates from the translators' great respect for the Qur'an and from their belief that they should not take liberties with the word of God. These translators also believe that adhering to the vocabulary and structure of the original text makes it possible to render part of the splendor and glory of the Qur'an, and that a non-Arab Muslim reader has the right to know what it feels like to read the original text.

Though the aim of the translation is to give non-Arab readers an opportunity to benefit from divine guidance, the foregoing attitude has often resulted in an unintelligible text. Clarity is required in translations of the Qur'an, but care must also be taken to notice the nuances of meaning and to render as much as possible the effect intended by the original text.

Figurative language is a very important means that contributes to shaping the intended effect. It is used to intensify or soften the effect, or simply to direct the attention to a particular aspect of the denoted meaning. Until recently, academic interest in metonymy was not proportional to the frequency of use of this particular trope. Wendland (2003) claims that metonymy is the most common figure of speech in biblical literature (p. 217). However, there are indications that this may be true in all language, not only in the language of the Bible. A study by Markert and Hahn (2002) shows that there is a metonymy in 17% of the utterances in 27 German magazine texts. Although the frequency of metonymy in Arabic is not supported by any statistical figures, there are indications that metonymy is quite common in Arabic as well (Sabrah, 2008). The Qur'an uses the linguistic tools of Arabic so that it may be understood and appreciated by the people to whom it was revealed. It is, therefore, expected that translators of the Qur'an will often encounter the problem of translating Qur'anic metonymies. They will have to make decisions about the method(s) through which metonymies are to be rendered. There is,

therefore, a need for clear guidelines as to how to treat metonymies of the Qur'an in a way that conveys the full meaning of the metonymies while maintaining the authenticity of the Qur'an as much as possible. The current study is meant to fill in this gap.

Purpose of the Study

This study aims to investigate the problem of translating metonymy through the analysis of renditions of 10 types of metonymy in five translations of the Holy Qur'an. The translations will be evaluated in terms of their linguistic and referential accuracy and in terms of their intelligibility. Judgments of accuracy will be based on a comparison between the translations and the original text, whereas judgments of intelligibility will be made by the researcher and verified by an English native speaker. The methods used will be identified in an attempt to figure out whether it is possible to make generalizations about the best method for translating metonymy. The study will also investigate whether the different types of metonymy require different methods of translation as suggested briefly by Newmark (1984:125).

The study will hopefully contribute to the ongoing efforts aiming at improving the translations of the Qur'an and cast more light on the translation of figurative language in general and translation of metonymy in particular.

Research questions

The study aims to answer the following questions:

1. What are the methods used in the five translations selected here for rendering metonymies in Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2)?
2. For each method identified, the following questions will be posed:
 - a. To what extent does the translator succeed in conveying the meaning and rhetorical impact of the metonymy?
 - b. To what extent does the translator succeed in producing an intelligible translation?
 - c. To what extent is the method consistent in yielding translations with the same degree of accuracy and intelligibility?
3. Is there one ideal method for translating Qur'anic metonymies?

If yes, what is it?

If no, what methods are found successful? What method(s) is/are found unsuccessful?
4. Do the different types of metonymy require different methods of translation?

Definition of Terms

Metonymy. Identification of Qur'anic metonymies in the practical study will be made on the basis of the definition of metonymy used by Arab rhetoricians which is the following: metonymy is a word used to refer

to a meaning other than its literal meaning. Such substitution is conditioned by the existence of a contiguity relation between the literal and figurative meanings and the existence of an implicit or explicit clue that indicates that the literal meaning is not intended.

Literal Translation. It means translating every source language word into its equivalent in the target language, while taking into consideration the syntactic and semantic rules of the target language.

Translation of the Qur'an. Since the corpus of the study is translations of the Qur'an, the term "translation of the Qur'an" will be repeatedly used. There is a widespread claim, initiated by Al-Maraaghiy (1981), that this term should be avoided in favor of terms like "translation of the meanings of the Qur'an". The argument behind this claim is that any translation, no matter how good it may be, would not be identical to the original text. Barakatullah (2007) also argues that literal translation of the Qur'an is impossible, and that any translation necessarily renders the meanings rather than the words of the Qur'an. This is an unnecessarily twisted route, and in this study, reference will be made to "translations of the Qur'an" since any translation is known to be an aid to reading the source, rather than a substitution. This view is supported by I. Al-Humaydaan (2002) who argues that this term is unlikely to lead the reader into thinking that the translation is sacred just like the original divine text. He also claims that works by early Muslim scholars did not mention a

"translation of the meanings". Rather, they used the shorter term to refer to a work that merely attempted to convey the Qur'anic meanings.

Limitations:

This is a qualitative study, that is based on analysis and induction. Unfortunately, this kind of research is highly subjective. In addition, the researcher has to make judgments about translations into English which is not the researcher's mother tongue. To solve this problem, an English native speaker will be consulted and asked to verify the researcher's judgments of intelligibility and accuracy.

Delimitations:

1. The conclusions will be drawn on the basis of the evaluation of translations of Qur'anic verses. It is expected that the conclusions will not be generalizable to the translation of metonymy in other types of text. Both the form and content of the Qur'an are sacred, which entails that a special treatment of its form is needed.
2. The phenomenon labeled "metonymy" covers a wide range of categories. However, the data extracted will be representative of only the ten types mentioned in the methodology section. These do not include logical metonymies, complex metonymies, or cases of metonymy where the literal

meaning can be true (called as *kinaayahs* in Arabic). These categories are too broad to be included in this study.

Chapter Two

Methodology

This study aims to investigate the problem of translating metonymy through the analysis and evaluation of renditions of 10 types of metonymy in five translations of the Holy Qur'an.

Collection of Data

The corpus from which the metonymies are extracted is sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2). A specific sura is chosen to be the corpus of this study because searching the whole Qur'an is a formidable task. Besides, Al-Baqarah is the longest sura in the Holy Qur'an, which makes it likely to contain examples of most of the metonymic types included in the study. However, if the metonymies in Al-Baqarah are insufficient, the search will be extended to other suras. Qur'anic verses and other Arabic words are transcribed into the symbols of the International Phonetic Alphabet. Only two new symbols (æ:,) are added to the IPA system to differentiate between the short and long vowels of the same quality (e.g. مَنَّعَ and مَنَّعَ would be transcribed into /mænæ æ/ and /mæ:næ æ/ respectively while the IPA does not make such a distinction). The IPA Arabic transcription symbols with the two added ones are shown on pages xii-xiii .

The metonymic types included in the study are as follows:

1) Part for Whole

Example:

{ و منهم الذين يؤذون النبي و يقولون هو أذن }

Sura At-Tawbah (sura no. 9), verse 61.

(And among them are those who abuse the Prophet and say, "He is *an ear*"), p.255. [Translations of verses that are not part of the data investigated are quoted from *The Qur'an: Arabic Text with Corresponding English Meanings* by an anonymous translator (1997). Using any of the five translations investigated would indicate bias toward that translation, hence the use of an outside translation].

2) Cause for Effect

Example:

{ فمن اعتدى عليكم فاعتدوا عليه بمثل ما اعتدى عليكم }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 194.

(So whoever has assaulted you, then *assault* him in the same way that he has assaulted you), p.37.

3) Effect for Cause

Example:

{ إنما يأكلون في بطونهم ناراً }

Sura An-Nisaa< (sura no. 4), verse 10.

(And grant me a *mention* [i.e. reputation] of honor), p.508.

8) Referring to an entity by its past status

Example:

{ و آتوا اليتامى أموالهم }

Sura An-Nisaa< (sura no 4), verse 2.

(And give to the *orphans* their properties), p.97.

9) Referring to an entity by its future status

Example:

{ إني أراني أعصر خمرًا }

Sura Yoosuf (sura no. 12), verse 36.

("Indeed, I have seen myself [in a dream] pressing *wine*"), p.313.

10) Derivational substitution

Example:

{ كتب عليكم القتال و هو كُره لكم }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 216.

(Fighting has been enjoined upon you, while it is *hateful* to you), p.42.

Three examples of each metonymic type will be extracted. The renditions of all thirty examples will be taken from the following translations:

1) *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an* (1992) by M. M. Pickthall, a British Muslim convert.

2) *The Koran Interpreted* (1996) by A. J. Arberry, a British Christian scholar of Arabic, Persian and Islamic studies.

3) *Interpretation of the Meanings of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language* (1996) by M. Al-Hilali and M. Khan. Prof. Al-Hilali was a Moroccan, originally Tunisian, who was interested in Arabic and Islamic studies. Dr. Khan is a Pakistani, originally Afghani, who has a medical degree. This is the translation often distributed to pilgrims in Saudi Arabia.

4) *Towards Understanding the ever-Glorious Qur'an* (1998) by M. M. Ghali, an Egyptian professor of English at the Faculty of Languages and Translation, Al-Azhar University.

5) *The Noble Qur'an, a New Rendering of its Meaning in English* (1999) by Abdalhaq and Aisha Bewley. Abdalhaq is a prominent Islamic scholar, and his wife, Aisha, is a convert who is also interested in Islamic studies. They both are American.

These particular translations have been chosen because of a number of considerations: First, they are among the translations known to scholars for their relative accuracy (Kidwai, 1998; Saab, 2002). This means they are not known to contain any intentional deviations. Also, a preliminary comparison of their rendition of a random selection of verses reveals that they use distinct ways of translating (i.e. the translators did not copy from each other). Another criterion of selection followed was that the

translations were done by people of different tongues, religions and cultural backgrounds.

Procedure

In order to select the assessment method that best suits the objectives of this study, a review will first be made of the different translation quality assessment approaches.

Approaches of translation assessment . Translation assessment is considered as the stumbling block in the area of translation studies (Maier, 2001, p. 205), yet there is an increasing awareness of its importance both in raising the standards of translation and in revealing more knowledge about the nature of translation (Newmark, 2000; House, 2001). However, although there is an abundance of work on prescriptive translation theory, including the issue of translation assessment, and in spite of the wealth of actual evaluation studies, there is a shortage of concrete suitable evaluation procedures.

According to Gerzymisch-Arbogast (2001), the best assessment method is one which can inform us when, how and why a translation is good or bad, on a highly objective basis. Total objectivity is, of course, beyond reach, and there has to be a degree of subjectivity in any assessment method, no matter how objective, because assessors differ in their preferences and judgments of certain criteria.

An assessment method has also to be practicable. McAlester (1999) claims that it is because of lack of practicability that none of the theoretical approaches to assessment has been used extensively.

There have been various approaches to assessment and each reflects the views of its advocates on meaning and translation. For example, the mentalists, such as Fodor (1998) and Jackendoff (1992), view meaning as a product of the speaker's attitude. This has resulted in viewing translation as an individual, creative act, which depends on intuition and subjective interpretation. Consequently, evaluation of translation is subjective and intuitive, and consists of general judgment statements such as "The translation is accurate".

The behaviorist views of translation assessment aimed originally at providing a more scientific way of evaluating translations. They dismissed the actions involved in the translation process since these actions belong to an unknowable "black box" (i.e. the brain), and instead, focused on the readers' response as the criterion of evaluation. To the behaviorists, a good translation is one which achieves equivalence of response. This explains how the term "dynamic equivalence" came to Nida (1964). It suggests that the recipients' response to a translation should be equivalent to that of the readers of the original. The translation testing methods proposed by Nida (1991), including the loud reading and cloze tests, clearly reflect the criteria considered significant by the advocates of this approach, namely,

intelligibility, informativeness in addition to the equivalent response. Unfortunately, these testing methods are applicable only to experimental use and often test one aspect of communication at a time. McAlester comments that these methods "are often totally unsuitable for practical evaluation - surely I must not wait to see how many end-users of a translation of instructions for connecting an electrical appliance actually electrocute themselves before I decide whether it is functionally adequate" (1999, p. 173).

Another reader-oriented approach to translation assessment is the functionalist view which is one aspect of the skopostheory school of translation pioneered by Katherine Reiss (2000a) and Hans Vermeer (1998), and of which Nord is one of the most prominent proponents. According to this approach, equivalence of function is considered the main criterion in the evaluation process. A translation assessor will focus on the extent to which the translation is in line with its brief and skopos and the extent to which the target language norms are observed or flouted. The purpose of a translation is often decided outside of the text by the translator or whoever is commissioning the project. Nevertheless, Nord declares that the purpose should be compatible with the original author's intentions (1997, p. 125).

This method was attacked by linguistically-oriented scholars on the basis that it is not clear how equivalence or adequacy is to be determined,

or how the translator decided on the linguistic realization of the purposes of the text. House (2001) points out that, according to the functionalists, the translator is free to accept or reject the information in the text depending on what purposes he assumes the text to have. Newmark (1993a) contends that this method reflects a mistaken view of the priority of the message over meaning. Message is the core of meaning, but it is not all meaning, for "meaning is richer, subtler, larger, [and] wider than message" (p. 162).

The significance of the meaning of the original is also undermined in text-based approaches such as what House (2001) labeled as the "literature-oriented approach" and the deconstructivist thinking. According to the former, translations are treated as pieces of literary text and judged independently from their source texts in terms of their forms and functions compared to comparable texts in the receiving culture and literature. Lefever (1983) is a famous advocate of this approach. He introduces the concept of the polysystem which is a collection of different trends of literature in a given era that are dominated by certain works accepted as the canon or center. Translated works are seen as elements involved in the struggle between center and periphery in literary systems. They are evaluated also in terms of the role they play in the interaction between literatures.

Lefever (1992) expresses his distaste for literary translation evaluations that use accuracy as a criterion, because it distorts the

naturalness and literary spirit of the original. He says, "It is pointless to tell a translator that his translation is lacking in rigorous exactness if you are unable to show him ... that he could have been exact without becoming less pleasing" (p. 116).

Obviously, the problem with this approach, besides undermining accuracy, is that it does not provide criteria for judging the strengths and weaknesses of a translation. It cannot even tell which text is considered a translation and which is not.

Another text-based approach is the deconstructivist approach that is concerned with the power relations which may have skewed the translation. The task of a translation assessor is to attempt to discover the hidden forces which governed the choice of a text for translation and the ways in which the text was twisted in the interests of individuals or groups of power or simply to make the text less alien to the target recipients. Venuti (2000) believes that the source message is not an invariant in the process of communication because it undergoes a process of reconstruction in the target language and culture and it varies according to different languages and cultures. He declares that "Translation is always ideological because it releases a domestic remainder, an inscription of values, beliefs and representations linked to historical moments and social positions in the domestic culture" (p. 485).

House (2001) praises this approach provided that it is used strictly for the particular purpose of showing the forces affecting a translation. She maintains that the approach does not provide means for differentiating between one translation and another which has been changed to the extent that it can no longer be called a translation.

The linguistic approaches to translation assessment have the merit of not neglecting the source text, but they differ in their capacity to provide evaluation procedures. Unfortunately, there is not yet a standard assessment procedure for translation quality. Williams (2004) reports that "as the organizers of a 1999 conference on translation quality in Leipzig ... noted, no generally accepted objective criteria currently exist for evaluating the quality of translations" (p. xiv). Therefore, one should be grateful for the fact that there is agreement over the basic criteria. First, there is a widespread insistence by scholars that any evaluation should be comparative (De Beaugrande, 1978; Neubert and Shreve, 1992; Newmark, 2000; House, 2001). Second, the majority of linguistic translation assessment methods depend on finding errors, though none of them says anything about the amount or gravity of errors that can be tolerated to consider a translation good (McAlester, 1999). McAlester distinguishes between two types of errors: those that are violations of the norms of the target language (errors in grammar, usage, vocabulary, register, etc.), and the errors in representing the source text (omissions, additions,

mistranslations). This classification corresponds roughly to Newmark's (2000) dichotomy of linguistic and referential errors.

Newmark (2000) has developed a comprehensive five-step scheme for translation quality assessment. It can be used as a checklist, from which the assessor can choose the criteria that suit the type of text and focus of the evaluation. The scheme begins with an analysis of the source text in terms of the author's purpose, target readership, quality of language, and themes covered. The next step is to identify potential problems, then to compare the translation and the original to see how the translator solved the problems. The assessor makes judgments about the referential and pragmatic accuracy of the translation both by the translator's standards and by the assessor's standards. Finally, the assessor has to evaluate the translation's position in the target language culture in terms of its justification and influence on the language or literature.

No matter how comprehensive and flexible this model may seem to be, the problem of the absence of standard assessment criteria still persists. Williams (2004) mentions ten reasons for the current chaos in translation quality assessment:

1. Many models are designed with specific types of text in mind, so the model may not apply to other types of text.
2. There is disagreement over whether or not to include in the model factors that are extraneous to the quality of the translation such as

deadlines, difficulty of the source text, end use, competence of evaluators, etc.

3. The notion of quality of the translation that the service provider has may not match the needs of the end user. The example provided by Williams is using Standard French to translate a text for technicians with the Canadian Armed Forces.
4. There is no uniformity in the assessment of language errors. For example, some consider typos and spelling and punctuation errors to be serious because these are the errors that are usually detected by the reader, while other evaluators may think that these are trivial errors.
5. There is disagreement over the level of accuracy required. While some can accept minor shifts of meaning as long as the core message is conveyed, others insist on total fidelity.
6. Translation quality assessment that is based on error detection requires considerable human resources. Therefore, it is sometimes performed through "sampling" which refers to the analysis of samples of translations rather than whole texts. This may result in overlooking serious mistakes that are not in the samples.
7. Translation quality assessment is often based on quantification of errors. Therefore, translation service providers and translation teachers sometimes develop assessment grids which have several

quality levels depending on the number of errors detected. The problem with these grids is that they do not provide many levels of error seriousness. As a result, two translations may be allotted the same grade, though one is better because its errors are slightly less serious.

8. Even when the seriousness of errors is finely graded, the same error will have different seriousness ratings in two different types of text.
9. Translation assessment models usually determine parameters against which the quality of the translation is to be assessed. Assuming that a fair assessment of each parameter is made, how can we reach an overall quality rating for the translation?
10. The design of the translation quality assessment scheme will vary depending on the purpose of the scheme. For example, in training institutions, the design of the scheme will differ according to whether the purpose is formative evaluation (to provide feedback in support of the learning process) or summative evaluation (to provide evidence of translation competence so that the student passes a course or graduates).

Until these problems are solved, which is unlikely in the near future, translation evaluators will continue to devise their own assessment models that are tailored to suit the specific evaluation situation in hand. However,

the criteria of assessment followed should be mentioned and clearly defined by the evaluators.

Translation assessment model. A semantic-pragmatic model will be used for the analysis and assessment of the data. The model is based on comparing the original with five of its translations. It will consist of the following procedures:

(1) Context of situation

An explanation of the verse or part of it and any contextual information necessary for understanding it will be given in this section. There will be heavy dependence on commentaries for explanations and background information. The commentaries used will basically include Aṭ-Tabariy (2001), Aṣ-Ṣaaboonyi (1981), and Ibn-Katheer (1996).

(2) The substitution involved

In this section, the metonymic word and its intended meaning will be stated. The metonymies are identified by the researcher on the basis of the Arab rhetorical definition of metonymy stated in the definition-of-terms section.

(3) Possible purpose of substitution

The purpose of substitution identified will be described as "possible" because nobody can claim with certainty to know Allah's intentions. Since commentaries are not of much help in this regard, the possible purpose of a substitution will usually represent the researcher's own conception of what

could be the purpose on the basis of the literal meaning of the metonymy and how it relates to the intended meaning. The possible purpose will be incorporated with the total meaning that should be conveyed in the translation of the metonymy.

(4) Translations

The metonymies identified will be compared with their renditions in the five translations of the Holy Qur'an mentioned above. It is important here to point out that this study does not aim to criticize particular translations, but to investigate the extent to which they succeed in solving the problem of translating metonymy and to relate that outcome to the translation methods used.

(5) Evaluation

Every translation will be evaluated in terms of its intelligibility and accuracy. Judgments of accuracy and intelligibility will be made by the researcher and verified by a native speaker of English. In addition to speaking English, the informant should preferably meet the following criteria: (1) The informant should have majored in a language-related discipline because that would make him/her able to distinguish between a rendition that is unintelligible and another that is intelligible but sounds strange. (2) The informant should not know Arabic so that his/her judgment

of intelligibility is not affected by the understanding of the original. (3) The informant should be Muslim to avoid prejudice.

Dr. Alia Mitchell, an assistant professor in the Department of English, Prince Sultan University, meets these criteria and will provide the verifying judgments. She will not be asked to make any judgments regarding the smoothness of reading, acceptability of resultant collocations, or the extent to which the translations are normalized. Such judgments would relate to highly controversial issues regarding whether or not to maintain the foreignness of the source language text in a translation or to make it mostly idiomatic (Ziman, 2004). Besides, in a translation of the Holy Qur'an, the foreign flavor is not merely a choice but a reality that the translator can only minimize in a way that does not affect the accuracy of the translation.

After the application of the assessment model to all the metonymies extracted, it will hopefully be possible to draw conclusions regarding the best method for translating metonymies in the Holy Qur'an.

Chapter Three

Review of Related Literature

This study aims to analyze and evaluate the methods of rendering metonymy in five translations of the Holy Qur'an, with the purpose of identifying the best method that produces intelligible translations and conveys the full meaning of the original metonymy. The first section of the literature review will start with a discussion of the various attempts at producing comprehensive definitions and classifications of metonymy in both English and Arabic literatures. This knowledge is very important for the identification of metonymic expressions in the Qur'an, which is the first practical step in this study. This will be followed by a discussion of the different views on the function of metonymy and its translatability. Such views are of particular importance for the evaluation of the translations investigated.

The second section of the review will discuss the controversy about the best method for translating religious texts in general and the Qur'anic text in particular. Most of the arguments about the best method are originally posed in the context of translation of the Bible, which is not of interest here. Such arguments will be mentioned because they state the merits and drawbacks of each translation method, and they undoubtedly should be borne in mind when a method is selected for translation of the

Qur'an. Finally, a survey of a number of assessment studies that evaluate Qur'an translations will be made. This part should serve to show where the current study stands among other Qur'anic linguistic studies since it is meant to be a continuation of the trend.

Metonymy

Definition of metonymy. This section aims to review the literature related to the various accounts on metonymy. Unfortunately, there is less literature on metonymy than on metaphor. This may have led to the current uncertainty about its status as compared to metaphor (Ibanez, 2003).

Metonymy has for long been considered as a mere embellishment, a view that is considered by Birdsell (1986) as partially responsible for the backwardness of rhetorical studies in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He states that "the ornamental rhetoric pushed the analysis of tropes, and perhaps of rhetoric in general into a very secondary role with respect to study of meaning and belief. Trope as aesthetic device features rhetoric as the beautification of preexisting ideas" (p. 4).

Metonymy has traditionally been defined as merely a figure of speech where the name of one entity is substituted for that of another entity that is contiguous to it (Peters, 2003; Wendland, 2003). Thus, according to the traditional rhetorical view, metonymy is only referential, and it involves substitution provided that the substituted entities are contiguous.

With the advent of cognitive linguistics, metonymy has come to be realized not only as a matter of language, but also as an important aspect of cognition. This is illustrated by the following analogy: If you ask a person to show you his son, he will probably show you a picture of his face and you will be satisfied. But if he shows you a picture of his son's body, you will not be satisfied and you might ask, "But what does he look like?" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

Thus, according to cognitive linguists, metonymy is not merely a figure of speech; it is also a way of thinking and conceptualizing. Therefore, any definition of metonymy should not talk about words or names of things; rather, it should be about concepts or entities. Radden and Kövecses (1999) define metonymy as "a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model" (p. 21). The Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs), originally Lakoff's innovation (1990), are conceptual structures that are produced by the human conceptualizing capacities. They consist of complex concepts and general categories, and they help a person make sense of experience (Papafragou, 1996). In metonymy, both the vehicle and target should belong to the same ICM, unlike the case in metaphor where they belong to two different ICMs. However, while Lakoff views metonymy as mappings between two

conceptual entities (Lakoff and Turner, 1989), Croft believes that the mappings link two conceptual domains that belong to the same domain matrix. In other words, metonymy involves a shift of salience between two domains within the same domain matrix (Croft, 1993). Here is Croft's example to illustrate this view:

I got the students to read *Wierzbicka* for the next seminar.

There is a metonymy here where the name of a person (i.e. Wierzbicka) is used to refer to her work. What happens here is the backgrounding of the domain of human being and highlighting of the domain of academic writing.

Croft maintains that the difference between the two accounts is not as great as it seems. Both views postulate that metonymy involves a transfer of reference between elements in the same conceptual complex which is united by human experience.

Papafragou (1996) points at some defects of the cognitive-linguistic approach to metonymy and thinks it is inadequate for a full account of this phenomenon. First, the cognitive-linguistic approach is, like the traditional approach, based on an associationist view; that is, the success of metonymy is grounded on empirical associations between concepts. These associations derive from experience and culture, and they overlook the innate cognitive capacity, which is responsible for the patterning and formation of categories in the first place. Second, associationism cannot

answer the question why a novel metonymy that belongs to one of the established patterns is not readily comprehensible as in the following example:

You should avoid marrying *a sheep* at all costs.

"Sheep" refers to a person born in the year of the sheep. Thus, associationism accounts for only conventionalized metonymies.

Further, the cognitive-linguistic approach does not say anything about the impact of metonymies. For example, it does not account for the dehumanizing effect of the following statement:

The ham sandwich is getting restless.

Here, a person is referred to by the kind of food he ordered. This substitution gives the impression that the speaker, who is a waiter or waitress, views the person who ordered the ham sandwich mainly as a customer who differs from other customers only by the kind of food he ordered, ignoring all his other more human distinctive features.

Pankhurst suggests a relevance-theoretic approach as an alternative to the cognitive-linguistic approach. Relevance theory, that is loosely based on Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle, assumes that every utterance is relevant. The speaker is expected to produce only relevant utterances, and the hearer is expected to know this before the interaction begins (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). One of the fundamental ideas in relevance theory is the relationship between contextual effect and processing effort. "Since the

degree of relevance depends on the two factors of effort and effect, it increases if less effort brings greater effect, and decreases if more effort brings less effect" (Pankhurst, 1994, p. 5).

Sperber and Wilson (1986) believe that the human information processing system attempts to obtain a balance between the amount of mental effort exerted and the amount of cognitive effects achieved from a particular stimulus. It seeks to maximize relevance through the derivation of the greatest cognitive effects possible for the least possible effort.

Papafragou (1996) contends that the use of salient features for the identification of objects or people leads to the decrease of cognitive effort.

This is what happens in metonymy. A salient feature of a person or an object is used interpretively to give access to the cognitive representation of the person or the thing. The feature is selected by virtue of its being the most relevant means of pointing to the referent. The following example illustrates how a metonymy is comprehended according to the relevance-theoretic approach:

The *piano* is in a bad mood.

According to Papafragou, the hearer of this utterance will reject the literal interpretation assuming that the utterance must be optimally relevant. The hearer will form a new hypothesis on the basis of the argument requirements necessitated by the type of predicate in the statement, which

is that the argument must be a person. The hearer is likely to form the following proposition:

The person that could appropriately be called *the piano* is in a bad mood <at time x>.

Thus, according to relevance theory, metonymy involves the production of implicit assumptions or implicatures. But all other figures of speech (hyperbole, litotes, etc.) are treated in the same way. This is why Ibanez (1998) criticizes relevance theory and argues that it does not say anything about the mental mechanisms that are common between metonymy and metaphor, and it does not distinguish between these two phenomena and the other figures of speech. He concludes that:

the relevance-theoretic account fails to note that the connection between metaphor and metonymy is stronger than that between, for example, metaphor and hyperbole. This special connection has been highlighted by cognitive linguistics, where metaphor and metonymy are described as conceptual mappings. (p. 1)

Unfortunately, the associationist view on which the traditional and linguistic cognitive approaches to metonymy are based is also lacking. It does not account for creative metonymies, it does not acknowledge the role of the innate cognitive capacity, and it does not say anything about the effects achieved by the use of metonymy.

Thus, there is need for a more comprehensive treatment of metonymy that exploits the merits of the two approaches discussed above and contributes to the knowledge pertaining to the cognitive processes involved in metonymy.

Metonymy and metaphor. Drawing a clear distinction between metonymy and metaphor is of particular importance for the purpose of definition as well as identification of metonymy. Both tropes involve the substitution of one term for another, achieve stylistic effects by ellipsis of information, require shared knowledge to arrive at the intended meaning, and involve contextualization and inferencing (Pankhurst, 1995).

Therefore, it is important to discuss the differences between them in order to make it easier to identify the instances of metonymy in the selected corpus with a high degree of certainty.

Fass (1997) defines metonymy as "a form of indirect reference in which one entity is used to stand for another entity closely associated with it" (p. 70). The two distinctive criteria used in this definition were attacked and were shown to be nondefinitional. Ibanez (2003) argues that although metonymy is used primarily for reference, there are nonreferential or predicative uses of metonymy as is shown in the following examples:

John is *a brain*. (He is intelligent)

I'm all *ears*. (I am listening)

She's just a pretty *face*. (She is shallow)

Besides, even a metaphor can be used referentially.

The pig is waiting for his check.

A falsification of the reference criterion automatically overrules the stand-for criterion. In the example of the metaphor above, there is a stand-for relationship. *The pig* refers to and stands for a person. Yet, it is a metaphor, not a metonymy.

Warren (1999) suggests that the difference between metonymy and metaphor lies basically in the kind of link between the figurative and intended meanings of the metonymy. While the interpretation of metonymy involves the retrieval of a relation, the interpretation of metaphor involves retrieval of a shared attribute. This distinction is expressed in simpler terms by Jakobson and Halle (2002) as they maintain that the link in metaphor is one of similarity whereas in metonymy, the link is one of contiguity (p. 76). This is one of the most commonly used criteria for distinguishing between the two concepts.

Cognitive linguists, like Ibanez (2003), distinguish between metaphor and metonymy in terms of the number of domains involved. If the source and target belong to the same superordinate domain, we have a metonymy. If the source and target belong to two different superordinate domains, then we have a metaphor.

The use of the domain criterion for distinguishing between metonymy and metaphor did not go without problems. Barcelona (2003) points out that the boundaries of domains are not clear, for their breadth differs from person to person. Therefore, it is sometimes difficult to decide whether we have two domains or one. Here is the example that Barcelona gives:

He walked with *drooping shoulders*.

The drooping shoulders is one of the behavioral effects of sadness. On that basis, this is a metonymy. Barcelona thinks that more cognitive linguists would say that statements like the example above are manifestations of the metaphor SADNESS IS DOWN/HAPPINESS IS UP. According to Barcelona, the best way to solve this paradox is by remembering that the drooping position is a subdomain of verticality. He rightly argues that at least on a conscious conventional level, verticality is not a subdomain of sadness or happiness though unconsciously it is considered as part of these two notions. Thus, Barcelona adds to the definition of metaphor the condition that the two domains are classified as separate domains both conventionally and consciously.

Deignan and Potter (2004) conducted a corpus study of metaphors and metonymies in Italian and English. Their concordance data show few clear-cut cases of metonymies and metaphors. They found that while much of the figurative language analyzed had a metonymy, most of the mappings

were complex. There were cases of a metonymically used entity embedded within a complex metaphorical expression, as in the phrase *to get back on one's feet*. If this phrase is used to mean "to recover from an illness", then it contains only a metonymy. If the intended meaning is "to improve (a company's fortunes, etc.)", then the phrase has a metonymy within a metaphor.

Another interesting study, by Jakobson and Halle (2002), suggests that the processing of metaphor and metonymy takes place in two different areas of the brain. This finding follows from the observation that the use of metaphor and metonymy is affected by two different aphasic disorders. The first involves a deterioration of metalinguistic operations. Symptoms include the replacement of key words with abstract anaphoric words or with more general words such as *thing* or *piece*. This disorder results in the suppression of the relation of similarity, so the patient cannot handle metaphor. The other aphasic disorder affects the capacity for maintaining the hierarchy of linguistic units. Symptoms include the loss of syntactic rules organizing words into larger units. Sentences consist of content words in chaotic order. The relation of contiguity is suppressed, which makes the patient incapable of handling metonymy.

Unfortunately, although Jakobson and Halle's study (2002) uncovers the fact that metonymy and metaphor are further apart than it was

first thought, it has no implications for the identification of either trope in corpus studies.

Classification of English metonymies. In traditional rhetoric, metonymies are classified according to the kind of relation between the source and target. Consider the following statement:

He bought *a Ford*

The intended meaning is "He bought a car produced by Ford". This metonymy is classified under the category: Producer for Product.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) classify metonymies into the following categories:

1. Part for Whole: We don't hire *longhairs*.

"Longhairs" is used here to refer to "people with long hair".

Initially, Lakoff and Johnson suggested another category (i.e. Face for Person), but later, they noted that this category should fall under the Part-for-Whole category.

2. Producer for Product: He's got a *Picasso* in his den.

In this example, "Picasso", a name of a famous artist, is used to refer to that artist's painting.

3. Object used for User: *The buses* are on strike.

"The buses" is used here to refer to "the drivers of the buses".

4. Controller for Controlled: *Napoleon* lost at Waterloo.

"Napoleon", a name of a French emperor, is used to refer to the army led by that emperor.

5. Institution for People responsible: *The army* wants to reinstitute the draft.

"The army" is used to stand for the commanders of the army.

6. Place for Institution: *Wall street* is in a panic.

"Wall Street" is used to stand for the US stock exchange which is located on that street.

7. Place for Event: *Watergate* changed our politics.

"Watergate", a name of a place, is used to refer to a series of scandals during the presidency of Nixon.

8. Symbolic metonymies grounded in the cultures and religions. The example is using *the dove* for the Holy Spirit (a Christian metonymic concept).

Later, Lakoff (1990) adds three more categories:

9. Object for Goal. This is exemplified by cases where a concrete object like *a staff* or *bat* stands for a goal like a win or a hit.

10. Seeing something done for Making sure that it is done:

See that he gets his money.

The intended meaning is "Make sure that he gets his money".

11. Thing perceived for Percept. According to Lakoff, percepts are sounds, smells, pains, etc. while the thing perceived is the entity which

produces the percept, such as alarm clocks, injuries, etc. He illustrates this by contrasting the following two sentences:

There goes *the beep*. (No metonymy)

There goes *the alarm clock*. (A metonymy where the alarm clock stands for its sound)

Lakoff and Turner (1989) mention six metonymic concepts though they do not claim that their list is exclusive:

1. Author for Works. The example provided by Lakoff and Turner is taken from *The Tower* by Yeats:

"It seems that I must bid the muse go back
Choose *Plato* and *Plotinus* for a friend."

The intended meaning is "spend time reading works by Plato and Plotinus".

It is not clear why Lakoff and Turner reduced the previous category

Producer for Product to Author for Works. This would exclude cases where a painting is referred to by the name of the painter.

2. Building for Institution: *The White House* is responsible for that policy.

"The White House" is used to refer to the US president and his officials.

This category is similar to Lakoff and Johnson's Place for Institution. Yet, again, Lakoff and Turner's category is narrower.

3. Effect for Cause: Don't get *hot under the collar*.

The intended meaning here is "don't get angry".

4. Name for Reputation: An example is in the phrase "To blacken someone's name".

The word "name" is used to refer to reputation.

Here, there is an interaction with the basic metaphor GOOD IS WHITE/BAD IS BLACK.

5. Part for Whole. Everyone who wants *a roof* should have one.

The word "roof" is used to refer to the whole house.

6. Words for the Concepts they express: Those are foolish *words*.

The intended meaning is "Those are foolish ideas".

Stern (1975) uses the word "permutations" for metonymies. He classifies metonymies into four major classes according to their part of speech. He lists more than 18 categories under the four classes: nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. The following are some of his categories: Material for Object made from it, Receptacle for Content, Symbol for Thing symbolized, Instrument for Action, Instrument for Product, etc.

Fass (1997) was the first to draw attention to the close relation between metonymic connections and case roles. According to him, every metonymic concept can be expressed in terms of a relation between two case roles. For instance, Producer for Product can be expressed as Agent for Patient. Fass reclassifies the metonymic concepts identified by Stern (1975) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in terms of case role relations:

1. Agent for Patient. This category covers the previous categories Producer for Product, Artist for art form, and Controller for Controlled.
2. Patient for Agent instead of Institution for People responsible.
3. Instrument for Agent instead of Object used for User.
4. Instrument for Patient instead of Container for Contents.
5. Patient for Patient. This category covers the previous categories Part for Whole, Face for Person, Property for Whole, Symbol for Thing symbolized, and Whole for Part.
6. Location for Agent instead of Place for Institution or Building for Institution.
7. Location for Patient instead of Place for Event.

Fass expresses hope that the new hierarchy of metonymies built on the basis of case roles would solve the problem of arbitrariness. Metonymy is arbitrary and open-ended, but case roles may be limited and may dictate what can or cannot be a metonymy.

As mentioned above, cognitive linguists' main focus is on the mental processes involved in the production and processing of metonymy. They stress the presence of mappings between entities in the same domain or ICM. These mappings correspond roughly to the relations between the figurative and intended meanings discussed by rhetoricians. Yet, no attempts have been made to classify these mappings. One exception is

made by Radden and Kövecses (1999) who abandon the discussion of types of metonymies in favor of metonymy-producing relationships. These refer to the conceptual relationships within an ICM which may give rise to metonymy. For example, the conceptual relationship between a container and the thing contained may produce the metonymy "Container for Contents" and "Contents for Container". However, it is important to note that not all possible relationships in an ICM can produce metonymies. For example, *nose* cannot stand for *mouth* although the two words refer to two contiguous entities.

Radden and Kövecses classify their metonymy-producing relationships into two broad categories: (1) Whole ICM and its parts; (2) Parts of an ICM. There are many subcategories subsumed in each category. The total subcategories mentioned are 64; yet, the investigators state that their lists are not meant to be exhaustive.

Metonymy in the Arabic literature. This section discusses the way Arab scholars dealt with metonymy, and how it differs from the current status of metonymy in Western literature. Metonymy in the Arabic literature is discussed under traditional rhetoric. In all definitions of metonymy, it is considered as a word or an utterance. There is awareness that it reflects mental connections between concepts, but it seems that Arab

rhetoricians think it is more useful to talk about the tangible realizations of those concepts.

Most Arab rhetoricians and linguists quote Abdul-Qaahir Al-Jurjaaniy who lived in the eleventh century AD. Although the phenomenon of metonymy was noted long before him, Al-Jurjaaniy was the first to clearly distinguish between the different tropes. He is an authority on eloquence and is quoted by almost every modern rhetorician. He was most concerned with metaphor and simile which occupied the greatest portion of his famous book *Asraarul-Balaaghah* [Secrets of Eloquence] (1983), but he discussed metonymy, though briefly and without naming it, as a cotaxonym of metaphor. He allotted special attention to the distinction between metaphor and metonymy, and gave many examples of metonymy without classifying them.

Al-Jurjaaniy's definition of metonymy was the basis on which more recent definitions are based. Metonymy means using an utterance to refer to a meaning other than its original meaning because of some contiguity between the two meanings (p. 325). However, more recent rhetoricians incorporate the conditions of metonymy in the definition. For example, Saqqaal (1997) defines metonymy as "a word used to refer to a meaning other than its original meaning because of a relation other than similarity, with a clue which indicates that the original meaning is not intended" (p. 170). Thus, if any of the two criteria mentioned in the definition is absent,

then we do not have a metonymy. If the relationship is one of similarity, the trope is a metaphor. If the relationship is not one of similarity but there is no clue, then the trope is a *kinaayah* (This word has no equivalent in English because the English literature on metonymy does not distinguish between metonymies where the literal meaning is true and metonymies where the literal meaning is false). Al-Jurjaaniy's definition says *utterance* rather than *word* so that it does not exclude complex metonymy. In complex metonymy, a sentence is used to express a meaning other than its literal meaning and the relationship between the two meanings is not similarity. For example, we often say *وفقك الله* /wæffæqæk l-l :h/ which literally means "Allah gave you success" while the purpose of the utterance is to supplicate to Allah that he may grant the addressee success. Further discussion of complex metonymy will not be made since this type of metonymy is too broad and is thus excluded from the scope of our investigation.

One main difference between what is commonly known as "metonymy" and its Arabic correspondent *المجاز المرسل* /ælmæd æ:z l-m rsæl/ is that the latter does not include cases where the literal meaning is not true. These are considered as belonging to another trope termed *الكناية* /æl-kinæ:jæh/. As-Sakkaakiy (1983) took concern to distinguish between

metonymy and *kinaayah*. In the latter, the original meaning of the words is not against the facts of reality. When we refer to a woman as نؤومة الضحى /næ u:mæt - æ:/ (a sleeper of the forenoon) meaning that she has servants, the literal meaning can still be true. But when we say رعينا الغيث /ræ æjnæl- æj æ/ (We grazed the rain), there is no way that we mean the literal meaning of the rain. In other words, in *kinaayah*, both the literal and figurative meanings are true, whereas in metonymy, only the figurative meaning is true. In the Western literature on metonymy, such a distinction is not made and the corresponding examples of *kinaayah* are considered as clear-cut metonymies. It may be argued that the literal meaning is not always true in Arabic instances of *kinaayah*. For example, we may call an idiot عريض القفا /æri: l-qæfæ:/ (broad-backed) even if he is not so. But in fact, this behavior is based on what is usually true. If the literal meaning CAN be true, then we have a *kinaayah* rather than a metonymy.

Since the truth of the literal meaning is a distinctive criterion that distinguishes metonymy from *kinaayah*, it was only natural that Arab scholars took special concern in discussing the clues (قرائن /q r :<in/) that indicate that the literal meaning cannot be true. These may be explicit as when the statement contains a word that creates incongruity with the literal

reading of the metonymic word. A clue can also be implicit as when the literal reading is in contradiction with a fact or a convention.

This dichotomy is reflected in Al-Feel's (1987) classification of clues into lexical and situational. The latter are called as such because it is the situation rather than the utterance that contradicts the literal reading.

Salmaan (2000) identifies four categories of clues: lexical, religious, rational, and conventional. Salmaan's lexical category corresponds to that of Al-Feel, while the other three types can be subsumed under Al-Feel's situational category. Thus, the two classifications are not really different.

Another distinctive feature of the Arab treatment is that the Arab scholars invariably consider synecdoche as a hyponym rather than a cotaxonym of metonymy, a view that has been controversial in the Western literature on metonymy.

In his discussion of metonymy, Al-Jurjaaniy mentioned examples of the relations between the literal and figurative meanings of a metonymy. He made no attempt at enumerating or restricting them. Some rhetoricians who followed him tried to provide exclusive lists of these relations. Others remarked that the metonymic relations were innumerable (Abdul-Raaziq, 1981; Hussein, 1985) and mentioned only the most frequently occurring relations. These include the following:

1. Cause for effect:

رعت الماشية الغيث /r ætil-mæ: ijæt l- æj æ/ (The livestock grazed the rain)

The intended meaning of الغيث /æj æj æ/ (the rain) is "the grass".

2. Effect for Cause:

لا تأكل مال اليتيم /læ: tæ k l mæ:læl-jæti:mi/ (Do not eat the orphan's property)

The verb تأكل /tæ k l/ ([you, singular] eat) is used here to express the action of taking.

3. Whole for Part:

شربت ماء النيل / æribt mæ: æn-ni:li/ (I drank the Nile water)

The intended meaning of ماء النيل /mæ: æn-ni:li/ (the Nile water) is only some amount of the water (e.g. a glass) rather than the whole river.

4. Part for Whole:

قبضنا على عين من عيون الأعداء /qæb næ: ælæ: æjnin min ju:nil-æ dæ: i/ (We caught one of the enemies' eyes)

The word عين /æjn/ (eye) is used to refer to a spy.

5. Referring to an entity by its past status:

يلبس المصريون القطن الذي تنتجه بلادهم /jælbæs l-mi rijju:næl-q næl-læði:

t ntid h bilæ:d h m/ (Egyptians wear the cotton produced by their country)

The intended meaning of القطن /æɫq t̪n/ (cotton) is "clothes made from that material".

6. Referring to an entity by its future status:

أهلاً يا دكتور! /æhlæn jæ: d kt :r/ (Welcome, doctor!) [said to a

medical student, for example, who is not yet a doctor]

7. Location for Entity:

قضت المحكمة ببراءة الرجل /q til-ma kæmæt bib r : ætir-r d l/

(The court decided that the man was innocent)

The word المحكمة /ælmæ kæmæh/ (The court) is used here to refer to the judge.

8. Entity for Location:

نزلت بالقوم فأكرموني /næzælt bilqa mi fæ ækr mu:ni:/ (I stopped by

the people and they entertained me)

The intended meaning of القوم /æɫqɑ m/ (the people) is "the place where those people reside".

9. Instrument for Action:

لسانه عفيف /lisæ:n h æfi:f n/ (His tongue is polite)

The word لسان /lisæ:n/ (tongue) is used to refer to the action that the tongue performs (i.e. speaking).

10. Opposite for Entity:

An example is the Arabic usage of مفازة /mæfæ:zæh/ which literally means "a place of victory" to refer to a deadly desert in order to express optimism.

11. Concomitant for Entity:

سال الوادي /sæ:læl-wæ:di:/ (The valley ran)

"الوادي" /ælwæ:di:/ (the valley) is used to refer to the water it contains.

12. Derivational substitution:

كان رسول الله أفضل الخلق /kæ:næ r su:l l-l :hi æf læl-xælqi/ (Allah's

apostle was the best of all creation)

"الخلق" /ælxælq/ (creation) is used when the intended meaning is "creatures".

However, the observer of the classifications listed by different scholars notes a great deal of randomness in the classification process. For example, At-Tayyibiy (1986) mentions three categories that could go under

Al- Alawiy's (2002) concomitant category; namely, (1) Source for Entity (e.g. using السماء /æs-sæmæ: / [heavens] to refer to rain), (b) Carrier for Carried (e.g. using الراوية / r-r :wijæh/ [the camel] to refer to the water bag it carries), and (c) Carried for Carrier (e.g. using الخفض /ælx f / [furniture carried on the camel] to refer to the camel itself. Besides, some scholars claim that all the relations can be classified under only two categories: the Part-for-Whole and Whole-for-Part relations, or the Entity-for-Concomitant and Concomitant-for-entity relations (Al-Kurdiy, 1986), while others classify them into as many as 43 types (An-Naklaawiy, 1984). According to As-Saamurraa<iy (1974), rhetoricians have gone to extremes with the classifications to the extent that they drew diagrams that looked like geographic maps.

Obviously, such classifications would not be possible without enforced deduction. They are often criticized for being mentally tiresome, for they require mental effort to reach the conclusion that a particular instance belongs to a certain category. As-Sayyid (1978) maintains that the numerous relations mentioned by rhetoricians lead to bafflement and confusion, and some of them seem to be forced (p. 42).

One example of enforced deduction, given by Fayyood (1998), is the claim that ضربت زيدا (I beat Zayd) has a metonymy because the speaker did

not beat all Zayd but only part of him. Fayyood comments that enforced deduction is useless and is against the spontaneous nature of language.

Ahmad Badawiy (1950) confirms the same point of view as he declares that this is against linguistic taste. If we follow that approach, we will find that all our speech is tropes. He argues that if a trope does not draw the reader's attention, it should not be considered as a trope. This criterion is stricter than the one mentioned by Shinohara (2002) who identifies four categories of metonymies depending on the degree of their metonymyhood, and finally concludes that if it is easy to determine the target then we have a clear case of metonymy; if not, then there is little point in saying that the instance is one of metonymy.

More importantly, regardless of the problems of classification, some rhetoricians conclude that the classifications have no practical value. As-Saamurraa<iy (1974) contends that they are useless even for a student of rhetoric because they do not serve the literary text or the aesthetic aspect of the rhetorical case. As-Sagheer (1986) echoes the same viewpoint as he states that distinguishing between the overlapping metonymic relations requires philosophical scrutiny rather than rhetorical taste, which means that they are not justified rhetorically. Ibn Al-Atheer (died in 1239 AD), as cited in Abdul-Jaleel (1980), postulated that classification can only be justified if each class has a distinctive feature; otherwise, the classification is useless.

Al-Bayaatiy (1998) accuses the early rhetorical studies made after Al-Jurjaaniy of the tendency toward intensive classification and branching and of being void of any attempts at discovering the psychological implications or rhetorical values that create the intended effect on the recipient. Fortunately, this is beginning to change, for many modern researchers focus on bridging this gap and deal with the artistic value and resultant psychological effect (e.g. Aboo Moosaa, 1980; Fayyood, 1998; Al-Jarabiyy, 2000) which will be discussed in the next section.

Functions of metonymy. The primary function of metonymy is referential; that is, we use one entity to stand for another. But this does not answer the question: Why do we use metonymy? What makes us refer indirectly?

There is no doubt that using metonymy achieves some rhetorical benefits. While some think that metonymy is more eloquent than direct reference, Salmaan (2000) emphasizes that figurative reference and literal reference each can be more eloquent than the other if it is used in its right place.

According to Lakoff (1990), we use B instead of A because B is easier to understand, or to remember, or is more useful for the particular purpose. Fass (1997) adds that sometimes we need to "zoom out" or "zoom in"; that is, to highlight or to hide an entity in order to serve a particular

purpose in the discourse. For example, we use the Agent for Instrument to highlight the persons responsible for some action. Conversely, we use the Instrument for Agent to hide those responsible. We also use Location or Instrument for Agent or Patient when we want to objectify agents and patients and downplay the people responsible for the action.

In other words, we basically use metonymy to evoke certain images and to suppress other images that would otherwise be evoked by more direct reference. Even what Lakoff and Turner (1989) refer to as "poetic effect" is achieved through the same process of selective activation. In their example, the *rocking cradle* was used to refer to Christ, the baby it contains, because the poem is about historical cycles, and the rocking cradle connects the coming of Christ with the cyclic nature of events:

..but now I know

That twenty centuries of stony sleep

Were vexed to nightmare by *a rocking cradle* (p. 101).

The following are some of the functions that the use of metonymy fulfils:

1. Fantasy activation:

The recipient imagines the scene that results from assuming that the intended meaning is the literal meaning. Al-Maghribiy (1992) explains that such images are evoked temporarily when the words are uttered, then the clues determine the intended meaning and push the literal meaning away from the scope of imagination. Here is an interesting example by Aboo

Moosaa (1980): Upon hearing the verse أسنمة الآبال في سحابه /æsnimæt l-æ:bæ:li fi: sæ æ:bihi/ (The humps of camels are in its clouds), the mind imagines crowding humps in the clouds. Aboo Moosaa comments, "Styles are valued by how much they stimulate, evoke and move. The strongest of these are those that carry us to a state where we experience new feelings and live in new atmospheres" (p. 354).

Fareed (2000) points out that fantasy activation is like a sudden loud tone that shakes and alerts us. It also has an aesthetic value about which Al-Alawiy (2002) says, though not without exaggeration, "A tropical expression shakes a man upon hearing it. It stimulates him and sways his shoulders ... The addressee finds an ecstasy similar to that which comes with wine. When the talk is cut out, he sobers up" (p. 120).

2. Interest arousal:

There is some amount of vagueness in metonymy, for it requires thinking before it can be understood. It creates interest and pleasure in the recipients upon discovering the hidden intended meaning. As a result, they become more readily influenced by the utterance containing the metonymy.

Salmaan (2000) calls this influence 'Psychological Tickling'. Pankhurst (1994) postulates that a metonymy has to be novel to create such an effect.

When metonymy is used creatively, a great deal of its effect derives from unexpected deviance from literal truth, or the 'gap' between

linguistic form and semantic implication, which arouses the reader's curiosity and invites him to search for a less obvious referent. (p. 6)

3. Achieving specific goals:

One such goal is glorification. For instance, we may say رأيت العالم /ræ æjt l- æ:limæ/ (I saw the scientist) when the intended meaning is "I saw the student who will be a scientist" (Fayyood, 1998). Undermining is another goal. For example, أنظر إلى الجيفة كيف يتكبر! / n r ilæl-d i:fæti kæjfae jætækæbb r/ (Look at the rotten corpse how proudly he acts!). The intended meaning is "Look at the person who will die someday and turn into a rotten corpse how proudly he acts!" (Fayyood, 1998).

Pankhurst (1996) mentions an interesting example of the use of metonymy to communicate a particular attitude. The statement "Would you call a *Picasso* second-hand?" was used as an advertising slogan for used Mercedes-Benz cars. The metonymy in *Picasso* conveys a number of attitudes: (1) admiration of the product and producers, and (2) the idea that valuable things do not need to be new.

4. Expansion:

Using metonymy increases the chance of selecting the appropriate words. The speaker/writer can use a metonymy to avoid certain words that are not standard or that are heavy for the tongue or the receptive ear. Metonymy also helps a poet maintain the meter and rhyme of his poem. Salmaan

(2000) points out that tropes in general expand language because words are finite whereas meanings are not. He also draws attention to the fact that early scholars called metonymy *الاتساع* /*ælittisæ:* / (expansion) because it helps in expressing subtle meanings and ideas.

Imagery is resorted to due to the inadequacy of words and their literal meanings for expressing the inner feelings of the writer. ... So he moves from one metonymy to another and from one metaphor to another. It feels as if we jump with him in his skies from one horizon to another and be delighted. Or say as if we are in a cinema watching consecutive pictures that separate us from our real lives. We like and enjoy them because we get rid of our life burdens, at least for a while. (Dayf, 1988, p. 150)

5. Metonymy is often used as a basis for images when it replaces an abstract or a less concrete word. For example, sometimes we refer to the kingdom by the *crown* or *scepter* (Abul- Udoos, 1998). Terry (1999) explains this tendency by remarking that a large amount of our knowledge is acquired through the senses to the extent that all our abstract ideas have a material base and are thus easier to express and understand if connected with that concrete base.

6. Brevity:

Through the use of metonymy, one can express in one or two words what would otherwise require a whole sentence. Brevity is one of the aesthetic tools of language, and a preferred style is one that expresses the same meaning with the least number of words possible. Cicero, the Roman philosopher, said, "Brevity is a great praise of eloquence".

Thus, metonymy is an indispensable tool for writers and speakers, and it seems more common than many people think. It is important that translators be aware of the effects that the use of metonymy may have on the discourse so that they try not to lose the additional meanings in the process of translation.

Translation of metonymy. There is no doubt that metonymy is a universal phenomenon since it is deeply rooted in the human cognitive capacity to comprehend and organize experience. According to the cognitive linguistic view, metonymy as a trope is merely a linguistic realization of the broader cognitive phenomenon labeled metonymy.

The use of metonymic expressions in language is primarily a reflection of general conceptual metonymies and is motivated by general cognitive principles. We claim that all metonymies are ultimately conceptual in nature, and that many, if not most,

metonymies do not even show up in language" (Radden and Kövecses, 1999, p. 18).

Therefore, most studies concerned with the translatability of metonymy aim to prove that a high proportion of metonymies are universal. This should lead to the conclusion that at least some metonymies can be translated literally.

One such study was conducted by Kamei and Wakao (1992) who asked seven native speakers of Japanese and five native speakers of Chinese to translate 25 English sentences that included metonymies, then to judge their acceptability. They concluded that many metonymies are not literally translatable. However, they do not say what exactly they mean by a sentence being unacceptable. Is it that the sentence sounds novel or strange but understood, or is the sentence incomprehensible?

Kamei and Wakao (1992) used the results of this survey in the designing of a machine translation program, for figurative language in general poses a major challenge in machine translation systems. If the initial survey shows that at least one language does not accommodate the literal translation of a particular metonymy, the system accepts the metonymy for analysis, coming up with a metonymic reading. Then the metonymy is rendered by the generation component into each language literally or metonymically depending on the tendency of acceptability of

each language. Thus, the correct translation of metonymy should depend on two factors: universality of the metonymy and language tendency. Kamei and Wakao add a third factor which is the context, culture and familiarity. They comment that these are not expected to be dealt with by a machine translation system, but they are quite controllable by human translators.

Another experiment was conducted by Seto (1996) who investigated the lexicalization of the container-content schema in eight languages: Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Javanese, Turkish, Italian, Germanic, and English. For example, the word 'kettle' means "a metal pot for boiling", but it can also refer to the quantity a kettle will hold. Seto found that this pattern exists in all eight languages, which means that it is cross-linguistic. He suggests that since this polysemic pattern extends over language family boundaries, then it must be universal. This also means that the pattern has its basis in the general human conceptualization. It is, therefore, logical to expect that a literal translation of a metonymy that belongs to this pattern should not lead to confusion.

A similar study was conducted by Charteris-Black (2003) who compared the figurative uses of three oral body parts; namely, mouth, lip and tongue, in Malay and English, to find out whether there is an orientation toward metaphor or metonymy in the two languages. Investigation of the corpora that were taken from books, newspapers, and magazines provided evidence that both languages used metaphor,

metonymy and metaphorical figurative blends. The investigator concluded that the two languages have similar cognitive processing as well as discourse functions for the investigated body parts.

Peters (2003) comments that the problem with these studies is that they are conducted on small scales. He tried to bridge this gap by conducting a large-scale experiment that used the EuroWordNet, a multilingual thesaurus that includes wordnets from eight languages: English, Italian, Dutch, German, Spanish, French, Czech, and Estonian. The investigators identified regular polysemic patterns in English. For example, there is more than one word in English that means both a fabric and a covering made of the fabric (e.g. fleece, hair, tapa, wool). Peters investigated the existence of this pattern in two other languages: Dutch and Spanish, and he found that it does exist. The findings support the hypothesis that some metonymic patterns have a higher degree of universality than others. Yet, Peters admits that one main limitation of this experiment is that wordnets for Dutch and Spanish are much smaller than that for English, which means that the coverage of metonymies in these two languages is limited.

Thus, all the above-mentioned experiments connect the translatability of a metonymy to its universality, and they show that metonymies have varying degrees of universality.

In his comparative study, Yu (2001) investigated the metaphoric and metonymic use of expressions for the face in Chinese and English. He noted that figurative uses of the face are based on the biological facts and functions of the face. This explains why similar extensions in English and Chinese are found. Yu expresses his expectation that similar ones would be found in other languages as well, and concludes that "the phenomenon should be widespread, if not universal" (p. 20).

However, the expressions containing the "face" do not stand in a one-to-one relationship in the two languages. For example, the metonymy *to lose face* which means "to lose dignity" has several counterparts in Chinese. On the other hand, there are several idioms containing 'face' in English that do not have equivalents in Chinese. Yu attributes these differences to cultural variations in the values attached to those concepts. He believes that the cultural difference between two speech communities affects the distance between their languages. But no matter how far apart the two cultures may be, they always come down and meet at some point, for "cultures and languages are all wired to the very essence of humanness" (p. 30).

In another comparative study, Yu (2004) investigated the similarities and differences between Chinese and English in using metonymic and metaphoric expressions that use the eyes to refer to sight and mind. Yu found that the similarities and differences take three major forms:

1. Similar expressions with similar meanings.
2. Similar expressions with different meanings.
3. Different expressions with similar meanings.

Yu attributes the differences to the idea that those expressions are based on our common bodily experiences as they arise from the interaction between culture and body.

An interesting experiment by Frisson and Pickering (1999) used eye movement as a measure for the difficulty of comprehending conventional metonymies. They considered metonymy as suitable for eye tracking because it generally consists of one word only, contrary to idioms and metaphors. The investigators compared the processing of sentences that have the word "convent" used once literally to refer to a place and another time metonymically to refer to the institution in the place. The results of eye tracking show that the reader has no difficulty processing either the metonymic or literal usage of "convent". The investigators repeated the same experiments with the word "Vietnam" that can refer to a place or to an event. The results suggest that both literal and metonymic senses are interpreted directly and do not cause any processing difficulty.

Another important experiment by Frisson and Pickering (2003), as reported by Pickering, Frisson, McElree, and Traxler (2004), followed the same strategy using novel metonymies. The results show that novel

metonymies do not cause processing difficulty when appropriate context is provided. Consider the following statement:

Not so long before she died, my great grandmother met Needham in the street. I heard that she often read *Needham* when she had the time.

Frisson and Pickering explain that the comprehensibility of the metonymy is due to the readers' employing the Producer-for-Product Rule:

Roughly, if x refers to a producer, then x also refers to that producer's characteristic product.

This experiment has an important implication for translating metonymy since it suggests that even if literal translation introduces a novel metonymy into the target language, this metonymy may easily be understood provided that there is a clue that excludes the literal meaning and that the metonymy belongs to an already-established pattern in the target language. If these two conditions are not met, there is a great chance that a literal translation will lead to confusion and miscomprehension.

Samuel and Frank (2000) discuss the problem of translating figurative expressions. They point out that the translator will either produce a literal translation or reduce a figurative expression to its meaning only. Literal translation is the easiest thing to do, but the result is a translation that is not natural-sounding and the meaning is not clear. The alternative strategy, referred to by the investigators as over translation, involves

explicating all implicit information. The result may be clear and sounds natural, but it is dull and lifeless.

Samuel and Frank suggest that the translator must know or have access to the rhetorical tools of the target language in order to be able to make a sound decision on which translation strategy to follow. They stress that in any case, the translator should check his translation for comprehension and naturalness by consulting native speakers of the target language.

Newmark (1984) maintains that unless there is a corresponding metonymy in the target language, a metonymy – whether conventional or original – should be translated communicatively. He makes one exception, however, which is institutional metonymies such as the Kremlin, the White House, etc. that may or may not need explanations depending on the target language readers' knowledge.

Although Larson (1998) expresses a similar view as he postulates the existence of a corresponding metonymy in the target language, he mentions a third translation strategy which is to translate the metonymy literally (i.e. into the same metonymy) then to add its intended meaning. Larson suggests that this method be used if there is a component of emotions or impact that is lost when the metonymy is translated into a literal statement.

Similarly, Gutt (1992) places a special emphasis on the impact of using figurative language and warns against losing or explicating it:

Translators should have a firm grasp of hitherto neglected aspects of meaning. In particular, they should understand that there are important differences between expressing and implicating information, between strong and weak communication. They should understand the importance of open-endedness in communication, especially for figurative language and poetic effects, and the danger of limitation and distortion that can arise from explication. (p. 72)

Gutt also stresses that translators should distinguish between genuine translation problems, which result from mismatches in the linguistic resources of the two languages, and communication problems due to mismatches in contextual assumptions between the source text audience and target language audience. He claims that such a distinction is particularly important because the explication of contextual information in the body of the translation always has a distorting effect.

The same view is expressed by De Beaugrande (1978) who thinks that explication deprives the readers from the chance to infer and experience the pleasure of thinking. Besides, the translator's interpretation may not be the only possible one. Gutt remarks that "while explication is obviously advantageous to uninitiated readers, in the long run it will often prejudice a deeper and richer understanding of the originally intended meaning, perhaps precluding the reader from exploring wider ramifications of the original intentions" (p. 73).

This means that where the translation of a metonymy leads to unintelligibility or miscomprehension, the problem should be solved through linguistic means within the body of the translation. But if the problem emanates from lack of background information, the reader should be helped into building up the necessary contextual knowledge outside the body of the translation.

The literature reviewed proves that at least some metonymies are universal, and these are expected to be translatable into the same metonymies. However, experiments that use eye tracking show that even novel metonymies are translatable provided that there is adequate contextual information to guide the reader into the correct interpretation. Another point stressed in the literature is that translators should be aware that metonymies are not only an aesthetic tool; their use has an impact that needs to be identified and maintained or at least compensated for in the translation.

Religious Translation

Most of the literature on religious translation focuses on the translation of the Bible which is claimed to be the most translated book in the world (Goldenberg, 1990; Barnstone, 1993). Therefore, a large part of our discussion of religious translation will deal with the recommended

translation methods for Biblical discourse, for the arguments involved may have important insights for the translation of the Qur'an.

Formal equivalence vs. dynamic equivalence. One of the basic elements in any definition of translation is the assumption that translation involves the conveying of meaning from one language to another.

Newmark (1984), for instance, defines translation as "a craft consisting in the attempt to replace a written message and/or statement in one language by the same message and/or statement in another language" (p. 7).

Consider also the definition given by Reiss (2000b): "Interlingual translation is a bilingual mediated process of communication, which ordinarily aims at the production of a target language text that is functionally equivalent to a source language text" (p. 160). Note the use of "and/or statement" in Newmark's definition and the use of "ordinarily" in Reiss's definition. These expressions indicate attempts to avoid the exclusion of cases of translation where the rendition of meaning is not the primary aim.

In earlier stages of Christianity, little attention was given to the semantic content of religious text. There was more concern about the general effect that that sort of text was supposed to create in the recipient. Such effect was achieved through the use of mysterious expressions and unfamiliar words. Translators of the Bible did not think it was necessary to make their translations intelligible. They held to a claim that religion is

often read for the comfort it brings to its readers rather than for intelligibility (Nida, 1964).

This view began to change with the Renaissance movement, then the Reformation, and the more recent tendency for intellectual inquiry. Greater emphasis began to be placed on the meaning of religious expression. The need for producing intelligible religious text became more obvious when the recipients were targets of religious call, especially whenever the religion was text-based such as Christianity. The task of an evangelical would be much easier if the religious text, the carrier of the Word of God, spoke for itself (ibid).

The first translation of the Bible appeared in the second century BC when the Old Testament was rendered into Greek. Shortly afterwards, some of the new translations of the New Testament were also made into Latin (Nida, 2001). The New Testament was translated into 1012 languages, and the Old Testament into 392 languages, not to mention the incomplete translations which are used primarily by missionaries especially in Africa (Ilias, 2002). This should explain the abundant literature on the translation of the Bible, as compared to the literature written on the translation of the Qur'an.

A large part of the literature on the translation of the Bible discusses the most appropriate method to be followed. Much of the controversy is about whether to translate the Bible literally or to convey the meaning

without having to stick to the source language structure, a controversy that is claimed to be a major obstacle in the way of composing a proper definition of translation (Nida, 2000). A translator has to decide whether to produce a 'formal-equivalence translation' or 'dynamic-equivalence translation'. Nida considers that his most important contribution to Bible translation is to help people know what the text means rather than what words it says. This is why he argues for dynamic-equivalence translation which he defines as "the closest natural equivalent to the source language message" (1964, p. 166). A natural translation is one which fits the target language and culture, the context of the message and the target audience. It requires adaptation of the grammar and lexicon, and it avoids anomalies and vulgarities. In sum, it is a translation about which a person who is both bilingual and bicultural can say, "That is just the way we would say it" (ibid, p. 166).

The major focus of dynamic translation is the response of the recipients. The same message that is communicated to the original audience should be communicated to the audience of the target text. This should be given priority over resemblance of the translation to the original text (Nida and Taber, 1969). This is why dynamic-equivalence has come to be called 'functional equivalence', the very essence of which is challenged by posing questions like: What does the same effect mean? And how is it to be measured or assessed? (Osers, 1998: 57)

Formal-equivalence translation, on the other hand, was defined as one that is "basically source-oriented; that is, it is designed to reveal as much as possible the form and content of the original message" (Nida, 1964, p. 165). Such a translation tries to reproduce idioms almost literally so that the reader gets to know the way the original text used local cultural elements to express the message. But such a translation has much that is not readily intelligible, which means there is a pressing need for marginal notes.

To justify his position against literal translation, Nida refers to the Information Theory. The main idea in this theory is that the amount of information carried by any message is determined by the unpredictability of the signals employed. This means that the more unpredictable a message, the more information it carries and the more effort that is required for decoding it. Nida estimates that languages are 50% redundant. When we translate literally, we reduce the amount of redundancy, because we have to use unusual syntax, rare forms of words, noncollocating words and unfamiliar topics. When redundancy is reduced, the message becomes more difficult to decode (1964).

Thus, literal translation produces a text that requires both time and effort to comprehend and that lacks naturalness. To that Nida (1998) adds that sometimes literal translation also leads to miscomprehension. He gives an example in the statement "Blessed are the poor in spirit". This is often

misunderstood and taken to mean "Blessed are the people who don't have ambition or drive or who are discouraged and apathetic", which is a wrong interpretation. Nida is content with the New English Bible rendering of this phrase as "Blessed are the people who know their need of God". Nida goes further in supporting the explication of information when he praises the Contemporary English Version for turning the passive into active and thus rendering the same statement into "God blesses those people who depend only on him".

Griffin (2002) compares excerpts from the translation of the Bible by C. S. Lewis and the Authorized Version in order to support his view that paraphrase, another term for dynamic-equivalence translation, is better than literal translation. Griffin points out that literal translation of the Bible would produce 300-word sentences in English, because there are 100-word sentences in Latin, and that will be rendered, out of fidelity, into very long English sentences. The outcome will be "strings and strings of run-on sentences" (p. 3). Osers (1998) thinks that literal translation has always been the practice of incompetent or inexperienced translators, or maybe of translators who have a sense of insecurity translating in a new linguistic environment.

It seems that the preference for dynamic-equivalence translation is the popular view among scholars. All member organizations of the Forum of Bible Agencies, at their meeting on April 21, 1999, recommended

avoidance of literal translation. It is believed that changing the structure of the text is necessary in order to achieve accuracy and maximal comprehension. Translators should also be aware that the feelings and attitudes of the original text should be rendered into the target text in forms that are consistent with normal usage of the target language. It is true that the original cultural and historical context should be kept unchanged, but this should be done in such a way that the target recipients may understand the original message (Forum of Bible Agencies, 2002).

The shift of emphasis to dynamic-equivalence translation was associated with a change in the role of the church. The role of the church is no longer to explain the ambiguous text, being the literal translation of the Bible, but to apply, and help people to apply, the meaningful translation to life (Neff, 2002).

Marlowe (2002) thinks that Nida went to an extreme position in this respect. Marlowe points out that the Bible itself contains situations where there is always a teacher to explain the Bible for the audience or readers. Therefore, he thinks, it is normal for the Bible to be not self-explanatory. The Bible itself says that it is difficult to be understood by those who are not spiritual. Marlowe also argues that even if the Bible is translated through dynamic equivalence, it still contains much that cannot be understood without some sort of preparation, carried out by the church. He says, "However much these versions may smooth the way for ... a lonely

reader on the sentence level, they cannot solve the larger questions of interpretation which must press upon the mind of any thoughtful reader" (p. 5).

It is generally claimed by Marlowe and others that the theory behind dynamic equivalence developed originally as a method for translating the Bible into languages of primitive tribes who had not been reached by missionaries (Barnwell, 1987; Marlowe, 2002; Kirk, 2005). Therefore, this method reflects Nida's belief that there was no need for planting churches in those distant areas and his sympathy for those uneducated groups who need to have the message conveyed to them in as clear a way as possible.

Kirk (2005) also accuses proponents of dynamic-equivalence translation of trying to cut the close relationship between the missionary endeavors and western colonization, since evangelists are often accused of being more interested in spreading the western culture and western religious terms than in spreading the essence of the Christian message.

One major weakness of dynamic-equivalence translation lies in Nida's claim that meaning can easily be isolated from words and sentences to be contained again in another natural-sounding equivalent set of words and sentences (Mojola and Wendland, 2003):

The reading, interpretation and translation of texts are influenced by presuppositions and assumptions, prejudices and biases, value systems and belief systems, textual traditions and practices, world

views, ideology and interests. Readers have no access to the pure original, or to the pure thought of the original author. They interpret texts through the lens of language, their experience, language, belief system, circumstances, interests, needs and agendas (Mojola and Wendland, 2003, p. 8).

Marlowe claims that there is a considerable amount of loss that results from the method of dynamic equivalence. There are important conceptual differences that can only be conveyed through the uncommon Biblical phrases and words. He uses the principle of Linguistic Relativity to support his view that there is loss of meaning in dynamic equivalence. According to this principle, "the categories and distinctions encoded in one language-system are unique to that system and incommensurable with those of other systems" (Lyons, 1990, p. 305). Because the differences between Ancient Hebrew and English are great, meaning loss is inevitable and can only be avoided by sticking to the words and structures of the original text.

We cannot think like Biblical writers [who spoke ancient Hebrew] unless we use their words. We can keep the cognitive distortion to a minimum if we become habituated to literal translations of the Biblical texts ... but if we put everything in an idiom which is perfectly natural English, we still inevitably distort the meaning of the original. (Marlowe, 2002, p. 7)

In order to undermine the difficulties relating to text comprehension that arise with literal translation, Marlowe says that every profession has its jargon which is learned by its members so fast, so why should the church be an exception?

In defense of his views, Nida, as quoted by Neff (2002), states that they are not in disagreement, as Marlowe claims, with linguistic relativity. Marlowe thinks that cultural meanings are attached to words and that they can flow cross-linguistically through word-to-word translation. Nida, on the other hand, believes that words have meanings only in their culture, and these meanings cannot flow across cultures. If we translate the words for an audience in a different culture, they become meaningless, so why stick to them. This view is supported by an interesting fact noted in the *Natural Semantic Metalanguage* being that only about 50% of all words have equivalents in all or most languages. Even words that are thought to be equivalent turned out to be quite different in meaning (Myhill, 1997).

Although Nida has expressed his support for dynamic equivalence translation very clearly, he views translations as a continuum beginning with very literal translations and ending with highly dynamic-equivalence renderings. He believes that there is a point at each end of the scale where the translation fails because of lack of efficiency, accuracy or relevance. A very literal translation is overloaded because it is full of awkward expressions. A highly dynamic-equivalence translation, on the other hand,

is unfaithful and is more dangerous, especially if the translator is clever enough to conceal it (Nida, 1964).

The problem is that even on the seemingly right spot on the continuum, the translator experiences a clash of objectives. While Ivir (1998), for example, praises literal translation for its high potential for communicational precision and competence, he postulates that the recipients should be familiar with the concepts expressed in the text. He also claims that literal translation is communicatively inadequate if there is cultural information implicitly contained rather than explicitly stated in the text. The translation will also sound foreign which makes it more communicatively conspicuous than is justified.

The clash of objectives is also discussed by Gutt (2000) who declares that while the translator needs to maintain the authenticity of the text, it is also necessary to communicate the content as clearly as possible. The clash is greater whenever the difference in the cognitive environment between the original audience and translation audience is greater. Although Gutt shows his preference for literal translation, he suggests that two different versions (free and strict) be produced to serve two different audiences (uneducated and educated). He also supports the use of footnotes to provide the readers with the background information required for the correct comprehension of the original.

Wendland (1996) argues against the use of footnotes claiming that they require unjustifiable effort on the part of the recipients. He expects that the readers will ignore them and eventually ignore the whole book because they cannot understand it.

Maintaining the authenticity of a religious piece of text does put effort upon recipients, but it is by no means unjustifiable. Religious text is not read for fun but for the guidance it provides. In a sense, it is like reading an instructions manual which describes how to assemble then operate a machine. Many people do not enjoy reading manuals because they have to make effort trying to identify the parts referred to in the description. Yet, they do read them carefully because they need to. Manuals cannot be made much simpler because they talk about concepts the recipient is not familiar with. The bottom line is when effort is justifiable, people make it.

Before we proceed to a review of the contributions of Muslim scholars to the controversy of how to translate religious texts, one important fact needs to be stressed: The Bible and the Qur'an are two different types of religious text. Aziz and Lataiwish (2000) classify religious texts into two basic categories: religious texts where both the word and the message are considered sacred such as the Qur'an, and religious texts where only the message is holy and the word is not, such as the Bible.

Of course, there are those who think that words of the Bible are holy. Currie (1999), for example, attacks dynamic-equivalence translation because, she claims, it produces inaccurate and unreliable versions of the Bible. She says that it reflects disrespect for the word of God and is motivated by greed and a need to be innovative. Then she states that dynamic-equivalence translation is justified only on the basis of a denial of the idea that the Bible was word-for-word inspired by God.

The same view is echoed by Fitton (1999) who considers dynamic equivalence, as represented in the New International Version, as "Satan's ploy" because it means a rejection of the Scriptures as the inspired revelation of God. It led to omission of words and phrases and even whole passages. He claims that some Scriptures have even been tampered with.

However, it is widely admitted by Christians that the current Bible was written by people rather than revealed word-by-word by God.

Chatzitheodorou, a translator and translator trainer, wrote, "One basic problem inherent in Bible translation is that we do not have the original manuscript of the Bible, but copies of copies of copies." (2001, p. 1)

In contrast, the Qur'an is believed by Muslims to be the Word of Allah revealed to his messenger Muhammad - peace be upon him - and guaranteed by Allah not to undergo any changes. The Almighty says,

{إنا نحن نزلنا الذكر و إنا له لحافظون }

Sura Al-Hijr (sura no. 15), verse 9.

/innæ: næ n næzzælnæð-ðikræ wæ innæ: læhu: læ æ:fi u:n/

Translation: (Indeed, it is We who sent down the message [i.e. the Qur'an], and indeed, We will be its guardian.) (p. 344)

This difference between the Bible and the Qur'an has its implications for the selection of the method to follow in translating the Qur'an. For example, Aziz and Lataiwish reason that since the words of the Qur'an are sacred, they cannot be rendered into the target language because they would lose their divine value. Translation of the word is, therefore, impossible. Unfortunately, the investigators seem to be confusing the loss of divine value with the loss of meaning in order to arrive at the conclusion that word-for-word translation is not the best choice. But they are right that any translation of the Qur'an is not authoritative and cannot be used for worship as a replacement for the original text. As for the second type of religious text, of which the Bible is an example, it can be translated into any language, and the translation is authoritative (Aziz and Lataiwish, 2000).

Translation of the Holy Qur'an. The translatability of the Qur'an has been a controversial issue among Muslim scholars due to both theological and linguistic considerations. Since here is not the right place for a discussion of the theological aspects of the controversy, only the

linguistic considerations related to the uniqueness of the language of the Qur'an will be discussed.

There is no doubt that the language of the Qur'an is unique in the sense that it creates in the recipients an effect so strong that it was described as "magic" by the enemies of Prophet Muhammad – peace and blessings of Allah be upon him - fourteen centuries ago. One such enemy was Al-Waleed ibn Al-Mugheerah, a leading figure of Quraysh, the tribe of the Prophet to whom the Qur'an was revealed. When Ibn Al-Mugheerah heard the Qur'an being recited, he admired its language and could not conceal his astonishment. Fearing that he might embrace Islam and then be followed by the rest of the tribe, Quraysh pressured him to disgrace the Qur'an. He tried, but the worst he could say was that it was "magic" (Az-Zu biy, 1985).

It is not easy to determine where the miraculous nature of the Qur'an lies. Qu b (1978) pointed out that the miracle lies in all sorts of harmony that can be found in the verses: harmony of sound, harmony of images and harmony of the feelings evoked consecutively as the reader smoothly goes from one verse to another.

Others attribute it to the density of associative meanings carried by many of the words of the Qur'an, which makes it impossible to find equivalents for such words in other languages (Al-Maraaghiy, 1981). Still,

others see the miracle in the Qur'anic literary style, the wonder of its rhyme and the marvel of its rhythm (Phillips, 1997).

It has been suggested that the inimitability of the Qur'an is not necessarily unique, for there are great English poets, like Shakespeare and Chaucer, who had a unique style. In defense of the Qur'an, Phillips argues that it is possible, after careful study of Shakespeare's works, to produce a work in the same style. If written in old ink on old paper, critics might believe that it was written by Shakespeare himself even after careful study. As for the Qur'an, attempts have been made to forge chapters, but none stood close scrutiny (1997).

There have been many attempts at providing good translations of the Qur'an, but most of them are not acceptable. There is always a significant loss or change of meaning. This is why it has been said that "the Qur'an suffers more than any other book we think of by the translation, however masterly" (Okpanachi, 1999, p. 123).

There are two major obstacles that get in the way of producing good translations of the Qur'an. First, there is a cultural obstacle resulting from the psychological, social and religious differences between cultures.

Thaakir believes that this obstacle hinders rendition of meaning with the minimum degree of honesty and respect. For example, some translators of the Qur'an, non-Muslims of course, claim that the Qur'an was written by

Muhammad (Thaakir, 1991). One example of such translators is Dawood (1974).

The second obstacle is of a linguistic nature. Arabic is a semitic language and differs greatly in structure and resonance from any European language. Abdullah (1992) reports a number of linguistic problems that are often encountered by translators of the Qur'an:

1. The semantic range of two seemingly equivalent words can differ in two ways: (a) one word has a wider semantic range than the other, or (b) one word is ambiguous and the other has only one meaning.
2. A euphemism should be translated with a euphemism that has the same degree of departure from the original meaning.
3. Languages differ in their classification of existence, which has created lexical gaps (i.e. words that do not have equivalents in the other language).
4. When translating the different kinds of tropical expressions such as metaphor, metonymy, etc., the intended meaning needs to be conveyed while maintaining the effect created by the trope.
5. Each of the names and attributes of Allah should have an equivalent that is not used for any other name or attribute. For example, the equivalent of الرحيم / r-r i:m/, Most Merciful, should be exclusive to this attribute and not be used for other attributes such as الرحمن / r-r mæ:n/ (the Gracious).

6. There are words that have acquired new, special meanings in Islam such as *salaah* and *zakaah*. There is no one-word equivalent for each of these terms, and an explanation is sometimes necessary.

In spite of all such difficulties, there have been numerous attempts at translating the Qur'an. In fact, translation of the Qur'an started fourteen Hegiri centuries ago when the Prophet Muhammed – peace be upon him – sent messages to non-Arab nations calling them to Islam (Al-fawzaan, 2002). Since Islam is a text-based religion, it was necessary to translate the Qur'an or at least parts of it into the languages of those nations.

One of the earliest English translations was produced by Alexander Ross in 1649. Although some Muslim scholars have expressed their certainty that Ross's translation aimed primarily at distorting the Qur'an and showing that it was written by Muhammad (Aboo-Firaakh, 1982), this may only be a secondary motive. Maṭar (1998) points out that Ross used the translation of the Qur'an to attack the commonwealth authority of the time and to ridicule weak censorship. He used the Qur'an as evidence for the intellectual and religious chaos that emerges when sects are allowed to expand and when religious authority is weakened.

The following are some of the most common objectives that motivate translations of the Qur'an:

1. There are translations produced by Christians or Jews with the intention of fighting the Qur'an by casting doubts on its divine revelation and its

significance to Muslims. Al-Biqaa iy (1996) points out that most of those translations were produced at the time of wars between Muslims and Christians in Andalus (now called Spain) or at the time of the Crusade Wars. One example is the translation produced by Ali-Robert de Kenton, an English priest, in response to a request by Pierre de Venerable of Cluny. De Kenton finished the translation in 1143, but the Church did not allow it to be published because it would introduce Islam to the people. The translation was published only in 1543 in Pal, Switzerland, and in 1550 and 1565 in Zurich. Muhammad Ali (2002) claims that all orientalist's translations of the Qur'an were made in bad faith, but that the more recent ones do not reveal their true intentions (p. 33). He provides examples even from Arberry's translation (1996) that has been highly valued by some Muslim scholars. These scholars believe that there cannot be a perfect translation, and that the instances of mistranslation noted in Arberry's work are only mistakes (Saab, 2002).

2. There are translations that were produced with the intention of interpreting the Qur'an in accordance with the translator's religious tenets. For example, according to Muhanna (1978), translations of Maulana Muhammad Ali, Malik Ghulam Farid, and Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, reflect the translators' Qadiani beliefs. The translators are followers of Ghulam Ahmed Al-Qadiany, who announced that he was the Promised

Messiah. This claim led to other erroneous beliefs such as the denial of finality of the prophethood of Muhammad, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him. Although the translators declared respect for the book of Allah, they attempted to spread their beliefs by interpreting some verses in the most unusual ways that violated the language norms and the interpretations agreed on by the majority of Muslim religious scholars (Muhanna, 1978).

Another example is the translation by Baqir Behbudi, a Shi'ite scholar who unreservedly expressed his unfounded views in his work, not to mention the innumerable instances of mistranslation (Kidwai, 1999).

3. Some orientalists translated the Qur'an only to display their knowledge of Arabic. Being non-Muslims, those translators did not fully appreciate the cultural and religious value of the Qur'an. Regis Blachere, for example, thought that some verses were missing from the Qur'an and replaced them with parts from the Old Testament. He also reordered the suras and verses according to the order of revelation.

4. Other orientalists translated the Qur'an only to know or to show its content to non-Arab readers. The French orientalist Jacques Berk, for example, claimed that many Algerians did not understand the Qur'an before they read his French translation (Al-Laawindiy, 2001). One problem with the translations of this category is the translators' poor knowledge of Arabic.

5. Many of the translations of the Qur'an were produced by Muslims who thought that the meanings of the Qur'an should be conveyed into other languages in order to achieve the following:

- a. Help the non-Arab Muslims to know the teachings of Islam.
- b. Help the non-Arab Muslims to appreciate the splendor of the Qur'an.
- c. Correct the distorted image of Islam created by misleading translations.
- d. Help the non-Muslim foreigners who seek the truth.
- e. Fulfill the duty of spreading the Word of Allah in the whole world. (Shihaatah, 1980)

But good intentions are not enough even if accompanied by enthusiastic effort, for they do not guarantee perfect translations. So the appropriate question to pose is whether a perfect translation can really exist.

There is a famous Italian proverb, "Traduttore, traditore!" translated paraphrasally by Griffin (2002) into: "You, a translator? You're nothing but a traitor!" The proverb means that there is no translation without loss, which makes the translation process an act of betrayal to the source text. The proverb is even truer of the translation of the Qur'an because of its inimitability. However, since there is more than a billion Muslims around the world, and most of them are not Arab (Al-Mu aayirjiy, 1985), it would

be unfair to deny these the guidance they need because there is not a perfect translation of the Qur'an. Therefore, the idea of translating the Qur'an is widely accepted now, and the debate has shifted from whether or not to translate it to the question of how to minimize the loss of meaning.

Al- Ubayd (2002) mentions three different methods for translating the Holy Qur'an: literal, lexical, and interpretive translation. The first method is what he calls "literal translation" by which he means translating each word into its equivalent in the target language, while maintaining the same word order. This method is impractical, and impossible. Al-Filaasiy (2003) cites Ibn Uthaymeen in his *fatwa* (formal legal opinion) that this method is prohibited because in order to translate the Qur'an literally, certain conditions need to be met. The two languages have to have similar word orders, and there has to be a one-to-one correspondence between the lexical items of the two languages. Even if the target language has a similar word order to that of Arabic, the target language will not produce the same effect in the recipient as that created by the language of the Qur'an, nor will it convey the whole meaning. No matter how similar the two languages may be, it is unlikely that the lexical or syntactic equivalents will carry the same connotative meanings as those of the source language lexis and structure. This is especially true when the two languages are spoken in two different cultures, which is often the case.

The second method mentioned by Al- Ubayd (2002) is lexical translation which involves replacing the source language words with target language items that convey the same meaning, while changing the order in accordance with the word order rules of the target language. This is the method followed in most translations of the Qur'an, especially those produced by Muslims. Such translators hold so much respect for the sacred text they feel reluctant to change the structure of the verses.

It is important to note that this is the method referred to by most scholars as "literal translation". This term, in particular, has been commonly used with different denotations. Take, for example, the study of El-Gemei (2000) on the power of discourse in religious translation. Among the objectives of this study, according to El-Gemie, was to argue for literal translation of the Holy Qur'an. Here is how she defines her usage of the term:

It should be noted here that for the TL to bring out the true picture of power in the religious ayas ... [the text] should be translated literally.

In the sense that the dialogue form should be transferred into a dialogue in the TL in the same order of question followed by an answer (p. 4).

This variation of perspective accords with Nida's view of translations as a continuum that has very literal translations on one extreme and very

dynamic translations on the other (1964). Therefore it is very important to define our usage of the term. In the current study, "literal translation" means translating every source language word into its equivalent in the target language, while taking into account the syntactic and semantic rules of the TL. The majority of existing translations of the Qur'an follow the literal method though they are criticized for it. In the rest of this study, Al-Ubayd's lexical translation will be called literal translation.

A. Al-Humaydaan and A. Mahmoud (2002) criticize the existing literal translations of the Qur'an, and argue that literal translation can lead to semantic ambiguity. However, the extent to which the translation of a certain verse is negatively affected by literal translation depends on the structure of the verse. Some verses have a simple structure where literal translation would not cause ambiguity. Other verses have a complicated structure, or express cultural concepts that are alien to the target reader. Here, a literal translation would definitely lead to ambiguity because of the linguistic differences between Arabic and English on the lexical, grammatical, morphological, pragmatic and contextual levels.

Another criticism against literal translation is expressed by Aziz (2002) who describes the existing literal translations of the Qur'an as unnatural and incapable of rendering the secondary meanings. Literal

translation focuses on the denotation of words and leaves out all other types of meaning: connotative, metaphorical, etc.

Al-jumhoor and Al-Baṭal (2002) criticize Newmark for considering religious text as a type of text that should be translated semantically rather than communicatively. Semantic translation, they claim, is incapable of rendering the communicative functions of a text. They argue that the task of translators of any text, except for technical and scientific texts, is not only to deal with two different languages, but also to deal with two different cultures.

If we are to refer to Newmark's (1984) dichotomy of semantic and communicative translation, we should use Newmark's definition of these two terms. Otherwise, we should state our own definitions that determine the limits of such concepts, which the investigators failed to do. Newmark talks about communicative translation which aims mainly at conveying to the readers an effect similar to that of the original text. Communicative translation should thus render the force rather than the content of the text. Therefore, the translator has the right to correct the logic of the source text, change the structure, omit repetitions or unintelligible metaphors, and solve any ambiguities as long as the equivalent effect is guaranteed. In addition, communicative translation is addressed to a limited category of readership and performs a specific function.

Semantic translation, on the other hand, is more appropriate for addressing all readers, or as Newmark says, for "all who have ears to hear" (p. 48). He distinguishes between semantic translation and literal translation by stating that the former respects the context and the semantic structure as well as the syntactic structure of the target language, whereas the latter takes into account only the syntactic rules of the target language. Therefore, a semantic translator has the right to shorten extraordinarily long sentences and to interpret unintelligible metaphors. Newmark points out that a semantic translation is always inferior to the source, whereas a communicative translation may be superior to it. Semantic translation, however, may be resorted to whenever the language of the source text is as important as the message, which is often the case in literary texts.

All in all, Newmark seems to be quite justified in recommending semantic translation for religious texts. This is truer of the Qur'anic text, in particular, because Muslims believe that the Qur'an is all divine and its language carries layers after layers of meaning. Therefore, a translator cannot claim that he can determine the force (or act) in a verse and render it communicatively, ignoring all language that does not serve to express that force. The liberty of a translator of the Qur'an to change, add, or omit should be as limited as his human capability to conceive all the rich meanings carried by the Qur'anic verses.

The third type of Al- Ubayd's (2002) methods of Qur'an translation is the interpretive. This can be done in one of two ways: First, to translate interpretively and directly from the Qur'an. The translator is not committed to replace every Arabic word with its equivalent in the target language. The translator should have knowledge of both the Qur'an interpretation and translation techniques. *The Meaning of the Qur'an* by S. A. Maududi (1999) is a good example of this sort of translation. The second option is to translate the Arabic commentaries of the Qur'an. To do so, it is enough for the translator to be good at translation and he need not be knowledgeable of the Qur'an interpretation. An example of this type is the translation of *Tafsir ibn Kathir* (2003).

Al- Ubayd points out that some of the existing translations use a mixture of the three methods without an obvious reason. Unfortunately, he does not give any examples to show that it is really possible to follow one and only one of the methods he mentioned. He himself remarks that lexical translation (our literal translation) is possible in some constructions and impossible in others, so nothing can stop us from assuming that the translators tried to stick to the source text only when it was possible to do so. Hence the mixture of the methods!

Assessment of the Qur'an translations. One of the most comprehensive works on the translations of the Qur'an is Kidwai's annotated bibliography (1998) which includes more than 30 translations starting with the orientalist's translations, which he considers as part of the Christian missionaries to distort the image of Islam, through the earliest Muslim translations at the beginning of the 20th century, to the most recent ones. What is special about Kidwai's bibliography – that he claims to be the first to do - is that it gives the reader an idea about the translator's approach to the Qur'an and the quality of the translation. He recommends certain translations as accurate, and warns against reading any translation published by a non-Muslim even if the translation is a faithful one because non-Muslim publishers may allow errors or omissions.

Abdul-Muhsin (2002) examined a number of translations produced by orientalist's. He comments that most of these translations were based on the equivalence of words rather than the meaning of the whole text (a whole verse or more) because they attempted to imitate the Qur'an. The investigator stresses the fact that the Qur'an is inimitable, first because of the great differences between Arabic and the European languages in terms of sentence structure, figures of speech, etc., and second and more importantly, because the Qur'an is meant by Allah to be a miracle which even the Arab nonbelievers of Makkah, who were known for their superiority in eloquence, could not imitate. Some orientalist's translations

ignore the original Arabic text and depend on translations of the Qur'an into other languages as their source text, which means further distortion and loss of meaning.

The disrespect for the Qur'an also shows in changing the order of the suras, albeit this is generally against the ethics of translation. Some orientalist such as Palmer, Rodwell, and Bell ordered the suras according to the order of revelation. Others, like Rigis Blashier ordered them according to the stages of Da wah (Islamic call); still others according to their poetic nature such as Dawood (1974).

The low quality of the orientalist's translations can be attributed to a number of factors such as the translator's weakness in Arabic or ignorance of Islam, the great differences between Arabic and European languages, and the translator's indifference about observing the ethics of translation (Abdul-Muhsin, 2002).

The current tendency in Qur'anic translation studies is toward narrowing the scope of investigation as much as possible either by limiting the number of translations dealt with or the number of suras examined, or by concentrating on a particular linguistic aspect in the Qur'an to determine the best way it can be translated. For example, Abdul-Raof (2005) discusses the problem of translating certain instances of cultural and linguistic untranslatability in the Qur'an. He thinks the best solution may be

paraphrase through domestication, transposition, or dynamic equivalence, but he is aware that this technique robs the Qur'anic text of its special religious character. He does not suggest further solutions, but he agrees with Nida (1998) that it is necessary to provide notes about cultural differences in many instances. However, he strongly disagrees with Nida in his calling for creative adjustments that aim at accommodating the sociolinguistic sensitivities of the target language audience. Abdul-Raof stresses the importance of preserving the authenticity of the Qur'an whenever possible.

Jassem and Jassem (2002) focused on sura Al-Faatihah (sura no. 1), and the study included eight translations of the Qur'an. The investigators criticize the use of certain words which indicate a Christian influence on the translators, i.e. the words are from the Bible. There is also an overuse of transliteration of Arabic words, which means that a lot of explanation needs to be done. The investigators suggest a number of criteria that can be used for evaluating the translations: belief, general knowledge, linguistic and stylistic loyalty to the source text, general meaning, general attitude (considering it a divine revelation or not), and aesthetics.

Another study was conducted by Abdul-Raheem (2002) who investigated the way Arabic assertive light *إن* /in/ - as in { *وإن كنا لخاطئين* } /wæ in k nnæ: læx :ti i:n/ , sura Yoosuf (sura no. 12), verse 91 - was

rendered in six translations of the Qur'an into different languages. He found that all six translators made mistakes in translating assertive light **إِنْ** /in/ either by completely overlooking it or by attributing to it a different function than assertion. Abdul-Raheem recommends that a guide for Qur'an translators be published explaining relevant linguistic and theological issues.

Hassanein (1992) points out that the objective that should be sought in any translation of the Qur'an is to render the meaning of the text, its communicative effect and the beauty of the language. Therefore, in her study which was restricted to examining the translation of sura Maryam (sura no. 19), she searched for the mismatches in meaning and in communicative effect between the source text and five different translations. She found that all five translations did a good job in rendering the meaning, though each had a number of mismatches, but they varied greatly in how well they managed to render the communicative effect.

El Sheikh (1990) compared Pickthall's and Arberry's translations of the last section of the Holy Qur'an. He chose these two translations because, he claimed, they represent two contrasting approaches to translation: the semantic approach and the communicative approach, respectively. El Sheikh investigated the problems in the two translations on the morphological, lexical, syntactic, semantic and stylistic levels, and evaluated each translation in terms of how communicative it was. He

concluded that Pickthall's translation was better only in terms of the ordering and numbering of verses, for Pickthall concentrated on the dictionary meaning of words at the expense of the message. Arberry's translation was found to be worthy of revision by making use of the merits of other translations.

Rizk (1996) discussed the problem of equivalence in five translations. He evaluated lexical and stylistic equivalence in the translations of three suras; namely, Al-Faatiḥah (sura no. 1), Al-Ikhlāṣ (sura no. 112), and An-Naṣr (sura no. 110). He noted the following problems: inaccurate selection of lexical items, broadening or narrowing the meaning, overlooking the connotative meaning, overuse of archaic words, translating the names of Allah without transliterating them, and use of Biblical terms. Because his judgment was highly subjective, Rizk conducted interviews with Ghali and Ezzat and they supported his judgment. Rizk suggests that Al-Azhar (an Islamic university in Cairo, Egypt) selects one commentary to be used for all translations, an idea that is far from realistic because Al-Azhar is not accepted as an authority by all Muslims. New translations of the Qur'an will continue to depend on different commentaries.

Ereksoussi (2003) investigated the translation of metaphor in the Qur'an. She analyzed and compared the renditions of 16 Qur'anic metaphors in three translations. The reduction of the metaphor to sense,

translating it into a different metaphor, or deleting it altogether have resulted in loss of meaning and/or the rhetorical impact of the metaphor. This means that all these methods should be abandoned in favor of the literal method since it guarantees that all the meaning is conveyed. She also found that the contextual factors did not pose any problems in the translations.

In a similar study to the current one, G. Mohammed (2007) investigated the errors made in two translations of the Qur'an, namely Zidan's and Pickthall's, in translating euphemistic expressions in the Holy Qur'an. The investigator noted that the two translators either rendered the euphemism literally and ignored the intended meaning or rendered the meaning only and dispensed with the euphemism. Mohammed suggests that if the target language has an equivalent euphemism, it sure is a happy coincidence. Otherwise, the translator has to keep the euphemism and mention the intended meaning through explication, paraphrase or annotation.

There are more and more studies concerned with examining the existing translations. In addition to drawing attention to certain flaws in the translations, the studies often recommend avoiding certain translations, if they are considered beyond repair, and using less erroneous ones. Some of the Qur'anic studies are characterized with a high degree of objectivity and accuracy, and are supported with detailed analysis and a lot of examples.

Nihamatullah (1999), however, criticizes the absence of a standard framework for analyzing the errors in the translations of the Qur'an. He states that the best method is to start with the descriptive approach which should be complemented with a critical evaluation. Any study of the translations should account for the following: (1) the principles, methods and procedures followed, (2) the problems of translating the Qur'an, (3) the differences in the translations, (4) the errors of the translations, and (5) the role of the translator.

One study which is considered an extreme case of subjectivity reviewed and compared three Spanish translations of the Qur'an. The study, conducted by Hamed (2003), tells nothing more than the feeling or general impression of the investigator expressed in general terms without examples or any sort of concrete evidence. The investigator used expressions with relative value. For example, "Version A is easier to read than version B", "Version A lacks the eloquence of B", "The style of Rafael is more appealing", or "Many native speakers dislike the style Cortes used". As I mentioned earlier, Hamed's study is an extreme case, and to my knowledge, the majority of studies meet the requirements specified by Nihamatullah (1999).

Thus, the studies that examine the Qur'an translations are many. They investigate the achievement of different kinds and aspects of equivalence. Yet, to my knowledge, none of the studies focused on the

translation of metonymy in the Holy Qur'an. This is the gap that the current study intends to fill in.

Chapter Four

Analysis and Evaluation

This study aims to find the best method for translating Qur'anic metonymies. Thirty metonymies will be extracted from the Holy Qur'an, and will be displayed in this chapter along with their renditions in five translations of the Holy Qur'an. Commentaries and dictionaries will be checked in order to guarantee a correct and full understanding of the verse, or part of verse, containing the metonymy. Then, each metonymy will be compared to its five translations in order to discover any mismatches and, if possible, to relate the degree of success a translation achieves to the translating method it follows.

1. Part-for-Whole Metonymy

Example 1:

{ و أقيموا الصلاة و آتوا الزكاة و اركعوا مع الراكعين }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 43.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And bow your heads with those who bow (in worship)) (p. 11).

Arberry: (And bow with those that bow) (p. 34).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And bow down (or submit yourselves with obedience to Allah) along with Ar-Raaki'een) (p. 19).

Ghali: (And bow down in the company of others bowing down) (p. 7).

Bewley and Bewley: (And bow with those who bow) (p. 6).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah addresses the Jewish rabbis and the hypocrites who command people to pray and give charity, but do not practice what they preach. Allah commands them to pray, give alms, and submit themselves to Him just like the members of the nation of Islam (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 1, pp. 294-5).

The substitution involved:

The word اركعوا /irkæ u:/ ([you, plural, imperative] bow) is used when the intended meaning is "submit" (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 1, p. 295) or "pray" (As-Saabooniy, 1981, vol. 1, p. 39). Different commentaries give different interpretations of what is meant by the command of bowing, but they agree that the word is used metonymically.

Possible purpose of substitution:

The command اركعوا /irkæ u:/ ([you, plural, imperative] bow) is used to refer to the action of praying or submitting because bowing is one of the most important signs of surrender and submission. It involves facing and looking at the ground, and the bower looks as if he submits his head and neck to his master.

Evaluation:

The command expressed by the word اركعوا /irkæ u:/ literally means "bow down". However, this is a command to submit oneself to Allah (or to pray to Him). This meaning is expressed in the form of a command to bow down because bowing is the deed most expressive of total submission to the Creator. Thus, the resulting metonymy substitutes a word that denotes a whole action by another word that denotes only part of it.

All translators render the metonymy literally, maintaining the stress on the command of submission to Allah. Note that Pickthall's choice of equivalent for the word اركعوا is totally erroneous. He wrote *bow your heads*, whereas bowing, as expressed by the word اركعوا , means "to bow the top half of the body" rather than the head only.

Al-Hilali and Khan first translate the metonymy into the same metonymy, and mention, in parentheses, one of the possible intended

meanings beginning with the conjunctive *or*, which indicates that it is an alternative reading. The use of *or* should be avoided in any translation unless it is part of the original message. The recipient is not interested in the problems of the translator as much as in getting the message. It is possible that the translators mean that the enclosed information is explanatory. Still, *or* is used inappropriately, because the parentheses are enough to indicate the explanation purpose, and because *or* gives the wrong impression that only one meaning is correct rather than both meanings.

Another point in Al-Hilali and Khan's translation of this verse concerns their transliteration of the word الرَّاكِعِينَ / r-r :ki i:n/(Those who bow). Obviously, the translators have decided to follow this procedure to avoid the repetition of their long explanation of the related word ارْكَعُوا (i.e. submit yourselves with obedience to Allah). However, this is not enough reason for breaking the smoothness of the reading the way the translators do. They can solve the problem by saying, 'with those who do so' instead of writing the Arabic word, "ar-raaki een".

Example 2:

{ بَلَىٰ مِنْ أَسْلَمَ وَجْهَهُ لِلَّهِ وَهُوَ مُحْسِنٌ }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 112.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Whosoever surrendeth his purpose to Allah) (p. 20).

Arberry: (Whosoever submits his will to God) (p. 42).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Whoever submits his face (himself) to Allah) (p. 29).

Ghali: (Whosoever surrendered his face to Allah) (p. 17).

Bewley and Bewley: (All who submit themselves completely to Allah) (p. 15).

Context of situation:

This verse was revealed as an answer to a claim, mentioned in the preceding verse, by the Jews and the Christians that only a Jew or a Christian will enter Paradise. It states that whoever submits himself to Allah, i.e. performs deeds in sincerity for Allah's sake without partners, will enter Paradise (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 1, p. 567).

The substitution involved:

The word **وجه** /wæd h/ (face) is used to stand for the whole person.

Possible purpose of substitution:

The face is the most graceful of all man's parts, and is the part that is most worthy of being saved from humiliation. On the face, feelings, including that of submission to the master, can be seen. Therefore, submission of the face is an indication of the submission of the whole body.

Evaluation:

Ghali and Al-Hilali and Khan render the metonymic expression literally so as to maintain the rhetorical impact of the metonymy which is adding to the intensity of the verb *submit*. It should be noted, however, that Ghali, probably influenced by the source text, uses the past-tense of the verb "surrender" with the conditional expression "whosoever". But this is one area where the two languages differ. In Arabic, conditional مَنْ /mæn/ (whoever) can precede a past- or present-form verb, and in both cases, the sentence would be stating a rule that holds true till the Day of Judgment. In English, if a conditional takes a past-form verb, the relationship between the two actions will not hold true in the future.

Al-Hilali and Khan add the intended meaning of the word وجه in parentheses right after the word *face*. Since the translation is intelligible

without it, this addition is unnecessary and undermines the smoothness of the reading.

Bewley and Bewley, Arberry, and Pickthall substitute the metonymic word 'face' with what they assume to be the intended meaning, but they differ in their choice of the word expressing that meaning. Bewley and Bewley use the word *themselves*, and they compensate for the loss of rhetorical impact by adding the word *completely*. Arberry uses the word *will* in the English idiomatic expression, "submits his will". The idiom, which means "to surrender completely", is an accurate rendition of the meaning of the phrase. However, Arberry does not have to avoid a literal translation of the metonymy just because the words "submit + face" do not collocate in English. According to Fawcett (2003, p. 8), it is not always bad to diverge from the target language collocation if there is a good reason for such divergence. Maintaining the form of a sacred text is certainly a good reason.

Complying with the commentaries that stress that total submission to Allah means performing deeds for His sake only, Pickthall uses the word *purpose* in his translation of this verse; however, this does not justify this narrowing, awkwardness and unintelligibility of the translation.

Example 3:

{ و لكن البر من آمن بالله و اليوم الآخر و الملائكة و الكتاب و النبيين و أتى المال على حبه ذوي
القريبى و اليتامى و المساكين و ابن السبيل و السائلين و في الرقاب }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 177.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And to set slaves free) (p. 29).

Arberry: (And to ransom the slave) (p. 51).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And to set slaves free) (p. 43).

Ghali: (And to ransom a slave) (p. 27).

Bewley and Bewley: (And to set slaves free) (p. 23).

Context of situation:

This verse states the different ways money can be given away in charity. One of these ways is giving money to slaves who wish to free themselves but do not have enough money to do so (Ibn-Katheer, 1996, vol. 1, p. 155).

The substitution involved:

The word الرقاب /ær-riqæ:b/ (necks) is used when the intended meaning is "slaves".

Possible purpose of substitution:

It is common in Arabic to refer to an entity by the name of one of its parts. This is usually a part that is characteristic of that entity and vital for its survival. Just as a spy is called عين / æjn/ (an eye) and a worker is called يد /jæd/ (a hand), a slave is often referred to by رقبة /ræqæbæh/ (a neck).

The substitution is probably made because the word "neck" reminds the recipient of the humanity of the slaves rather than of their rank in society, and thus triggers feelings of compassion and sympathy. Besides, the recipients should feel that buying the freedom of those people, who are their brothers and sisters in humanity, is akin to setting their necks free from heavy chains.

Evaluation:

In this verse, spending money to free slaves is mentioned as a legitimate way of giving money away. It is only logical that "necks" cannot be bought in isolation, so the recipient is likely to understand that the intended meaning has something to do with spending money on buying slaves and setting them free. The relationship between the figurative and intended meanings is that of a part to a whole.

All translators render the metonymy conceptually, i.e. they write the intended, rather than the literal, meaning of the word الرقاب /æ:r-riqæ:b/ (necks). This is because this particular metonymy is not used in English. Therefore, there is fear that recipients may not understand the intended meaning. However, the effect of using the metonymy, which is probably to arouse the sympathy of the rich towards slaves, is lost, and none of the translators compensates for that loss.

2. Cause-for-Effect Metonymy

Example 4:

{ فَمَنْ اَعْتَدَى عَلَيْكُمْ فَاعْتَدُوا عَلَيْهِ بِمِثْلِ مَا اَعْتَدَى عَلَيْكُمْ }

Sura al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 194.

Translations:

Pickthall: (One who attacketh you, attack him) (p. 31).

Arberry: (Whoso commits aggression against you, do you commit aggression against him) (p. 54).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Whoever transgresses the prohibition against you, you transgress likewise against him) (p. 48).

Ghali: (Whoever transgress against you, then transgress against him) (p. 30).

Bewley and Bewley: (If anyone oversteps the limits against you, overstep against him) (p. 26).

Context of situation:

In the sixth Hegiri year, the Prophet and his companions headed for Makkah to perform umrah. The unbelievers prevented them from reaching Makkah, and an agreement was held that the Muslims return to Medinah and come back the year after. In the seventh Hegiri year, the Muslims headed for Makkah again. They entered it, but they were fearful that the disbelievers might fight them and the Muslims would not be able to defend themselves because they were in a sacred place and in the month of Thul-Qi dah (a month when fighting is prohibited both in Islam and in pre-Islamic Arab tradition). This verse states a permission from Allah to the Muslims to fight back if they have to, even though they are in the vicinity of Al-Ka bah and in the month of Thul-Qi dah (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 2, pp. 235-9).

The substitution involved:

The word فاعْتَدُوا /fæ tædu:/(commit a hostile act against somebody) is used when the intended meaning is "punish" or "retaliate".

Possible purpose of substitution:

It is common in the Qur'an that a word may denote an action and its punishment. Other examples are { و مكروا و مكر الله } [And they planned ..., but Allah planned] (*The Qur'an*, 1997, p. 71), Sura Aal- Imraan, verse 54; and { و جزاء سيئة سيئة مثلها } [And the retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it] (*The Qur'an*, 1997, p. 685), Sura Ash-Shu araa<, verse 40. This style creates a stronger connection in the mind of the recipient between the evil action and its punishment. The recipient is thus discouraged from doing evil because he/she knows that punishment is inevitable. Also, the substitution should tell Muslims not to hesitate to fight back as forcefully as the aggressors regardless of time and place.

Evaluation:

All the translators render the substitution literally, maintaining the emphasis on the cause-and-effect relationship. However, Ghali and Al-Hilali and Khan chose the word *transgress the prohibition* as an equivalent for the words اعتدى /i tædæ:/ ([he] committed aggression) and اعتدوا /i tædu:/ ([you, plural, imperative] commit aggression). "Transgress" means "to break or violate a law", and has the Arabic equivalent تعدى

/tæ æddæ:/ rather than اعتدى . Although both تعدى and اعتدى refer to the same event, the component of aggression associated with the word اعتدى is absent in the meaning of تعدى , for law can be violated in a number of ways. Similarly, Bewley and Bewley use the expression *overstep the limit* which has the same meaning as "transgress the prohibition".

Arberry uses the phrase *commits aggression* which means "to commit an offensive action or procedure". This makes it equivalent to and on the same level of generality as the source text word اعتدى . On the other hand, Pickthall's choice of the word *attack* is unsuitable since its scope of meaning is narrower than that of the original word. Thus, Arberry's word choice seems to be the best. However, Arberry's use of the emphatic structure (i.e. "do you commit") is unjustified since the original structure is not emphatic.

Example 5:

{ إن الله يبشرك بكلمة منه اسمه المسيح عيسى بن مريم }

Sura Aal- Imraan (sura no. 3), verse 45.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Allah giveth thee the glad tidings of a word from Him, whose name is the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary) (p. 55).

Arberry: (God gives thee good tidings of a Word from Him whose name is Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary) (p. 79).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Verily, Allah gives you the glad tidings of a Word ["Be!" _ and he was! i.e. 'Isa (Jesus) the son of Maryam (Mary)] from Him, his name will be the Messiah 'Isa (Jesus), the son of Maryam (Mary)) (p. 81).

Ghali: (God gives you glad tidings of a word from Him, his name is Messiah Jesus the son of Mary) (p.55).

Bewley and Bewley: (Your Lord gives you good news of a word from Him. His name is the Messiah 'Isa son of Maryam) (p. 48).

Context of situation:

This verse reports the address of the angels to Mary as they gave her the glad tidings of the birth of the Messiah, Jesus, peace be upon him (Al-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 3, p. 315).

The substitution involved:

Jesus is referred to by *كلمة* /kælimæh/ (a word) because he was the result of Allah's commanding word *كن* /k n/ ([you, singular, imperative] Be!) (Al-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 3, p. 315).

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made to indicate the honor given to Mary and Jesus as Jesus was created with a word from Allah and without a father. Besides, the substitution stresses Allah's absolute ability to create man from nothing.

Evaluation:

When this verse is taken literally, it means that Mary was given the glad tidings that she will be given a word and that word will be named Jesus. Because of the resulting incongruity, the recipient is likely to assume that the word *كلمة* /kælimæh/(word) is not used here to refer to the combination of letters or sounds that expresses meaning. Rather, it must be used to refer to a human male since it is followed by the word *اسمه* /ism h / (his name). Mary's son is referred to as a word because he was the result of Allah's commanding word "كن!" /k n/ (Be!). The literal and figurative meanings have a cause-and-effect relationship.

All translators render the metonymy literally, maintaining the additional meanings which emphasize the greatness of the Creator and the honor given to Mary and Jesus.

Pickthall's use of archaic language, *giveth* and *thee*, may hinder comprehension and is not justified since a translation of the Qur'an is not meant to imitate the Qur'an or to replace it in worship.

Al-Hilali and Khan's explanatory additions should be placed in a footnote especially when they are long or when they lead to repetition as is the case in this verse. For example, their explanation of the meaning of "word" leads to redundancy because the following sentence that begins with "his name" makes it clear who he is. Translators should guard against over-explanation because it can offend a smart recipient. What makes Al-Hilali and Khan's explanations even more annoying is their unnecessary insertion of both the Arabic and English forms of historical names. The priority here is for clarity; relating characters in the Qur'anic stories to figures the recipient already knows helps to a great deal in the comprehension of the Qur'anic text and makes the text more friendly to the recipient. The translators should have written the English form of the names in the body of the translation, and referred to the Arabic form in footnotes.

Bewley and Bewley translate الله / Il :h/as *your Lord* , which translates into ربك /r bb k/. Although the referent is the same, each word carries specific connotations, which makes it necessary to abide by the literal translation of each word. This is supported by Newmark's view

(2000) that any divergence from literal translation is a problem, and the translator should be able to provide a justification for this divergence. One can hardly think of a reason why Bewley and Bewley translate الله as *your Lord*.

Example 6:

{ أولئك لم يكونوا معجزين في الأرض و ما كان لهم من دون الله من أولياء يضاعف لهم العذاب ما كانوا يستطيعون السمع و ما كانوا يبصرون }

Sura Hood (sura no. 11), verse 20.

Translations:

Pickthall: (They could not bear to hear) (p. 216).

Arberry: (They could not hear) (p. 241).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (They could not bear to hear (the preachers of the truth)) (p. 281).

Ghali: (They could not bear to hear) (p. 224).

Bewley and Bewley: (They were unable to hear) (p. 206).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah addresses His Prophet and the believers saying that if He wants to punish the disbelievers of Quraysh, they will not be able to escape His punishment which will be severe. They deserve it because

they did not benefit from His guidance as if they did not hear it (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 12, p. 30).

The substitution involved:

The verse states that the disbelievers could not hear the righteousness. But in fact, they did hear it; they just did not respond to it. Yet, the verse figuratively negates hearing which is the cause of responding.

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution here probably indicates the absence of response from the disbelievers of Quraysh to Allah's guidance as if they did not hear it. This should serve as further emphasis that those people deserved severe punishment because of their complete rejection of the truth.

Evaluation:

In this verse, Allah threatens the disbelievers with severe punishment because they would not hear. This should indicate that the sentence ما كانوا يستطيعون السمع /mæ: kæ:nu: jæstæ i: u:næs-sæm æ/ (They could not hear) should not be taken literally, for if they were really deaf, Allah who is Fair and Merciful would not blame them for not following guidance. The intended meaning then must be that they did not respond to divine

guidance, which was expected of them after hearing it. Thus, there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the literal and figurative meanings.

Arberry and Bewley and Bewley render this metonymy into the same metonymy, maintaining the effect of describing the disbelievers as being unable to hear. The resultant construction is smooth and intelligible because the context excludes the literal reading.

Pickthall, Ghali and Al-Hilali and Khan assume that there is not a metonymy involved in the verse, and that ما كانوا يستطيعون / mæ: kæ:nu: jæstæ i: u:næ/ (they could not) means "they could not bear to". Insertion of the word *bear to* adds a new meaning that is not implied by the original discourse. This understanding results from the translators' assumption that the phrase يستطيعون السمع /jæstæ i: u:næs-sæm æ/ here means "[they] tolerate to hear", whereas the correct meaning is "[they] have the ability to hear". Both meanings are mentioned in *Lisaan Al- Arab* (Ibn-Manzoor, 2003, vol. 5, pp. 661-663), but it is the second that agrees with the commentaries used (e.g. At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 12, p. 30; Ibn-Katheer, 1996, vol. 2, pp. 213-14; As-Saabooniy, 1981, vol. 5, p. 92).

3. Effect-for-Cause Metonymy

Example 7:

{إن الذين يكتُمون ما أنزل الله من الكتاب و يشترُونَ به ثَمنا قليلا أولئك ما يأكلون في بطونهم إلا
النار}

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 174.

Translations:

Pickthall: (They eat into their bellies nothing else than fire) (p. 28).

Arberry: (They shall eat naught but the Fire in their bellies) (p. 50).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (They eat into their bellies nothing but fire) (p. 42).

Ghali: ([They] eat nothing in their bellies but fire) (p. 26).

Bewley and Bewley: ([They] eat nothing into their bellies but the Fire) (p. 23).

Context of situation:

This verse states a threat from Allah to the Jewish rabbis who hid the fact that Prophet Muhammad – peace be upon him – was mentioned in their Book, and made changes in the Holy Book in exchange for bribes.

Allah states, in this verse, that those rabbis will be punished in Hellfire (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 2, p. 108).

The substitution involved:

The word النار /æ-n-n :r/(Fire) is used when the intended meaning is "bribes that lead to Fire".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution evokes in the mind of the recipient a temporary image of fire burning in the stomachs of those who change the Word of Allah. This image intensifies the feeling of the gravity of this sin and discourages recipients from committing it.

Evaluation:

The construction in the original discourse places the word "Fire" as a direct object for the verb "eat". Since fire is not edible, the recipient's mind is likely to reach the conclusion that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between two events: the Jewish rabbis' receiving bribes and their being burned in Hell. It is worth noting that the sentence involves two metonymies. The first substitutes the verb "take" with the word يأكلون /jæ k lu:n/ ([they] eat). This is an Effect-for-Cause metonymy and it will be discussed in the next example. In the second, the bribes are substituted with النار /æ-n-n :r/ (Fire), which is the subject of discussion in this section.

All translators render the metonymy into the same metonymy; in fact, they translate both metonymies literally, maintaining the effect, in the case of the second metonymy, of the direct connection between changing the Word of Allah and Fire. The translators also maintain the structure of negative exclusion (ما ... إلا) /mæ: ...illæ:/ in their English renditions, and the resultant constructions are smooth and intelligible. However, the combination of "nothing else than" by Pickthall is unacceptable, and it should be substituted by "nothing but".

Two mismatches should be noted here: first, Arberry and Bewley and Bewley write the word Fire with the definite article (the); second, the other translators write this word with an initial small letter. Whenever the word "Fire" is used to refer to Hell, it should begin with a capital letter and be used without an article.

Example 8:

{ الذين يأكلون الربا لا يقومون إلا كما يقوم الذي يتخبطه الشيطان من المس }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 275.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Those who swallow usury ...) (p. 46).

Arberry: (Those who devour usury ...) (p. 69).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Those who eat Riba (usury) ...) (p. 69).

Ghali: (Those who devour usury ...) (p. 47).

Bewley and Bewley: (Those who practice riba ...) (p. 40).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah states the punishment of those who practice usury. The verse states that those who take the interest money will be resurrected in the After-Life in a state of madness as if they are possessed by a devil (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol.3: 121).

The substitution involved:

The word يأكلون /jæ k lu:n/([they] eat) is used when the intended meaning is "take".

Possible purpose of substitution:

According to commentaries, what is prohibited is not only eating food bought with the interest money, but also taking usury regardless of how the taker consumes it. However, referring to the action of taking by a verb of eating is common in Arabic. It is used particularly whenever the intended meaning involves taking money unlawfully and out of greed. For example, it is common in Arabic to say "أكل المال الحرام" (eating forbidden money) or

"أكل مال اليتيم" (eating the orphan's money). This usage is probably due to the fact that what is eaten cannot be retrieved whereas what is taken can.

Besides, the word أكل /ækælə/(eat) expresses an action that fulfills one of the animal basic needs whereas "take" does not. This makes the action of taking interest sound more evil.

Evaluation:

In this verse, the verb يأكلون /jæ k lu:n/ ([they] eat) is followed by an object that is not food. The resulting incongruity should draw the recipient's attention to the fact that the phrase is used figuratively. The recipient is likely to understand that those who practice usury will be punished in Hell.

All translators, except Bewley and Bewley, translate the metonymy in this verse into the same metonymy using a construction that combines a verb of eating with usury. In this way, they maintain the effect of bringing to mind the image of taking with greed. This construction is quite understood in English. All English verbs of eating used, i.e. swallow, devour, and eat, can be used figuratively as well as literally, though in different contexts. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary (2001) provides the following sentences as contexts for the eating verbs: "Most of my salary gets swallowed (up) by the rent and bills" (p. 1312), "She devoured everything she could lay her hands on: books, magazines and

newspapers" (p. 345), "Legal costs had eaten up all the savings she had" (p. 398). This makes the metonymy acceptable and understood by the English recipient even though he/she has not heard it before.

Bewley and Bewley translate the metonymy conceptually by using the verb *practice* that directly expresses the intended meaning. This verb is neutral, contrary to the verbs of eating; it does not express any negative meanings. Besides, Bewley and Bewley borrow the Arabic term *riba* without explaining it, not even in a footnote. The reader has to look it up in the glossary of terms at the end of the volume – though there is no indication in the body of the translation that there is a glossary. This procedure is not acceptable in a text where clarity is a priority. Al-Hilali and Khan, on the other hand, choose to use both the Arabic term and its English equivalent (in parentheses). This method has the advantage of acquainting non-Arab Muslims with key Islamic terms, but it makes the text read less smoothly.

Example 9:

{ و سارعوا إلى مغفرة من ربكم و جنة عرضها كعرض السماء و الأرض }

Sura Aal- Imraan (sura no. 3), verse, 133.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And vie one with another for forgiveness from your Lord) (p. 66).

Arberry: (And vie with one another, hastening for forgiveness from your Lord) (p. 90).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And march forth in the way (which leads) to forgiveness from your Lord) (p. 98).

Ghali: (And vie in the race for forgiveness from your Lord) (p. 67).

Bewley and Bewley: (Race each other for forgiveness from your Lord) (p. 59).

Context of situation:

In the preceding verses, Allah orders the believers to avoid practicing usury or doing anything that leads to Hellfire, and to obey Allah and his messenger. In this verse, one more order is stated which is to hurry to the mercy of Allah by doing what it takes to deserve it (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 3, p. 117).

The substitution involved:

The word مغفرة /mæ firæh/ (forgiveness) is used when the intended meaning is "the causes of forgiveness".

Possible purpose of substitution:

It is more encouraging to refer to good deeds by their rewards. It makes the recipients feel that the reward is certain and that all they have to do is move and get it. This is why "forgiveness" is substituted for "good deeds" in the command stated in this verse.

Evaluation:

The metonymy in this verse evokes an initial image of people literally racing to get to the forgiveness of Allah. Since Allah's forgiveness is not a concrete target, and that to deserve Allah's forgiveness is not only a matter of speed, it is likely that the recipient will know that the literal meaning is not intended. People can compete with one another in performing acts of worship that lead to deserving Allah's forgiveness.

All translators, except Al-Hilali and Khan, render the metonymy literally, maintaining the effect of the direct connection between the command and the reward. Al-Hilali and Khan break that connection by inserting *the way which leads to*. They probably seek clarity by doing so,

but clarity is also achieved perfectly without this addition as can be seen in the other translations.

Another difference between Al-Hilali and Khan's translation and the others is in the way the commanding word سار عوا /sæ:ri u:/ ([you, plural, imperative] hasten) is translated. Al-Hilali and Khan interpret سار عوا as *march* meaning "to move from one point to another usually by walking especially in a direct purposeful manner and without delaying" (*Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, 2002), whereas the other translators use equivalents that involve a competition component: *vie* or *race each other*. Both interpretations are found in commentaries; the first in Ibn-Katheer (1996, vol. 1, p. 317) and the second in At-Tabariy (2001, vol. 4, p. 117). But according to *Lisaan Al- Arab* (2003, vol.4, p. 561), the first interpretation is more likely since the verb سارع /sæ:r æ/ means أسرع /æsr æ/ (hasten/hurry/rush) rather than سابق /sæ:bæq / (race). In either interpretation, there is a speed component in the meaning of سار عوا and it should not be ignored. This is why Ghali and Bewley and Bewley use the word *race* and Arberry chooses the word *hasten*. Pickthall is the only translator who fails to render the speed component and renders the competition component only.

4. General-for-Specific Metonymy

Example 10:

{ يا بني آدم خذوا زينتكم عند كل مسجد }

Sura Al-A raaf (sura no. 7), verse 31.

Translations:

Pickthall: (O Children of Adam! Look to your adornment at every place of worship) (p. 149).

Arberry: (Children of Adam! Take your adornment at every place of worship) (p. 174).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Children of Adam! Take your adornment (by wearing your clean clothes) while praying and going around (the Tawaaf of) the Ka bah) (p. 203).

Ghali: (O Children of Adam! Adorn yourselves fully at every time of prayer) (p. 154).

Bewley and Bewley: (Children of Adam! Wear fine clothing in every mosque) (p. 139).

Context of situation:

At the revelation time of this verse, Arabs used to take off their clothes before walking around the ka bah, claiming that their clothes were

dirty with sins. In this verse, Allah addresses all the children of Adam commanding them to keep their clothes on when they go to mosques in general (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 8, p. 189).

The substitution involved:

The word زينة /zi:næh/(adornment) is used when the intended meaning is "clothes".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made to indicate that mosques are respectful places and deserve to be attended by people in their best looks. Another possible purpose is to change the common negative view of clothes – as being stained with sins – by connecting them to the concept of adornment.

Evaluation:

A literal understanding of the command in this verse entails that people have to adorn themselves before going into mosques. At-Tabariy (2001, vol. 8, p. 189) explains that the command is actually for people to wear clothes before they enter mosques, contrary to the common practice in

Makkah at the revelation time. There is a general-for-specific relationship between the literal and figurative meanings of the metonymic word.

Pickthall, Arberry and Al-Hilali and Kahn maintain the substitution, translating the word زينة /zi:næh/ as *adornment*. Thus, they maintain the indirect meanings mentioned above. But there is doubt that the recipient would get to the intended meaning without the help of a commentary. Unfortunately, since the translation of this verse is quite intelligible, it is not likely that the recipient will feel the need to check a commentary. This is probably why Al-Hilali and Khan also mention the intended meaning in parentheses. This could be a valuable addition, but it would better be added in the form of a footnote so that it does not undermine the smoothness of the reading.

Ghali assumes that the literal meaning is the intended meaning, and changes the structure of the phrase in a way that adds to the intensity of the command. His use of the adverb *fully* rules out the generally accepted interpretation of زينة because "wearing clothes only" can be *adornment* but not *full adornment*.

There is a mismatch in translating the adverbial phrase عند كل مسجد / indæ k lli mæsd id/(at every mosque). Pickthall and Arberry write *place of worship* which is an inaccurate equivalent of مسجد /mæsd id/, for the former is more general. Al-Hilali and Kahn's translation, *while praying and*

going around the Ka bah, is more specific since it excludes from the command of wearing clothes cases where a man enters a mosque but does not pray in it. Besides, their translation of the phrase *عند كل مسجد* is interpretive, and this is inconsistent with the rest of their translation. Bewley and Bewley's *in every mosque* is the most accurate translation of this phrase and is the most readily intelligible.

As a translation of *خذوا زينتكم* /x ðu: zi:nætæk m/, Bewley and Bewley write *wear fine clothing*. In this way, part of the effect of referring to clothes as adornment, which is to make clothing a positive concept by connecting it with adornment, is lost. Besides, the word *fine* restricts the command to clothes of good quality only, which is not mentioned in commentaries.

Example 11:

{ و إذا أدقنا الناس رحمة من بعد ضراء مستهم إذا لهم مكر في آياتنا }

Sura Yoonus (sura no. 10), verse 21.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And when we cause mankind to taste of mercy after some adversity which had afflicted them) (p. 202).

Arberry: (When we let the people taste mercy after hardship has visited them) (p. 227).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And when we let mankind taste mercy after some adversity has afflicted them) (p. 226).

Ghali: (And when we give the people a taste of mercy after adversity has afflicted them) (p. 211).

Bewley and Bewley: (When we let people taste mercy after hardship has afflicted them) (p. 193).

Context of situation:

The disbelievers of Makkah were stricken by drought for seven years. They asked the Prophet – peace be upon him – to pray to Allah to send rain to them, and they promised in return to believe in his call. When Allah sent rain, they were back to denial and sarcasm (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 11, p. 116).

The substitution involved:

The word *الناس* /æn-næ:s/ is used when the intended meaning is "the disbelievers of Makkah".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made to associate the deed of the disbelievers with human nature in general. This serves to discourage all people, including believers, from remembering Allah only at times of adversity but turning arrogant when enveloped by Allah's mercy.

Evaluation:

According to At-Tabariy (2001, vol. 11, p. 116), the word *الناس* /æn-næ:s/ (people) in this verse stands for the disbelievers. If this metonymy is understood literally, it will mean that when people in general are stricken with adversity, they turn to Allah, and when they taste His mercy, they deny the truth. This is not true of all people, and only knowing that makes the recipient think of a figurative interpretation of the word *الناس*. In this metonymy, the literal and figurative meanings have a general-for-specific relationship.

All translators maintain the substitution of *الكفار* /ælk ff :r/ (disbelievers) with *الناس* (people), rendering the effect of the generalization which is to connect this act of running to Allah only at times of adversity to the human nature in general, so that even believers watch themselves and try to avoid doing that. Fortunately, the literal rendition of the metonymy does not lead to any structural problems.

Two mismatches noted are worthy of mention here. One is the literal translation of the definite article in the Arabic word الناس by Arberry and Ghali. Usage of articles is one area of difference between English and Arabic. The English word "people" without an article can mean either "particular persons (أناس) / næ:s/" or "persons in general (الناس)". When an article is attached, i.e. "the people", the word acquires a different meaning which is "all the persons who live in a particular place or belong to a particular country (الشعب) /æ æ b/". This is definitely not the meaning intended by الناس in this verse. Thus, Arberry and Ghali's use of the definite article is not justified.

Another mismatch is made by Pickthall in the phrase "taste of mercy". The preposition "of" should be omitted, for people can taste mercy rather than taste of mercy.

Example 12:

{ و يقول الإنسان أنذا ما مت لسوف أخرج حيا }

Sura Maryam (sura no. 19), verse 66.

Translations:

Pickthall: (and man saith: When I am dead, shall I forsooth be brought forth alive?) (p. 312).

Arberry: (Man says, 'What, when I am dead shall I then be brought forth alive?')(p. 336).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And man (the disbelievers) says: 'When I am dead, shall I then be raised up alive?') (p. 391).

Ghali: (And mankind says: 'How shall I, when I am dead, be brought to life again?') (p. 310).

Bewley and Bewley: (Man says, 'when I am dead, will I then be brought out again alive?') (p. 291).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah states that the disbelievers wonder in denial, "Shall we be resurrected after we have died?" The next verse reminds the recipients that Allah creates people from nothing, so it is easy for Him to resurrect them after death (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 16, p. 124).

The substitution involved:

The word الإنسان /æl-insæ:n/ (man) is used when the intended meaning is "disbelievers".

Possible purpose of substitution:

In more than one position in the Qur'an, Allah mentions the creation of man as evidence for His ability to recreate man after death. The use of the general word الإنسان in this verse probably serves as a reminder of the genus of the disbelievers, and of the undeniable truth that they were created from nothing.

Evaluation:

The verse states that الإنسان /æɪ-insæ:n/(man) asks in denial whether he will be brought out of his grave alive. Having some background knowledge about divine religions should enable the recipient to know that some people believe in resurrection after death while others do not, and that the word الإنسان should not be taken literally to mean "man" in general. However, it is not assumed that all the target audience have such knowledge. This is probably why Al-Hilali and Khan write the intended meaning of the metonymy in parentheses, a valuable addition though it should have been given as a footnote so that the smoothness of the reading is not interrupted.

All translators render the metonymy into the same metonymy, maintaining the effect of the substitution which is to remind the recipient of

the genus of the disbelievers. All the renditions of the metonymy are intelligible.

Pickthall's use of archaic language as in the word "saith" is not justified since a translation of the Qur'an is meant only to give non-Arabs access to the divine guidance. Anything that affects the clarity of the message can disrupt the achievement of that goal.

Pickthall and Arberry add to their translations words that express doubt, e.g. "forsooth" and "what", probably to indicate that man's question is not informative. These words serve to increase the intensity of the denial to a degree which exceeds that of the original. The Arabic language is not short of such words, yet none are used in the original discourse.

All translators use *man* as the subject of the event of saying except Ghali who uses the word *mankind* which is a noncount noun that refers to all human beings. It is therefore grammatically inappropriate as an antecedent for the first person singular pronoun in the reported speech. *Man*, on the other hand, is appropriate since it can be used to mean: a person, and it can be referred back to with the first-person singular pronoun.

The miracle denied by the disbelievers involves both being brought back to life and being brought out of the graves. Pickthall and Arberry translate the verb أُخْرِجُ / xr d / as *be brought forth* which is inaccurate

because it involves mention of only one miracle, i.e. the bringing back to life. Similarly, Al-Hilali and Khan and Ghali use verbs that express the bringing back to life but say nothing about bringing the bodies out of the graves. Bewley and Bewley' translation is the only one that manages to render both parts of the miracle by saying, *be brought out again alive* though it is preferable to place the adverb *again* after, rather than before, *alive* because it modifies the whole phrase of being brought out alive.

5. Referring to an Entity by its Location

Example 13:

{ و أرسلنا السماء عليهم مدرارا }

Sura Al-An aam (sura no. 6), verse 6.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And we shed on them abundant showers from the sky) (p. 123).

Arberry: (And how we loosed heaven upon them in torrents) (p. 149).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And we poured out on them rain from the sky in abundance) (p. 171).

Ghali: (And we sent down for them abundant rains) (p. 128).

Bewley and Bewley: (We sent down heaven upon them in abundant rain), (p. 113).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah addresses the Prophet – peace be upon him – with the question, "Why don't those disbelievers consider the various nations in history who perished although they were given blessings that you have never had?". The verse lists some of those blessings. They include the consolidation of those peoples' power; rivers running under their feet; and heavy, continuous rain (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 7, p. 176).

The substitution involved:

The word السماء /æs-sæmæ: / (the sky) is used when the intended meaning is "rain".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made to evoke an initial image of the great sky being sent down to those people. This is an exaggeration that serves as an indication (in addition to the word مدارا /midr :r :/) of the heaviness of the rain, and it shows how blessed those people were, yet they were destroyed because they disbelieved in Allah.

Evaluation:

It is obvious that the literal meaning of this sentence is not intended, for the sky has never been sent down on people. Therefore, the recipient's mind is expected to drift to the object that descends from the sky, usually as a blessing, which is rain.

Bewley and Bewley maintain the metonymy, translating it into the same metonymy. In this way, they manage to maintain the effect of the substitution which is probably to emphasize the heaviness of the rain. The resultant construction is intelligible, and there isn't any ambiguity first because of the rationale mentioned above and second because the translators mention *in abundant rain* which explains how heaven was sent down.

Pickthall, Al-Hilali and Khan, and Ghali write the intended meaning in the form of a literal statement, saying directly that abundant rain is sent down on those peoples. However, the abundance of the rain is intensified in the original discourse in two ways: the use of the word مدار (heavy and continuous) and use of the metonymy أرسلنا السماء / rsælnæs-sæmæ: æ/. By translating the metonymy into a literal statement, the intensity of the abundance of the rain is reduced unless some compensation technique is followed.

In Pickthall's translation, the intensity is further reduced by the use of the word "showers" which indicates that the rain, no matter how abundant, came down in short periods. This is against the description of the rain in the original discourse where the word مدار is used. Pickthall tries to compensate for the loss of meaning resulting from the rendition of السماء /æs-sæmæ: / into *showers* by mentioning that the rain was sent "from the sky", revealing that he misses the point of mentioning the sky in the first place. The concept denoted by السماء (the sky) in the original discourse lends its quality of hugeness to the rain which is contained in it. Thus, there is still lost meaning in Pickthall's translation.

Al-Hilali and Khan compensate for the loss in their translation through their choice of the verb *poured* which suggests that the rain came down in large quantities. Ghali, on the other hand, does not compensate for the loss. In any case, it is preferable that the translators adhere to the original structure if there is no linguistic constraint to block it, which is the case in this example.

Arberry is the only translator who renders the metonymy into a metaphor where he assimilates the heavily raining sky to a faucet that is loosed and that pours water in large quantities. Although the metaphor intensifies the heaviness of the rain in the same way the metonymy does, through evoking an interesting image, the translator has no excuse in not

adhering to the original structure since the metonymy is quite understood even though it is not common in English.

Example 14:

{ و اسأل القرية التي كنا فيها }

Sura Yoosuf (sura no. 12), verse 82.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Ask the township where we were) (p. 238).

Arberry: (Enquire of the city wherein we were) (p. 263).

Al-Hilali and Khan: ('And ask (the people of) the town where we have been ') (p. 305).

Ghali: (And ask the town where we have been) (p. 245).

Bewley and Bewley: (Ask questions of the town in which we were) (p. 226).

Context of situation:

When Prophet Joseph – peace be upon him – arrested his brother Benjamin claiming that he stole the bowl of the king, his step-brothers went back to their father, Prophet Jacob –peace be upon him – and told him about the event. They said if he didn't believe them, he should ask the

people of the town they came from and the caravan they came in (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 13, p. 46).

The substitution involved:

The word القرية /æɫqærjæh/(the town) is used when the intended meaning is "the people of the town".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made to indicate that everybody in the town knows about the theft incident, so Prophet Jacob should not doubt the credibility of his sons.

Evaluation:

In this verse, القرية /æɫqærjæh/(the town) is used as a direct object for the verb اسأل /is æɫ/ ([you, singular, imperative] ask). Since a town is a place where people live, and since inanimate objects like houses and streets cannot be asked, the recipient will probably assume that it is people of the town who are intended by the word القرية.

All translators except Al-Hilali and Khan maintain the metonymy, rendering it literally. In this way, they manage to maintain the effect which

is probably to stress the fact that the theft story has become known to everybody in the town. The resultant construction is understood clearly. This is expected since this metonymy is shared by English and Arabic. Besides, this metonymy is lexicalized, i.e. the figurative meaning is listed under the word entry in the dictionary. According to the *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2001), one of the meanings of "town" is "the people who live in a town" (p. 1376). Therefore, the recipient of the English translation is not expected to find any difficulty in getting the intended meaning.

Bewley and Bewley translate the commanding verb *اسأل* /is æl/ ([you, singular, imperative] ask) as *ask questions* which is inaccurate. In this verse, Joseph's brothers are suggesting that their father ask the town about the truth of their story. This is understood from the context represented by the immediately preceding verse. But there is not any indication that more than one question need to be asked. Thus, the addition of the word "questions" is not only redundant but also adds meaning and thus makes the translation less accurate. Similarly, Al-Hilali and Khan add an explanation of what is meant by the "town" in parentheses. They write "the people of". It is hard to think that without the parentheses, the recipient would assume that Prophet Jacob was told to ask the land or houses of the town. Therefore, the addition is not justified here.

Example 15:

{ فليدع ناديه }

Sura Al- Alaq (sura no. 96), verse 17.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Then let him call upon his henchmen!) (p. 724).

Arberry: (So let him call on his concourse!) (p. 344).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Then let him call upon his council (of helpers)) (p. 779).

Ghali: (Let him then call his henchmen) (p. 597).

Bewley and Bewley: (Let him call his attendants) (p. 625).

Context of situation:

In the two preceding verses, Aboo-Jahl is threatened to be taken by the forelock and thrown in Hellfire if he continues his attempts to prevent Prophet Muhammad – peace be upon him – from worshipping Allah. When Aboo-Jahl heard that threat, he said, "Is Muhammad threatening me though I have the largest number of proponents in the valley?" Then Allah revealed this verse where He challenges Aboo-Jahl to call his proponents because ,then, Allah will call the angels of torment (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 30, p. 309).

The substitution involved:

The word ناديه /næ:dijæh/ (the place where his proponents gather) is used when the intended meaning is "his proponents".

Possible purpose of substitution:

Referring to Aboo-Jahl's proponents by the place wherein they gather maximizes Allah's challenge to Aboo-Jahl, because it suggests that all the people who support him cannot make him win against Muhammad or escape Allah's punishment.

Evaluation:

In the original discourse, the object of the verb "call" is an inanimate object, a place where people gather. This creates an incongruity that serves as a clue that the literal meaning of this sentence is not intended.

All translators choose to write the intended meaning of the metonymy into its sense only. In this way, they lose the effect of referring to Aboo-Jahl's advocates by their gathering place. The translators make different word selections to express the intended meaning, but some of their choices are unsatisfactory. According to At-Tabariy (2001, vol. 30, p. 309), the intended meaning is "people who attend his gathering place out of support for him". This is hardly expressed by Arberry's choice, *concourse*,

which only means "a large group of people" and does not involve any assumptions as to how they are related to one another. Bewley and Bewley choose *attendants* as expressive of the intended meaning, but this word merely refers to close company, people who accompany a person to serve and care for him/her. Al-Hilali and Khan use the word *council* which refers to "a group of people who gather almost regularly to discuss matters of interest". But this usage of the word is obsolete and now the word is often understood to mean "a formal deliberative assembly that is elected to perform specific tasks". Finally, the word "henchmen" used by Pickthall and Ghali seems to be the most accurate literal equivalent since it is usually used for: loyal supporters of an important person. However, the effect of using the metonymy is lost, and none of the translators compensates for that loss.

This verse starts with a resumptive ف /fæ/ which is misinterpreted by Arberry as causative, translating it as *so*, and by Pickthall, Al-Hilali and Khan, and Ghali as conjunctive, translating it as *then*.

6. Referring to an Entity by its Concomitant

Example 16:

{ أتأمرون الناس بالبر و تنسون أنفسكم و أنتم تتلون الكتاب أفلا تعقلون }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 44.

Translations:

Picthall: (While ye yourselves forget (to practice it)) (p. 11).

Arberry: (And forget yourselves) (p. 34).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And you forget (to practice it) yourselves) (p. 19).

Ghali: (And neglect it yourselves) (p. 7).

Bewley and Bewley: (And forget yourselves) (p. 6).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah reproaches the Jews for ordering people to do good and not doing it themselves although they have the Torah in their hands (Aṭ-Ṭabariy, 2001, vol. 1, p. 296).

Possible purpose of substitution:

The word تتسون /tænsa n/ ([you, plural, indicative] forget) is used when the intended meaning is "leave".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made to indicate that the Jews do not commit themselves to the doctrines of their religion altogether as if they forget themselves.

Evaluation:

The metonymy in this verse combines the verb تتسون /tænsa n/ ([you, plural, indicative] forget) with the object أنفسكم /ænf sæk m/ (yourselves).

If taken literally, the verse means that the Jewish rabbis tell people to do good and forget to tell that to themselves. Usually, one is more concerned about oneself making it the primary target of discipline and care. Therefore, it is unlikely that one would literally forget oneself. Besides, had the rabbis literally forgotten themselves, they wouldn't have deserved Allah's reproach. They must have neglected abidance by the commands of Allah, yet they ordered people to perform them.

Ghali produces the intended meaning of the metonymy in the form of a literal statement. He renders the verb تتسون into *neglect*; but by so doing, he renders the meaning but not the effect of the metonymy which is to stress the rabbis' complete neglect of abidance by the doctrines of Judaism.

The other four translations maintain the substitution using an equivalent of تتسون, i.e. forget. The recipient is likely to accept the possibility that there is an indirect meaning because even in English, the verb "forget" can be used figuratively. According to the *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary* (2001, p. 504), "to forget oneself" means that one is behaving in a way that is not socially acceptable. But the immediate

context in the verse indicates that neglecting rather than misbehaving is the intended meaning.

Arberry and Bewley and Bewley translate the phrase literally, rendering the metonymy into the same metonymy, and the resultant construction is clear and smooth. Al-Hilali and Khan, on the other hand, manipulate the structure by adding an explanatory phrase in parentheses, obviously in pursuit for more clarity. Such a procedure is unnecessary since clarity is guaranteed without it. Besides, the parentheses are used here improperly. It should be possible to omit the content between parentheses without resulting in any change in the basic meaning or the structure of the sentence (Warriner, 1982). This condition is not met in Al-Hilali and Khan's addition since the omission of the parentheses changes the position of *yourselves* from an intensive pronoun to an object of a verb.

While attempting to maintain the metonymy, Pickthall produces an unjustified structural mismatch by considering *yourselves* emphatic rather than reflexive. This is not acceptable because there isn't any reason, grammatical or other, to justify changing the original structure.

Pickthall's use of the archaic form (ye) is improper. It is true that the Qur'anic text was revealed more than 14 centuries ago, but there is no point in writing the translation in an archaic form. It is not the aim of any translation of the Qur'an to replace the original text or to imitate it. The purpose is to give the non-Arabs access to divine guidance as represented

in the Holy Qur'an. Writing a translation in an archaic language can hinder comprehension or at least make the text less friendly to recipients.

Example 17:

{ فتوبوا إلى بارئكم فاقتلوا أنفسكم }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 54.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And kill (the guilty) yourselves) (p. 12).

Arberry: (And slay one another) (p. 35).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And kill yourselves (the innocent kill the wrongdoers among you)) (p. 20).

Ghali: (And kill the evildoers among you) (p. 8).

Bewley and Bewley: (And kill yourselves) (p. 7).

Context of situation:

When Moses came back to his people after he had been absent for 40 nights, he found out that they worshipped a calf made of gold. He told them that they had wronged themselves by worshipping the calf, so they had to turn in repentance to their Creator. Allah punished them by commanding those who did not worship the calf to kill those who did (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 1, pp. 328-30).

The substitution involved:

The word **أنفسكم** /ænf sæk m/ (yourselves) is substituted for the expression "one another".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The metonymy used evokes an initial image of the Children of Israel each one killing himself. This should suggest that the punishment of killing one another was as painful as killing oneself because Allah's worshippers and the wrongdoers belonged to the same group. Those who did not worship the calf deserved the punishment because they did not prevent their fellow brothers from committing this terrible sin.

Evaluation:

Pickthall, Bewley and Bewley, and Al-Hilali and Khan maintain the metonymy in this verse, and thus they convey the effect of grouping the wrongdoers with those who did not prevent them from committing the sin, which is probably to stress the importance of preventing the commission of forbidden acts in society.

A literal reading of this metonymy suggests that each of the Children of Israel had to kill himself in order to deserve Allah's mercy. There is not

any purely rational clue that the literal reading is not intended. It is true that in all divine messages, suicide is punishable with Hell whereas killing apostates is not only allowed but also demanded (Zaatari, 2004); however, the verse expresses a command from Allah, so it could be perceived as an exceptional command for the wrongdoers each to kill himself because of the gravity of their sin. This is why both Pickthall and Al-Hilali and Khan add an explanation in parentheses to exclude the literal meaning.

Unfortunately, in Pickthall's translation, the addition is given in a wrong position and in the wrong form. The parentheses should be placed after, rather than before, the word *yourselves* because what is between them should explain what is meant by "yourselves" or by the whole verb phrase *kill yourselves* rather than the verb *kill* alone. Al-Hilali and Khan place the addition in the right position, and it is in the form of a verb phrase because it explains the whole verb phrase *kill yourselves*.

Bewley and Bewley maintain the metonymy but they do not add any explanation. The English recipient who does not have the background knowledge about the punishment of Moses' people is likely to assume the literal meaning to be intended unless he/she reads a commentary or an explanatory footnote. Arberry and Ghali choose to write the intended meaning directly. The translation is clear but the effect of the substitution is lost and the translators do not compensate for the resulting meaning loss.

Example 18:

{ و إذا مسكم الضر في البحر ضل من تدعون إلا إياه }

Sura Al-Israa< (sura no. 17), verse 67.

Translations:

Pickthall: (All unto whom ye cry (for succour) fail save Him (alone)) (p. 287).

Arberry: (Then there go astray those on whom you call except Him) (p. 310).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Those that you call upon vanish from you except Him (Allah alone)) (p. 362).

Ghali: (Those to whom you invoke other than Him fail you) (p. 289).

Bewley and Bewley: (Those you call on vanish except for Him alone) (p. 270).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah tells the polytheists that if they face hardship at sea and fear drowning, they will supplicate to Allah alone. They will not remember any of the gods they worship because they know deep inside that they will not rescue them (As-Saaboony, 1981, vol. 7, pp. 66-67). Another interpretation (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 15, p. 142) is that the polytheists will

call upon the false gods who then will not be able to hear or rescue them.

According to both interpretations, there is a metonymy.

The substitution involved:

The word ضل / ɪlæ/ ([he] went astray) is used when the intended meaning is "did not occur to you", or "failed you".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The absence of the false gods is expressed with the word ضل probably to suggest that those gods were totally helpless at times of adversity.

Evaluation:

It is through adversity that true allies are discovered. This rationale will make it clear that the intended meaning is that the multiple gods will not be there for the polytheists at times of need.

None of the translators expresses the literal meaning in the translation, except Arberry who renders the metonymy into the same

metonymy, hence managing to render the effect of the substitution. The resultant construction is quite intelligible.

Pickthall and Ghali write the intended meaning in the form of a literal statement, i.e. the gods fail the polytheists. In this way, the emphatic effect of the substitution is completely lost and thus only part of the meaning is conveyed. Pickthall makes two additions in parentheses. The first is the addition of the word *alone* after *save Him*. This addition is redundant since the preposition *save* is enough indication that Allah is the only One of whom the preceding statement is not true. However, the second addition, *for succour*, is not only useful but also essential since the verb that Pickthall uses, i.e. cry, requires a clarification of what is cried for. Therefore, this addition should not be placed in parentheses but in brackets to indicate that it is added by the translator to be read as part of the sentence.

Al-Hilali and Khan, and Bewley and Bewley, on the other hand, choose (vanish) as an equivalent for ضل / llæ/ in an attempt to render the intended meaning. The word *vanish* means "to pass out of sight or out of existence, especially quickly". This is obviously not the literal meaning of the metonymy, nor is it the intended meaning because vanishing presupposes existence or being in sight. Nevertheless, the word "vanish" can be understood as indirectly referring to the intended meaning, which

means that it is a metonymy. Thus, the two teams of translators translate the metonymy in this verse into a different one. The new metonymy serves the purpose of intensifying the uselessness of the false gods, but this divergence from the literal meaning is by no means justified.

7. Instrument-for-Action Metonymy

Example 19:

{ و اصنع الفلك بأعيننا }

Sura Hood (sura no. 11), verse 37.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Build the ship under our eyes) (p. 218).

Arberry: (Make thou the Ark under our eyes) (p. 243).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And construct the ship under our eyes) (p. 283).

Ghali: (Build the ark by our care) (p. 225).

Bewley and Bewley: (Build the ark under our supervision) (p. 208).

Context of situation:

When Prophet Noah – peace be upon him – supplicated against his disbelieving people, Allah commanded him to construct a ship to escape the punishment Allah intended for them. This verse states the command to

Noah to construct the ship under Allah's supervision, which means that Allah will tell him how to do it (As-Saabooniy, 1981, vol. 5, p. 94).

The substitution involved:

The word أعين /æ j n/(eyes) is used when the intended meaning is "supervision".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made because the word أعين (eyes) involves a closer association with tender care than a word that only means supervision.

Evaluation:

In this verse, the word أعيننا /æ j ninæ:/ (our eyes) is used to refer to Allah's supervision of Noah's work on the construction of the ship. Pickthall, Arberry, and Al-Hilali and Khan maintain the substitution, and by so doing, they render its effect which is to suggest that Allah treated His messenger with His tender care. The resultant expression is acceptable and used in English. Ghali and Bewley and Bewley, on the other hand, translate the metonymy into a literal statement. They abandon the metonymic word in favor of words that convey its meaning but not its effect. Ghali uses the

expression *by our care* which is unacceptable because using the word "by" makes Allah's care an instrument rather than an accompanying circumstance. As for Bewley and Bewley, they use the expression *under our supervision* which is both grammatical and accurate. However, it does not convey the effect achieved by the substitution. Neither Ghali nor Bewley and Bewley compensates for the lost meaning.

Example 20:

{ و اجعل لي لسان صدق في الآخرين }

Sura Ash-Shu araa< (sura no. 26), verse 84.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And give me a good report in later generations) (p. 385).

Arberry: (And appoint me a tongue of truthfulness among the others) (p. 68).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (and grant me an honorable mention in later generations) (p. 466).

Ghali: (and grant me descendants to speak the truth among the later generations) (p. 371).

Bewley and Bewley: (And make me highly esteemed among the later peoples) (p. 353).

Context of situation:

This verse states part of Prophet Abraham's supplication to Allah. He asks Allah to cause him to be remembered in a good manner in later generations (Aṣ-Ṣaḥīḥ, 1981, vol. 10, p. 65). According to another interpretation, Abraham wishes for the later generations to believe in him and say the truth about him (Aṭ-Ṭabariy, 2001, vol. 19, p. 101). Allah gave him all that, for the Jews believe in Moses and disbelieve in Jesus, and the Christians believe in Jesus and disbelieve in Mohammad, but both the Jews and Christians believe in Abraham.

The substitution involved:

The word لسان /lisæ:n/ (tongue) is used when the intended meaning is "mention", or "praise".

Possible purpose of substitution:

It is common in Arabic to refer to what is said by the instrument of saying (the tongue), and the Qur'an uses the linguistic tools of the language of the people to whom it was revealed. None of the commentaries reviewed mentions any other reason for the substitution.

Evaluation:

If this sentence is taken literally, no sense could be made of it, for Prophet Abraham already had a tongue, and how can he be given a tongue in later generations! This indicates that there is a form of indirect reference in using the word لسان /lisæ:n/ (tongue) to refer to speech, which is normally produced by the tongue.

All the translators, except Arberry, render the metonymy conceptually, i.e. they try to convey its meaning in the form of literal statements.

Pickthall, and Al-Hilali and Khan produce a literal statement that is intelligible and clear. Since no purpose is known for using this metonymy except the use of the linguistic tools of the Arabic language, it cannot be claimed that there is meaning loss.

In Ghali's translation, the meaning is distorted by the addition of descendants, which Prophet Abraham does not ask his Lord for in the verse. Besides, when Ghali says, "speak the truth", he does not specify about what Abraham wants them to speak the truth.

Bewley and Bewley choose to use the expression "highly esteemed" as an equivalent for لسان صدق /lisæ:næ idqin/. This is inaccurate since it does not involve in its meaning the verbal expression of respect. It is

probably for the verbal expression that the instrument لسان is referred to in the first place.

As for Arberry's translation, it is both vague and inaccurate. His literal rendition of the metonymy produces an unintelligible sentence partly because this metonymy is not shared by the English language, and because the resultant combination of words is simply unacceptable. Besides, his reading of the short vowels on the word الآخرين /æɪ æ:xiri:n/ is wrong. His use of the word "the others" reveals that he misread الآخرين /æɪ æ:xiri:n/ (later generations) into الآخرين /æɪ æ:xæri:n/ (the others).

Example 21:

{ لا تمدن عينيك إلى ما متعنا به أزواجاً منهم }

Sura Al-Hijr (sura no. 15), verse 88.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Strain not thine eyes toward that which We cause some wedded pairs among them to enjoy) (p. 263).

Arberry: (Stretch not thine eyes to that We have given pairs of them to enjoy) (p. 286).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Look not with your eyes ambitiously at what We have bestowed on certain classes of them (the disbelievers)) (p. 332).

Ghali: (Do not even look at the worldly wealth We have let some pairs of the unbelievers (men and women) to gain) (p. 266).

Bewley and Bewley: (Do not direct your eyes longingly to what We have given certain of them to enjoy) (p. 248).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah addresses His messenger Muhammad – peace be upon him – and tells him that he should not wish for the worldly blessings that Allah gave to the rich who did not believe in Allah or the Day of Judgment, for there is severe punishment awaiting them (As-Saaboony, 1981, vol. 7, p. 14). According to another interpretation by Ibn Abbaas (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 14, p. 74), this verse is an address from Allah to the Prophet in particular and believers in general commanding them not to wish for the property of their fellow brothers. Regardless of which interpretation is the correct one, there is a metonymy in the first three words لا تمدن عينيك /læ: tæm ddænnæ æjnæjkæ/.

The substitution involved:

The word عينيك / æjnæjk/ (your eyes) is used when the intended meaning is "your sight".

Possible purpose of substitution:

It is common in Arabic to use the name of an entity to refer to the function it performs, and the Qur'an uses this procedure probably because it is one of the linguistic tools of Arabic, the language in which it was revealed.

Evaluation:

Since this metonymy is common in Arabic and since the literal meaning of لا تمدن عينيك /læ: tæm ddænnæ æjnæjkæ/ is obviously impossible, for an eye cannot be stretched, the recipient is likely to understand that the intended meaning of the original command is (do not raise your sights!).

Only Arberry renders the metonymy literally, combining the verb "stretch" with the noun "eyes". The resultant construction is quite intelligible, and the recipient is likely to get the intended meaning.

Pickthall, Al-Hilali and Khan, and Bewley and Bewley translate the metonymy into its sense only to avoid a possibly resulting incongruity, and they follow different procedures toward that end. They all translate the verb into one that can normally be combined with the noun "eyes" to form an acceptable construction that can be understood literally. "Strain thine eyes", "look with your eyes", and "direct your eyes" are all acceptable. However,

Pickthall's choice is the least accurate, for straining the eyes involves effort made in order to look whereas the original metonymy *تمدن عينيك* doesn't. Also, the prepositional phrase "with your eyes" in Al-Hilali and Khan's translation is redundant since the verb of looking is normally performed with the eyes. This is obviously why Ghali chooses to drop the mention of the eyes when he uses the verb *look*. Nonetheless, as can be seen in Arberry's translation (i.e. stretch not thine eyes), a literal translation is likely to be perceived figuratively by the recipient, since even in English, the word "eyes" can be used figuratively to refer to "sight" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 2002). Therefore, a deviation from the original form is not justified.

Pickthall and Arberry use the archaic form "thine", which is unjustified because as mentioned earlier, a translation of the Qur'an aims primarily to provide non-Arabs access to divine guidance, and the use of archaic language can hinder the achievement of that goal through making the text less readable.

8. Referring to an entity by its past status

Example 22:

{ و إذا طلقتم النساء فبلغن أجلهن فلا تعضلوهن أن ينكحن أزواجهن إذا تراضوا بينهم بالمعروف }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 232.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Place not difficulties in the way of their marrying their husbands) (p. 38).

Arberry: (Do not bar them from marrying their husbands) (p. 60).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Do not prevent them from marrying their (former) husbands) (p. 58).

Ghali: (Do not pose problems for them from their marrying their spouses) (p. 37).

Bewley and Bewley: (Do not prevent them from marrying their first husbands) (p. 32).

Context of situation:

It was narrated that a man named Ma qil ibn Yasaar prevented his sister from remarrying her cousin who had divorced her and left her until her iddah (period of waiting) was over. This verse was revealed as a warning from Allah to every 'waliy' (guardian) of a divorced woman against preventing her from remarrying her former husband (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 2, pp. 579-80).

The substitution involved:

The word أزواج /æzwæ:d / (husbands) is used to stand for "divorcés".

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution suggests that marriage relationships are so strong that the divorcés can still be called 'husbands'. This should lead to the feeling that preventing women from remarrying their divorcés is as bad as breaking up a marriage relationship against the will of the couple.

Evaluation:

Ghali, Arberry and Pickthall render the metonymy literally, and therefore succeed in reproducing the rhetorical impact. However, it should be noted that in Ghali's translation, the preposition "from" is used wrongly after the phrase *do not pose problems* whereas a better choice will be "in" if he insists on using the same construction. Ghali and Pickthall also produce a lexical mismatch in their rendition of the word *تعصلوهن* /tæ lu:h nnæ/.

One of the meanings of the verb *عصل* / æ læ/ is "[he] prevented from marriage". The equivalents used by the two translators are too specific; they denote only one way of preventing which is by posing difficulties. A woman's guardian can tell her that she is not marrying without having to pose problems for her.

Arberry renders the metonymy literally, and the translation is intelligible; the reader will not have any problem in inferring the intended

meaning of *husbands*, so any divergence from the original expression is considered unjustified.

Al-Hilali and Khan, and Bewley and Bewley try to avoid the peculiarity of the construction "marrying their husbands" by adding a modifying word. Bewley and Bewley add the determiner *first*, and Al-Hilali and Khan add the adjective *former* in parentheses. When "first" is inserted, the meaning changes completely. It is understood from the resultant phrase that there is a second husband and that the warning is against preventing women from marrying the first divorcee after getting a divorce from the second. This interpretation is against commentaries, (e.g. *At-Tabariy* (2001, vol. 2, pp. 579-80)). The word "former", on the other hand, means "that used to be", and does not imply that there are two divorcees. The meaning is correct here but the rhetorical impact is lost, because by referring to the proposing man as *the former husband*, the construction would suggest that he was part of the woman's past and he may well remain so.

Example 23:

{ و آتوا اليتامى أموالهم }

Sura An-Nisaa< (sura no. 4), verse 2.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Give unto orphans their wealth) (p. 76).

Arberry: (Give the orphans their property) (p. 100).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And give unto orphans their property) (p. 110).

Ghali: (And give the orphans their inheritance) (p. 77).

Bewley and Bewley: (Give orphans their property) (p. 68).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah addresses guardians of orphans commanding them to give the orphans their property when they have grown up (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 4, p. 284).

The substitution involved:

The word اليتامى /æljætæ:mæ:/ (orphans) is used when the intended meaning is "the grownups who were orphans". It is common knowledge that orphans should not be given their money when they are still too young to spend it wisely. This is a clue that indicates that the literal meaning is not intended.

Possible purpose of substitution:

The word *اليتامى* /æljætæ:mæ:/ (orphans) is used here probably to remind the recipient that these people to whom the money should be given suffered from deprivation during their childhood. This should soften the hearts of the guardians and make them feel it is terrible to subject the orphans to more deprivation by holding their money after they have grown up.

Evaluation:

The literal meaning of this verse is that orphans should be given their property. According to commentaries and by convention, guardians should wait until orphans have become adults before giving them their property. Since the direct meaning of the verse contradicts this fact, it is likely that the recipient of this discourse will understand that the people who should be given their property are no longer orphans but were so in the past. Thus, in this verse, an entity (grownups who were orphans) is referred to by a word that indicates its past status (orphans).

All translators maintain the substitution, and the resultant construction is both grammatical and intelligible. The effect of substitution, which is to soften the hearts of the guardians, is therefore maintained.

Pickthall and Al-Hilali and Khan use the form "give unto" which is uncommon and follows the form of Classical English. This usage is not justified, for translations of the Qur'an should basically aim at clarity rather than the production of a comparably sacred text, for this is an impossible task.

The translators differ in their selection of an equivalent for the word أموالهم /æmwæ:læh m/. Pickthall chooses the word "wealth" which is more often translated into Arabic as ثروة /ærwæh/ because it refers to an abundance of money or things (*Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, 2002). Therefore, "wealth" is more specific than مال /mæ:l/ and is thus not an accurate equivalent. Similarly, Ghali's equivalent of مال (i.e. inheritance) is too specific. The property that the guardians are ordered to keep and give to the orphans could have been owned by those orphans before the death of their parents. The word مال in the verse refers to all sorts of property. Therefore, Arberry, Al-Hilali and Khan, and Bewley and Bewley use the word "property" which is the best choice.

Example 24:

{ و لو ترى إذ المجرمون ناكسوا رؤوسهم عند ربهم ربنا أبصرنا و سمعنا فأرجعنا نعمل صالحا إنا موقنون }

Sura Al-Sajdah (sura no. 32), verse 12.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Couldst thou but see when the guilty hang their heads before their Lord) (p. 439).

Arberry: (Ah, if thou couldst see the guilty hanging their heads before their Lord) (p. 118).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And if you only could see when the mujrimun (criminals, disbelievers, polytheists, sinners) shall hang their heads before their Lord) (p. 523).

Ghali: (And if you could see the sinners lowering their heads before their Lord) (p. 416).

Bewley and Bewley: (If only you could see the evildoers hanging their heads in shame before their Lord) (p. 399).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah addresses His messenger – peace be upon him – telling him that when the disbelievers see their punishment and hear the truth from their Lord, they will hang their heads in shame and sorrow and ask to be sent back to the early life to worship Him (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 21, p. 113).

The substitution involved:

The word المجرمون /ælm d rimu:n/ (criminals) is used when the intended meaning is "people who were criminals".

Possible purpose of substitution:

Allah calls the disbelievers as "criminals" even after they believe probably to indicate that if man dies as a disbeliever, he will be considered a disbeliever in the afterlife. This should have served to console the Prophet at the revelation time and should discourage recipients from postponing obedience to Allah until they die.

Evaluation:

All translators render the metonymy literally, maintaining the effect of calling the Afterlife repentant disbelievers as sinners which is to indicate that repentance in the Afterlife is unacceptable.

The translators differ in their choice of an equivalent for المجرمون /ælm d rimu:n/. Pickthall and Arberry choose *the guilty*, Ghali *the sinners*,

and Bewley and Bewley *the evildoers*. They are all acceptable and accurate.

Al-Hilali and Khan produce a transliteration of the word مجرمون into *mujrimun*. This is an unjustified procedure since المجرمون is a word rather than a term; it refers to a person who commits a crime, both in Islamic language and in general language use. Use of Arabic words in an English translation disturbs the smoothness of the reading and might intimidate the recipients:

When a foreign text is crowded with Arabic words, this will no doubt form a linguistic as well as psychological barrier, not only against the comprehension of the translation but also against its reading. This is especially true when the reader is non-Muslim or is unfamiliar with Arabic Islamic expressions, and when those expressions represent the essence of the text (Saleh, 2002, p. 17).

Al-Hilali and Khan explain what is meant by *mujrimun* in parentheses immediately following this word. But the explanation is made in the form of four equivalents that are not even synonymous. Instead of confusing the recipient with multiple explanations, the translators should have written the one equivalent that agrees with commentaries, which is *disbelievers*.

One structural mismatch by Pickthall that is worth noting is the translation of ولو ترى /wæ la t r :/ into *Couldst thou but see* which in fact

states an obligation, and this is against commentaries. Al-Qurtubiy (2003), for example, thinks that *لو* /la / in this verse is conditional, and that the result clause is omitted. Another interpretation mentioned by Az-Zamakhshariy (2003) is that this verse expresses the prophet's wish that the addressee could see the disbelievers' regret on the Day of Judgment. Both interpretations are reflected in the other four translations.

9. Referring to an entity by its future status

Example 25:

{ فَإِنْ طَلَّقَهَا فَلَا تَحِلُّ لَهُ مِنْ بَعْدِ حَتَّى تَنْكِحَ زَوْجًا غَيْرَهُ }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 230.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Until she hath wedded another husband) (p. 37).

Arberry: (Until she marries another husband) (p. 60).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Until she has married another husband) (p. 57).

Ghali: (Unless she consummates marriage with another husband with the intention of remaining married to him) (p. 36).

Bewley and Bewley: (Until she has married another husband) (p. 32).

Context of situation:

This verse states that if a man divorces his wife for the third time, he will no longer be allowed to take her back into marriage until she marries another man and gets a divorce from him (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 2, pp. 568-572).

The substitution involved:

The word زوج /za d / (husband) is used when the intended meaning is "a man who will be a husband in the future".

Possible purpose of substitution:

According to a saying by the Prophet - peace be upon him - in order for a man to be allowed to remarry his third-time divorcee, she has to marry another man legally and allow him to enjoy her before she gets a divorce and be eligible for the former husband. Therefore, the word زوج /za d / is probably used to suggest that a marriage that makes a divorcee eligible for her former husband has to be a full marriage.

Evaluation:

A woman cannot marry a man who is already her husband. Therefore, the word زوج /za d / (husband) in the verse should not be taken literally. It refers to a man who will be a husband in the future.

All translators render the metonymy literally, i.e. into the same metonymy; therefore, the effect of the substitution, which is to stress the point that the divorcee's marriage to another husband should be a full marriage, is maintained. The resultant construction is understood correctly.

However, a comment needs to be made on Ghali's translation.

Although the information that Ghali adds by writing *consummates marriage* is not contradictory to the intended meaning, this particular information is not mentioned in the verse so it should be written in a footnote rather than in the body of the translation. Similarly, his other addition *with the intention of remaining married to him* should have been given in a footnote, or at least in parentheses, to show that it is not a translation of the original but additional information by the translator.

Example 26:

{ قال أحدهما إني أراني أعصر خمرا }

Sura Yoosuf (sura no. 12), verse 36.

Translations:

Pickthall: (I dreamed that I was pressing wine) (p. 233).

Arberry: (I dreamed that I was pressing grapes) (p. 257).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (I saw myself (in a dream) pressing wine) (p. 298).

Ghali: (I dreamt that I was pressing grapes) (p. 239).

Bewley and Bewley: (I dreamt that I was pressing grapes) (p. 221).

Context of situation:

As Prophet Joseph – peace be upon him – was in jail, he told two young men that he interpreted dreams, so they asked him to interpret theirs. One of the young men said that he saw himself pressing grapes to make wine. Joseph told him that he would stay in prison for three days, then he would be released, and serve wine to his master (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 12, pp. 256-257).

The substitution involved:

The word **خمر** /x mr/(wine) is used instead of (grapes) as the direct object of the verb **أعصر** /æ ir / ([I] press).

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made to achieve brevity by omitting insignificant details that could be retrieved from the story.

Evaluation:

Since wine cannot be pressed, the recipient is likely to understand that what is being pressed is fruit rather than wine. The phrase *أعصر خمرا* /æ ir x mr :/ (I press wine), though brief, indicates two consecutive actions: the pressing of grapes expressed by the verb *أعصر* /æ ir/ ([I press]) and the making of wine expressed by the noun *خمر* /x mr :/ (wine).

Any translation which does not convey these two actions is considered inaccurate and lacking in meaning. This is the case with the translations of Arberry, Ghali and Bewley and Bewley who render only the first action and ignore the second. The translations tell that the speaker was pressing grapes in his dream, but do not mention the purpose for which he was doing that.

The metonymy is rendered into the same metonymy by Pickthall and Al-Hilali and Khan. They maintain the length of the original discourse and at the same time, the resultant construction is quite intelligible.

Example 27:

{ إنك إن تذرهم يضلوا عبادك و لا يلدوا إلا فاجرا كفارا }

Sura Nooh (sura no. 71), verse 27.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And will beget none save lewd ingrates) (p. 658).

Arberry: (And will beget none but unbelieving libertines) (p. 304).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And they will beget none but wicked disbelievers) (p. 732).

Ghali: (And will not beget any but wicked ungrateful ones) (p. 571).

Bewley and Bewley: (And spawn nothing but more dissolute kafirun) (p. 578).

Context of situation:

This verse is a statement of part of Prophet Noah's prayer to Allah to destroy the disbelievers. Noah says, "If You leave them alive, they will mislead the believers and beget only wicked unbelievers" (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 29, p. 119).

The substitution involved:

The word فاجر /fæ:d ir/ is used as an object for the verb يلدوا /jælidu:/ ([they] beget). The literal meaning is definitely excluded because it contradicts information based on religion and convention that people are born innocent and may become corrupt as they grow up. The intended meaning is that the disbelievers will beget only children who will be as wicked and disbelieving.

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made for the sake of brevity by omitting insignificant details that could be retrieved from the context.

Evaluation:

If taken literally, the phrase in bold means that Noah's disbelieving people will only beget children who are as wicked and disbelieving. Since it is known that people are born innocent, the recipient is likely to guess that the descriptions فاجر /fæ:d ir/ and كفار /kæff :r/ will be true of those children when they have grown up rather than when they are born.

All translators, except Bewley and Bewley, choose the verb "beget" as an equivalent for يلدوا /jælidu:/. In this way, they maintain the metonymy

and its effect, while at the same time, their translations are intelligible. Bewley and Bewley use "spawn" as an equivalent. This verb is usually used to refer to production in aquatic animals. When it is used for people, it expresses contempt (Thinkexist, 2006). This makes it an inadequate equivalent for يلدوا /jælidu:/ which is quite neutral.

The translators differ in their translations of the two words فاجر and كفار. According to Ibn Manzoor (2003, vol. 7, pp. 27-29), the word فاجر means "disobedient to Allah". Ibn Katheer (1996, vol. 3, p. 552) states that it means "engaging in immoral activities". This is why Al-Hilali and Khan and Ghali choose *wicked*, and Bewley and Bewley write *dissolute*, and these two words more or less express the same thing. Pickthall and Arberry, on the other hand, produce a mismatch when they use words that suggest illegal sexual activities, i.e. lewd and libertines, respectively, because none of the commentaries refer to that particular aspect of immorality.

As for the word كفار, it can mean either ungrateful or disbelieving. Pickthall and Ghali use equivalents which are based on the first interpretation, i.e. ingrates and ungrateful respectively. Arberry, Al-Hilali and Khan, and Bewley and Bewley choose the equivalents *unbelieving*, *disbelievers*, and *kaafiroon* respectively, which reflect the second interpretation. Bewley and Bewley though do not have to transliterate the

word كافرين /kæ:firu:n/. Since there is an accurate equivalent for this word, nothing justifies the transliteration which would only make the reading less smooth and less intelligible for the non-Arab recipients.

10. Derivational substitution

Example 28:

{ وَقُولُوا لِلنَّاسِ حُسْنًا }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), verse 83.

Translations:

Pickthall: (And speak kindly to mankind), (p. 16) .

Arberry: (And speak good to men), (p.38).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (And speak good to people (i.e. enjoin righteousness and forbid evil, and say the truth about Muhammad)), (p.25).

Ghali: (Speak of good to the people) (p.12).

Bewley and Bewley: (And speak good words to people), (p.11).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah reminds the Children of Israel of the commandments that He gave them, and the covenants He took from them

to abide by those commands. The quoted part of the verse states one command which is to say good words to people (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 1, p. 451).

The substitution involved:

The noun حُسْن /ħ sn/ (good) is used instead of an (adjective + noun) construction, e.g. قولا حسنا /qa læn hæsaenæ:/ (good words).

Possible purpose of substitution:

The substitution is probably made to stress the importance of saying good words to people. The noun حسنا (goodness) is a name of a quality, so it carries more meaning than the adjective *good* whose meaning is restricted by the head noun following it.

Evaluation:

It is common in Arabic to substitute a noun denoting a quality for an adjective noun construction where the adjective is derivationally related to that quality. It is a means of exaggeration that amounts to saying that a person is all the quality, be it kindness, generosity, or beauty, instead of saying that he has some of it.

Arberry and Al-Hilali and Khan try to adhere to the original construction by combining *speak* with *good*. The verb "speak" is intransitive just like its Arabic equivalent "يتحدث" /jætæħæddæ /, and when it is used as transitive, its object can only be a language. Therefore, it is likely that the recipient will not think of the word "good" as an object but as an adverb meaning "well". The resultant construction then will suggest that there is a command to speak well. This is not the intended meaning. Al-Hilali and Khan attempt to explain the indirect meaning in parentheses. But the way the main statement is formulated in Al-Hilali and Khan's translation makes it an inaccurate rendition rather than an ambiguous statement that needs explaining.

Pickthall, Ghali and Bewley and Bewley translate the metonymy into a literal statement. Unfortunately, the equivalent of the metonymy selected by Pickthall is inaccurate. Speaking kindly differs from "saying good", for the former is concerned with the manner in which the event takes place whereas the latter is about what is said.

Bewley and Bewley translate the word حُسن /ħ sn/ into an adjective followed by a noun, in order to make the construction grammatical. The resultant construction is intelligible and expresses the intended meaning. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the goodness of what is said is lost, and is not compensated for.

Similarly, Ghali's translation of the metonymy is inaccurate since he writes *speak of good* which implies that the theme of speaking is good, and that is different from "saying good words". One can certainly say evil words about good. Another mismatch by Ghali is the use of the definite article before the word *people*, a mistake that is probably due to the influence of the original structure (الناس)/æn-næ:s/.

Example 29:

{ كَتَبَ عَلَيْكُمُ الْقِتَالَ وَ هُوَ كُرْهُ لَكُمْ }

Sura Al-Baqarah (sura 2), verse 216.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Though it is hateful unto you) (p. 35).

Arberry: (Though it be hateful to you) (p. 57).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Though you dislike it) (p. 53).

Ghali: (And you are averse to it) (p. 34).

Bewley and Bewley: (Even if it is hateful to you) (p.29).

Context of situation:

In this verse, Allah makes it obligatory for Muslims to fight against the enemies who transgress against Islam. The verse states that fighting is

obligatory although it is difficult and ordained for man (As-Saabooniy, 1981, vol. 1, p. 123).

The substitution involved:

The verbal noun كره /k rh/ (hatred) is used instead of the adjective كريه /kæri:h/ (hateful).

Possible purpose of substitution:

It is common in Arabic to substitute an adjective with a verbal noun to intensify the meaning expressed. The substitution is used probably to stress the fact that Allah knows how much people hate fighting, so they have to force themselves to do it. Use of the verbal noun indicates that the highest degree of hatred is felt toward fighting in war.

Evaluation:

In this verse, the adjective كريه /kæri:h/ (hateful) is substituted with the verbal noun كره /k rh/ (hatred). The substitution serves to intensify the hatred felt towards fighting. A literal rendition of the metonymy, which would be "though it is hatred", would result in an ungrammatical sentence because substitution of derivatives is not common in English.

None of the translators renders the metonymy into the same metonymy, probably for fear that a literal translation would not be understood. Therefore, Pickthall, Arberry, and Bewley and Bewley translate the verbal noun with an adjective, losing the intensifying effect of the substitution, and they do not compensate for the loss.

Al-Hilali and Khan, and Ghali manipulate the structure of this sentence, obviously to achieve more clarity, but the intensity of hatred expressed by their translations, especially Ghali's, is less than that expressed by the other translations that simply use the word *hateful*.

Example 30:

{ أو يصبح ماؤها غورا فلن تستطيع له طلبا }

Sura Al-Kahf (sura no.18), verse 41.

Translations:

Pickthall: (Or some morning the water thereof will be lost in the earth) (p. 298).

Arberry: (Or in the morning the water of it will be sunk into the earth) (p. 321).

Al-Hilali and Khan: (Or the water thereof (of the gardens) becomes deep-sunken (underground)) (p. 374).

Ghali: (Or its water will sink into the earth) (p. 298).

Bewley and Bewley: (Or morning finds its water drained into the earth) (p. 279).

Context of situation:

The four preceding verses report a believer's address to his companion who is doubtful about the Day of Judgment. The believer prays that Allah may give him something better than the companion's garden in the Hereafter and send on it punishment from heaven so that it turns into smooth mud, where nothing grows, or make its water disappear into the earth so that the disbelieving companion will never be able to seek it (At-Tabariy, 2001, vol. 15, p. 288).

The substitution involved:

The verbal noun غَوْر / a r/ (sinkage) is substituted for the adjective غَائِر / æ: ir/ (sunk).

Possible purpose of substitution:

As mentioned above, it is common in Arabic to substitute a verbal noun for an adjective as a way of intensifying the meaning expressed by the adjective. In this verse, the substitution is probably made to suggest that the water will be gone completely so that there is no hope in getting it back.

This shows the omnipotence of Allah and indicates His severe punishment for those who disbelieve in the Day of Judgment.

Evaluation:

The verbal noun غور / a r/ (sinkage) is used for describing the water of the disbeliever's garden. Since verbal nouns are not modifiers, it is obvious that there is a substitution that aims at intensifying the quality of being sunk.

The Arabic construction could not be translated literally, i.e. into a metonymy, because the result is ungrammatical. Therefore, the translators use adjectives as equivalents for the verbal noun, with the exception of Ghali who uses the verb form as an equivalent.

Pickthall translates غور with *lost*, an equivalent that is too general; for water can be lost in a number of ways including evaporating or flowing away into another place, but its meaning is restricted by the following prepositional phrase "in the earth" which makes the overall meaning equivalent .

Similarly, in Bewley and Bewley' translation, the word *drained* is more general than the original word غور , for water can be drained in different ways; however, the prepositional phrase that follows, i.e. "into the earth", restricts its meaning to that of sinking.

Arberry, Al-Hilali and Khan, and Ghali use as an equivalent different forms of the verb "sink", which is also a sound choice.

The loss of emphasis that results from translating the metonymy into a literal statement is compensated for only by Al-Hilali and Khan when they add the word "deep". However, the form of "sink" used by Al-Hilali and Khan, i.e. *sunken*, should be followed by a noun. If it is not, the form "sunk" is more appropriate.

One mismatch that is found in three of the translations is in the interpretation of the word *يصبح* /j biħ/. Pickthall, Arberry, and Bewley and Bewley seemingly trace the word *يصبح* to its origin *صبح* / bh/ (morning) and thus conclude that the event would necessarily take place in the morning. Actually, the word *يصبح* also means "becomes", and this is the meaning intended in the verse (Al-Saabooniy, 1981, vol.8, p. 16; Ibn Katheer, 1996, vol. 2, p. 417). We may say *أصبح أحمد عالما* /æ bæħæ æħmæd æ:limæn/ (Ahmad became a scientist). It can by no means indicate that one morning he became a scientist all of a sudden.

Chapter Five

Results

Findings

1. Although the literal meaning of a metonymy is not the intended meaning, the initial image it evokes in the mind of the recipient is required, for it usually serves a purpose.

It was possible to identify a possible purpose for the metonymic substitution in 28 examples (93% of the cases). The possible purpose in 15 examples (50%) seems to be emphatic, i.e. to stress the importance or intensity of an action or a quality. In 11 examples (36.7%), the possible purpose is to strengthen the connection in the mind between two concepts not directly related in order to encourage a good deed or discourage an evil deed. Finally, in 2 examples (6.6%), no purpose other than brevity could be identified.

2. The best method for translating metonymy is one that maintains both the meaning and effect, an aim that can only be attained by rendering the metonymy literally into the same metonymy. If literal translation is blocked because of any linguistic or cultural constraint, another translation method should be used. In this case, meaning loss is almost always inevitable.

Tables (1) and (2) below show the distribution and frequency with which the different methods are used in the five translations:

Table 1: Distribution of the metonymy translation methods

| Method | Pickhall | Arberry | Al-Hilali & Khan | Ghali | Bewley & Bewley |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|
| Translation into the same metonymy | 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 | 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28 | 4, 7, 8, 11, 16, 19, 23, 25, 26, 27 | 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27 | 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 27 |
| Reduction of metonymy to its sense only | 2, 3, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30 | 2, 3, 15, 17, 26, 29, 30 | 3, 5, 9, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 29, 30 | 3, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 28, 29, 30 | 2, 3, 8, 10, 13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 28, 29, 30 |
| Translation into the same metonymy with the intended meaning in parentheses | | | 1, 2, 10, 12, 17, 24, 28 | | |
| Translation into a metaphor | | 13 | | | |
| Translation into another metonymy | | | 18 | | 18 |
| Assuming that there isn't a metonymy | 6 | | 6 | 1, 6, 10 | |

Table 2: Frequency and relative frequency of the metonymy translation methods

| Method | Pickthall | Arberry | Al-Hilali & Khan | Ghali | Bewley & Bewley |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| Translation into the same metonymy | 18 (60%) | 22 (73.3%) | 10 (33.3%) | 14 (46.7%) | 15 (50%) |
| Reduction of metonymy to its sense only | 11 (37%) | 7 (23.3%) | 11 (36.7) | 13 (43.3%) | 14 (46.7%) |
| Translation into the same metonymy with the intended meaning in parentheses | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 7 (23.3%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Translation into a metaphor | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (3.3%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Translation into another metonymy | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (3.3%) | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (3.3%) |
| Assuming that there isn't a metonymy | 1 (3.3%) | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (3.3%) | 3 (10%) | 0 (0.0%) |

As the tables show, there is a general tendency to render metonymies into the same metonymies. All translators render a greater number of metonymies in this way rather than into their sense only. The tendency is

highest in Arberry's translation where 22 examples (73.3% of the metonymies investigated) are translated literally, and only 7 (23.3 %) are reduced to their sense only. Eighty-six percent of Arberry's literal renditions are successful, i.e. they are intelligible and convey both the meaning and effect (if any is identified) of the metonymy. In the remaining 14% where he fails; the reasons for failure are wrong selection of equivalent (9%), and unintelligibility due to literalness (4.5%).

Concerning the metonymies which Arberry reduces to their sense, he is justified in avoiding a literal rendition in 50% of the cases where he rightly expects that unintelligibility would result from translating the metonymy into the same metonymy. It is Arberry's policy not to make any additions to his translation, so it seems that the only way to avoid unintelligibility is to reduce a problematic metonymy into its sense only.

Pickthall is also inclined towards translating metonymies literally in 60% of the cases examined (18 examples). Only in example 17, Pickthall attempts to provide a clarification of the intended meaning in parentheses, and he is justified in doing so because the clue that excludes the literal meaning is purely religious. This metonymy in particular evokes an initial shocking image that should not last to the effect that the literal meaning is permanently thought to be the intended meaning. Unfortunately, Pickthall fails to express this addition in the right form or position.

Pickthall succeeds in 89% of his literal renditions to reproduce the meaning accurately and in an intelligible form, and where he errs (11%), it is because of a faulty selection of equivalents (5.5%), or a wrong structure (5.5%).

Pickthall reduces 36.7% of the metonymies (11 examples) to their sense only. He is justified in following this procedure in only four examples (13.3%) where literalness would lead to unintelligibility.

Al-Hilali and Khan's translation is generally characterized by a high tendency to use parentheses for clarification. In their translation of the 30 examples investigated, they use parentheses in 18 examples. Among the cases where they choose to render a metonymy into the same metonymy (17 examples), they give the intended meaning in parentheses or brackets in 7 cases. It seems that the translators believe that no assumptions should be made as to the recipient's resort to commentaries. This means that whenever the clue is purely religious, the literal meaning will be assumed by the recipient to be true unless the intended meaning is given as well.

Needless to say, added parentheses and brackets should be kept to a minimum since they disturb the smoothness of the reading. But among the 7 examples in which Al-Hilali and Khan make bracketed additions right after the metonymies, only three are justified. In other words, in these three cases only, the additions are necessary to exclude the literal meaning

because the clue is the recipient's possession of certain religious information.

Among Al-Hilali and Khan's 17 literal translations of metonymies, thirteen are successful and only four are not because of a wrong choice of equivalent (3 cases), or the production of a structural mismatch (1 example). Al-Hilali and Khan reduce 11 examples (36.7%) to their sense only, and only four of these are justified.

Following the same tendency, Bewley and Bewley's literal translations outnumber their reductions of metonymies to their sense only. Among their literal translations (15 examples), they succeed in reproducing the same metonymies in 12 examples (80%), and fail in 3 (20%) because of a wrong choice of equivalent (2 examples), and not providing an indication that the literal meaning is not intended when the clue is absent (1 example). They translate fourteen examples into their sense only, of which only five (16.6%) are justified because a literal translation would lead to unintelligibility.

Finally, Ghali has the lowest tendency towards translating metonymies into the same metonymies with a percentage of 46.7 (14 examples). He succeeds in translating 11 metonymies in this way and fails in the remaining three, making a faulty choice of equivalent (2 examples) and a grammatical mistake (1). Ghali reduces 13 examples (i.e. 43.3%) to

their sense only. He is justified in doing so in 42.8% of the cases for fear of producing an unintelligible sentence.

3. When a metonymy cannot be translated literally into the same metonymy, it can be reduced to its sense, but some meaning loss is inevitable. In this case, the translator should somehow compensate for the meaning loss. Among the thirty examples investigated, and whenever a metonymy is reduced to its sense, Al-Hilali and Khan compensate for the meaning loss in three cases, Arberry two, and Bewley and Bewley, and Ghali one each. Pickthall does not make any attempt to compensate for the meaning loss, although he uses parentheses in 3 occasions but for other purposes than compensation.

4. Except for cases of derivational substitution, all kinds of metonymies are in principle translatable into the same metonymy. It is noted that some translators reduce a metonymy to its sense when they believe that the metonymy is problematic, i.e. a literal rendition produces an unintelligible output or a permanent wrong understanding. In example 13, for instance, although two translations reproduce the metonymy successfully, three others reduce it to its sense, probably for fear of producing an unintelligible sentence. The metonymy, referring to rain with "the sky", is not familiar in English, albeit its rational clue eliminates the literal interpretation. However, some metonymies are obviously not problematic,

e.g. referring to people with the town they live in; yet in that particular example, the metonymy is rendered into its sense only in one of the translations. Other similar examples are 2, 8, and 19 where at least one translator of each avoids a literal rendition.

There isn't a pattern to explain why translators sometimes choose to delete a metonymy and convey its sense only rather than both its sense and effect. But these are individual cases because if we exclude metonymies where a literal translation is blocked by linguistic or cultural constraints (3, 20, 28, 29, 30), and cases where the translators overlook the metonymy altogether (6, 10, 21), we end up with 115 translations where a literal rendition is possible. Among these, 78 are literal translations and only 37 are reductions to their sense only. This indicates that there is a strong tendency in translations towards literalness, whenever it is possible. This, in turn, reflects a general awareness that the Qur'anic discourse is sacred, so both its form and content should be maintained, if possible.

It is not easy to predict whether the recipient will use the available clues properly to get to the intended meaning, nor is it always possible to know the extent to which ambiguity can be tolerated and solved. The difference in selecting the appropriate metonymy translation methods reflects the translators' different judgments of what is considered a clear translation. True, clarity is a priority, but it should not lead to oversimplification that can in turn lead to the loss of delicate meanings of

the Qur'an. A translator can consult an English native speaker about what is intelligible, but the extent to which the English native recipients will use universal clues may vary according to their education, intelligence, and cultural background. Therefore, it seems that the best procedure to follow is to maintain the metonymy and to use extensive footnotes to ensure that the intended meaning is arrived at eventually.

A metonymy that involves a derivational substitution made to increase the intensity of a specific quality cannot be translated into the same metonymy because the acceptability of the replaced form is usually peculiar to Arabic and is not shared by the target language. Therefore, a literal translation of such metonymies produces unintelligible statements as in examples 28, 29, and 30. Two translators make an attempt to reproduce the same metonymy in example 28, trying to exploit the coincidence that the word "good" can be used both as an adjective and as a noun – but the meaning would then be different. Thus, the general rule is that derivational substitution cannot be rendered literally, and compensation has to be made for the resulting meaning loss.

5. The clues identified in this study can be classified into four categories which correspond to Salmaan's types of clues (2000) mentioned in chapter two. The following table shows the distribution of the different types and their relative frequencies:

Table 3: Distribution and frequency of the metonymic clues

| Type of clue | Distribution | Frequency | Percentage |
|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| Linguistic | 3, 5, 28, 29, 30 | 5 | 16.7% |
| Rational | 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26 | 18 | 60% |
| Religious | 1, 10, 11, 12, 17, 27 | 6 | 20% |
| Conventional | 23 | 1 | 3.3% |

As shown in table (3), five metonymies have linguistic clues. In example 3 which involves the substitution of رقبة /r qæbæh/(neck) for the whole person, the recipient of the Arabic discourse makes use of the context, i.e. an enumeration of the charity targets, to understand that the phrase في الرقاب /fir-riqæ:b/ (in necks) refers to setting slaves free. Such a conclusion, however, is not reached solely by virtue of the context but also as a result of the Arabic convention that a slave can be referred to with رقبة, a convention which is absent in the English culture. This would make a literal rendition of the metonymy into English confusing to the recipient.

Similarly, in examples 28, 29, and 30, the clue lies in the linguistic incongruity between the metonymic word and its linguistic context. This incongruity is acceptable in Arabic and serves a purpose, but is alien to the

English language. Therefore, the reproduction of the same incongruity in the target language text would result in an unacceptable structure. Thus, both the metonymy and its clue are untranslatable literally.

In example 2, on the other hand, the clue in the original discourse is the linguistic incongruity that results from the difference of gender between the word *كلمة* /kælimæh/ (word) and its reference, the pronoun in *اسمه* /ism h / (his name). The gender differences are absent in English, yet there is still a linguistic incongruity between the word *كلمة*, which is inanimate, and its reference the possessive adjective *his*, which is human and masculine. Thus, the acceptability of a literal translation of a metonymy with a linguistic clue emanates from the possibility to maintain the clue, i.e. the linguistic incongruity, in the target language.

As for metonymies that have rational clues, it is found that they all, except for two, have been translated literally with success at least by one translator or team of translators. In example 15, the problem lies in the difficulty of finding a one-word equivalent for the word *نادي* /næ:di:/ expressing the sense in which it is used in the verse. In example 20, the unacceptability of the structure that results from the literal translation is due to an extreme case of lack of collocation between the different components of that structure.

Metonymies with religious clues, i.e. 1, 10, 11, 12, 17 and 27, are translatable into the same metonymies. The resultant constructions are correct and intelligible. But getting the intended meaning can be made only by recipients who have the particular religious information that can serve as a clue to excluding the literal meaning. For example, the recipient would think that the command in *خذوا زينتكم* /x ðu: zi:nætæk m/ is a command to adorn oneself unless he/she knows the circumstances of revelation or has read the explanation in commentaries. Since that kind of knowledge is not likely to be present in all the target recipients, it is better to mention the intended meaning in a footnote whenever the clue is purely religious.

In this study, there is one clue that is based on convention, which means that reaching the intended meaning requires certain information. In example 23, the literal meaning is that orphans should be given their property, whereas it is generally known that they are to be given their property only after they have grown up. This superficial contradiction serves to indicate that the recipient should go beyond the literal meaning. Thus, this metonymy in particular is translatable into the same metonymy by virtue of the shared clue, i.e. the fact that the English recipient has the same background information that serves as a clue.

Conclusions

The problem of translating metonymy in the Holy Qur'an is two-fold. On one hand, the Qur'an is a sacred book viewed by all Muslims as the Word of Allah that has not been altered by human interference. Any translation of the Qur'an is obliged to maintain the features of the original discourse, whenever possible, first because the Qur'an expresses layers after layers of meaning, some of which may not be perceived by the translator. Therefore, a communicative translator who claims to have captured and conveyed the "force" of a verse into a different form that reads more smoothly for an English recipient is taking the risk of overlooking some of the delicate meanings of the Qura'nic discourse that can only be rendered faithfully by maintaining the Qur'anic expression. Second, the non-Arab recipient has the right to get to know the style of the Qur'an which can only be achieved through a faithful, but intelligible, rendition of the text.

On the other hand, metonymy is not a useless substitution; it often serves a purpose. Although the recipients make use of the clue to get to the intended meaning, they will be affected by the substitution that evokes a temporary image in the mind for a particular purpose. This effect is added to the meanings that should be conveyed by the translator. Therefore, avoidance of that substitution results in the loss of part of the meaning of the metonymic expression.

In this study, it is obvious that all translators are aware, albeit in varying degrees, of the significance of maintaining the form of a metonymy, even if that leads to violating the target language collocations and the Admiral's resultant "braking effect" (Fawcett, 2003, p. 8) that slows down the reading and gives the text a translation flavor. The slow pace of reading should not be a problem in the Qur'anic discourse in particular because a translation of the Qur'an is not to be used in worship, and a little bit of the braking effect can be tolerated in exchange for the benefits of faithful renditions of metonymies. On the other hand, although Newmark (1993b) declares that a translation should not read like a translation, he stresses that if the source text is linguistically innovative and distinguished, the translation is likely to appear like a translation unless the translator insists on not making it sound like one by normalizing it. But then he would be ruining its impact or distinction.

Of course, it is not always possible to translate a metonymy literally because each language has its own structural and lexical systems that do not stand in one-to-one relationships with systems of other languages. Yet, the study shows that most of the metonymies involved in the study are translatable into the same metonymies, and the translations are intelligible.

The study also shows that the translatability of a metonymy into the same metonymy is not dependent on the type of metonymy as much as it depends on the type of clue. One exceptional case is the derivational

substitution which turns out to be the only "type" of metonymy that has to be rendered into a literal statement.

As mentioned above, the type of clue in a metonymy and its existence or absence in the target language culture are more critical in determining the way a metonymy should be translated. In table (3), the clues identified fall into four categories: linguistic, rational, religious, and conventional. Fortunately, most of the clues in the thirty examples investigated are rational, and these make the metonymies readily comprehensible in the target language because their clues are based on the universalities of the human mind and thought. On the other hand, when metonymies with conventional clues are translated literally, the intended meaning may or may not be reached depending on whether the convention on which the clue is based exists in the target language culture. If it doesn't, the intended meaning will need to be explained in a footnote.

By the same token, it can hardly be claimed that metonymies with religious clues constitute a real translation problem, for as the study shows, their literal translations are quite intelligible. The problem, however, lies in the fact that it is not likely that the translation recipients would have the religious information that serve as clues, or would have access to commentaries to correct their wrong understanding. Nevertheless, the problem should not be solved by translating the metonymy into its sense only because in this way the effect of the substitution will be lost. The best

solution is to maintain the metonymy and bridge the gap of information by providing the intended meaning in a footnote.

It is clear why translators who do not write any footnotes reduce a problematic metonymy to its sense only, i.e. to avoid giving a lasting wrong understanding. What cannot be understood is their insistence on producing a footnote-free translation. It is even more confusing to find a translation with detailed footnotes, but none of them are exploited for the important purpose of explaining a problematic metonymy.

Linguistic clues are the most problematic since they are often related to features of the source language system which do not have counterparts in the target language. The acceptability of a literal translation of metonymies with linguistic clues depends on whether or not the linguistic clue is transferable into the target language or at least translates into a corresponding incongruity in the target language.

Thus, although the study emphasizes that literal translation is the best method for translating metonymy, the acceptability of a literally-translated metonymy is not always guaranteed. Whether or not a metonymy is to be translated literally is determined by the following factors: the type of clue, the extent to which the metonymy is connected with the peculiar features of the source language, the extent to which the components of the resultant construction collocate, and whether their lack of collocation is acceptable to the target language recipients. Therefore, unless the

translator's mother tongue is English, the translator should consult an English native speaker for judgments about the acceptability of the translation resultant constructions.

The findings of this study have important implications for the Holy Qur'an translators because they show how to translate one of the most common tropes that sometimes poses a problem for translators. However, the findings cannot be claimed to be generalizable to the translation of metonymy in other types of text where the form is less important and where the translator's loyalty is mainly to the audience.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

Summary of the Thesis

This study aimed to find out the best method for translating metonymy in the Holy Qur'an, through the assessment of the ways metonymy is rendered in five translations of the Qur'an; namely, *The Meanings of the Glorious Qur'an* by M. M. Pickthall (1992), *The Koran Interpreted* by A. J. Arberry (1996), *Interpretation of the Meanings of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language* by M. Al-Hilali and M. Khan (1996), *Towards Understanding the Ever-Glorious Qur'an* by M. M. Ghali (1998), and *The Noble Qur'an, a New Rendering of its Meaning in English* by A. and A. Bewley (1999). The data analyzed consisted of thirty examples, twelve of which were extracted from sura Al-Baqarah (sura no. 2), and the other eighteen were extracted from other suras because it was not possible to find three examples of each of the ten types of metonymy in Al-Baqarah. For each example, the context of situation was determined on the basis of commentaries which basically included At-Tabariy (2001), As-Saabooniy (1981), and Ibn-Katheer (1996).

The thirty examples analyzed represent ten types of metonymy. The purpose behind the inclusion of a variety of metonymy types was to discover whether the different types require different translation methods.

The evaluation of translations followed a purely linguistic approach, that is based on analysis and comparison. First, the meaning of the metonymic expression is determined on the basis of commentaries; the possible purpose of the metonymic substitution is also determined, whenever possible, then the original discourse is compared to its five translations. The comparison aimed to uncover the extent to which each translation conveys the full meaning of the metonymy. Judgments were made about the accuracy and intelligibility of the translations. Conclusions were then drawn regarding the translation method that leads to successful renditions of metonymy, and the circumstances that justify resorting to alternative methods.

Answers to research questions

It is possible now to answer the research questions posed in the introduction:

1. What are the methods used in the five translations for rendering metonymies in the Qur'an?

The three main methods used by the translators in the five translations are the following: literal translation (i.e. rendition of a metonymy into the same

metonymy), reduction of a metonymy to its sense only, and a combination of literal translation and an explanation in parentheses.

Two more methods are identified which are translating a metonymy into another metonymy or into a metaphor. However, the frequency figures in table (2) show that these methods are not used systematically. Rather, the former is used only twice (1.5%) and the latter once (0.75%), so they are insignificant.

2. For each method identified, the following questions were posed:

- (a) To what extent did the translator succeed in conveying the meaning and the rhetorical impact of the metonymy? (b) To what extent did the translator succeed in producing an intelligible translation? (c) To what extent is the method consistent in yielding translations with the same degree of accuracy and intelligibility?**

The study has shown that literal translation has the merit of conveying both the meaning and impact of a metonymy. However, this capacity can be blocked by linguistic or cultural differences. Linguistic differences often lead to unintelligibility, whereas cultural differences undermine the accuracy of the translation. The problem of unintelligibility can only be solved by giving up literalness and resorting to addition or using a different structure. Lack of accuracy due to cultural differences can be solved by providing background information in the form of footnotes. This is better

than giving up the metonymy altogether and losing part of the meaning. Thus, the literal method yields accurate translations, yet, it can be blocked by linguistic differences between the two languages. Therefore, it can be said that it is successful but to an extent.

Reducing a metonymy to its sense only makes the translator more in control of the structure of the translation, so intelligibility is invariably achieved. However, since substitution in metonymy always serves a purpose, omission of the substitution leaves the purpose unfulfilled, and part of the meaning or impact is lost. Since accuracy is a priority, this method is not recommended. Whenever it has to be used, due to the unfeasibility of literalness, compensation has to be made.

The third method, which is a combination of literalness and explanation, combines some of the merits of these two methods. It achieves accuracy by maintaining the metonymy, and intelligibility since it gives an explanation. However, it has the disadvantage of jeopardizing the impact through oversimplification. A metonymy often serves its purpose by shocking the recipient with an image that is evoked temporarily in the mind. The recipient is not allowed to form that image because the explanation immediately follows. Thus, accuracy is affected. Another disadvantage of this method is that the explanation disturbs the smoothness of reading. Besides, the recipients may not need to read the explanations every time they read the translation. They should not be denied the right to

choose whether or not to read the interventions of the translator, which should, therefore, be presented in the form of footnotes.

3. Is there an ideal method for translating Qur'anic metonymies? If yes, what is it? If no, what methods were found successful? What methods were found unsuccessful?

Yes. The only method that maintains both the sense and impact of metonymy is literal translation. Therefore, it is the best method, on two conditions: First, the resultant construction should be intelligible. Second, explanatory footnotes should be used whenever background information is thought necessary for correct understanding of the metonymy.

4. Do the different types of metonymy require different translation methods?

No. The study has shown that the different types of metonymy do not require different translation methods. The only exception is the derivational substitution which is usually peculiar to Arabic and thus makes literal translation, with or without explanation, into English almost impossible.

Summary of Conclusions

1. In almost all the metonymies investigated, substitution adds meaning or an impact to the basic intended meaning.

2. The study has shown that the best method to convey both the basic meaning and the additional meaning or impact of a metonymy is by translating it literally into the same metonymy.
3. Only when literal translation is blocked by linguistic constraints, the intended meaning can be expressed in the form of a literal statement. In this case, however, compensatory measures should be taken, which the translations involved in this study rarely do.
4. The findings of the study reflect the translators' general awareness of the priority of literalness over other methods, whenever possible. They, nevertheless, differ in their judgment of whether certain situations necessitate a deviation from literal translation.
5. The study has shown that metonymy typologies do not determine the translation method to be used.
6. The study has also shown that the type of clue is more critical in determining the liability of a metonymy for literal translation. Religious and conventional clues contribute to correct comprehension of a literal translation on condition that the recipient possesses certain background information. Linguistic clues, on the other hand, are usually peculiar to the source language. They make it almost impossible to translate the metonymy literally unless the translation produces a corresponding linguistic incongruity to exclude the literal meaning. As for metonymies

with rational clues, they can usually be rendered literally provided that the resultant construction is intelligible.

Recommendations

1. When translating metonymy in general, translators should be sensitive to the delicate meanings added by substitution. These meanings are often lost when a metonymy is reduced to its sense only.
2. Translators should be aware of the importance of using compensation strategies whenever there is unavoidable meaning loss, especially when a metonymy has to be reduced to its sense only.
3. Qur'an translation projects should not be carried out in isolation from the Qur'an commentaries. These should be the source for background information against which the Qur'anic discourse is to be understood.
4. Qur'an translation projects should be carried out by teams that involve native speakers of both the source and target languages so that full comprehension of verses and commentaries as well as correct and acceptable reproduction of their meanings are made.
5. There are many translations of the Qur'an produced by individuals or small teams. Therefore, new translation projects should not start from scratch. Instead, revision of one of the existing translations should be made in order to save time and effort and make use of the tremendous efforts made by previous Qur'an translators.

6. Al-Hilali and Khan's translation is a good candidate for revision. The translators, however, need to transfer their additions to the margins, including the intended meanings of figurative expressions. Arberry's is another potentially good translation provided that it is enriched with explanations and contextual information in the margins.

Suggestions for Further Research

1. This study could be complemented by a similar one that investigates the translation of the types of metonymy excluded from this study (e.g. Specific for General, Whole for Part, Time for Entity, complex metonymy, kinaayah, etc.).
2. A similar study could be conducted to investigate the best method of translating metonymy in other types of text (e.g. poetry, advertisements, technical texts, etc.). This should enrich the literature with guidelines regarding one of the most common problems of translation.
3. The best method for translating metonymy could be investigated further by using the target recipients' response to a survey about the meanings – especially the connotative meanings - evoked by the different translations of a given Qur'anic metonymy.
4. The relationship (if any) between the various degrees of metonymyhood and the translatability of a metonymy could be investigated.

Appendix

Table A: The metonymies investigated and their translations

| No. | Verse | Translations |
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| 1 | <p>{وَأَقِيمُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَآتُوا الزَّكَاةَ وَارْكَعُوا مَعَ الرَّاكِعِينَ}</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 43.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [And bow your heads with those who bow (in worship)] (p. 11).</p> <p>Arberry: [And bow with those that bow] (p. 34).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [And bow down (or submit yourselves with obedience to Allah) along with Ar-Raaki'een)] (p. 19).</p> <p>Ghali: [And bow down in the company of others bowing down] (p. 7).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [And bow with those who bow] (p. 6).</p> |
| 2 | <p>{بَلَىٰ مَنْ أَسْلَمَ وَجْهَهُ لِلَّهِ وَهُوَ مُحْسِنٌ}</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 112.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Whosoever surrendeth his purpose to Allah] (p. 20).</p> <p>Arberry: [Whosoever submits his will to God] (p. 42).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Whoever submits his face (himself) to Allah] (p. 29).</p> <p>Ghali: [Whosoever surrendered his face to Allah] (p. 17).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [All who submit themselves completely to Allah] (p. 15).</p> |

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| 3 | <p>{ و لكن البر من آمن بالله و اليوم الآخر و الملائكة و الكتاب و النبيين و آتى المال على حبه ذوي القربى و اليتامى و المساكين و ابن السبيل و السائلين و في الرقاب }</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 177.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [And to set slaves free] (p. 29). Arberry: [And to ransom the slave] (p. 51). Al-Hilali and Khan: [And to set slaves free] (p. 43). Ghali: [And to ransom a slave] (p. 27). Bewley and Bewley: [And to set slaves free] (p. 23).</p> |
| 4 | <p>{ فمن اعتدى عليكم فاعتدوا عليه بمثل ما اعتدى عليكم }</p> <p>Sura al-Baqarah, verse 194.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [One who attacketh you, attack him] (p. 31). Arberry: [Whoso commits aggression against you, do you commit aggression against him] (p. 54). Al-Hilali and Khan: [Whoever transgresses the prohibition against you, you transgress likewise against him] (p. 48). Ghali: [Whoever transgress against you, then transgress against him] (p. 30). Bewley and Bewley: [If anyone oversteps the limits against you, overstep against him] (p. 26).</p> |

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| 5 | <p>{إن الله يبشرك بكلمة منه اسمه المسيح عيسى بن مريم}</p> <p>Sura Aal- Imraan, verse 45.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Allah giveth thee the glad tidings of a word from Him, whose name is the Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary] (p. 55).</p> <p>Arberry: [God gives thee good tidings of a Word from Him whose name is Messiah, Jesus, son of Mary] (p. 79).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Verily, Allah gives you the glad tidings of a Word ["Be!" _ and he was! i.e. 'Isa (Jesus) the son of Maryam (Mary)] from Him, his name will be the Messiah 'Isa (Jesus), the son of Maryam (Mary)] (p. 81).</p> <p>Ghali: [God gives you glad tidings of a word from Him, his name is Messiah Jesus the son of Mary] (p.55).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Your Lord gives you good news of a word from Him. His name is the Messiah 'Isa son of Maryam] (p. 48).</p> |
| 6 | <p>{أولئك لم يكونوا معجزين في الأرض و ما كان لهم من دون الله من أولياء يضاعف لهم العذاب ما كانوا يستطيعون السمع و ما كانوا يبصرون }</p> <p>Sura Hood, verse 20.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [They could not bear to hear] (p. 216).</p> <p>Arberry: [They could not hear] (p. 241).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [They could not bear to hear (the preachers of the truth)] (p. 281).</p> <p>Ghali: [They could not bear to hear] (p. 224).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [They were unable to hear]</p> |

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| | | (p. 206). |
| 7 | <p>{إن الذين يكتمون ما أنزل الله من الكتاب و يشترون به ثمنا قليلا أولئك ما يأكلون في بطونهم إلا النار}</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 174.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [They eat into their bellies nothing else than fire] (p. 28).</p> <p>Arberry: [They shall eat naught but the Fire in their bellies] (p. 50).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [They eat into their bellies nothing but fire] (p. 42).</p> <p>Ghali: [[They] eat nothing in their bellies but fire] (p. 26).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [[They] eat nothing into their bellies but the Fire] (p. 23).</p> |
| 8 | <p>{الذين يأكلون الربا لا يقومون إلا كما يقوم الذي يتخبطه الشيطان من المس}</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 275.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Those who swallow usury ...] (p. 46).</p> <p>Arberry: [Those who devour usury ...] (p. 69).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Those who eat Riba (usury) ...] (p. 69).</p> <p>Ghali: [Those who devour usury ...] (p. 47).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Those who practice riba ...] (p. 40).</p> |

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| 9 | <p>{و سارعوا إلى مغفرة من ربكم و جنة عرضها كعرض السماء و الأرض}</p> <p>Sura Aal- Imraan, verse, 133.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [And vie one with another for forgiveness from your Lord] (p. 66).</p> <p>Arberry: [And vie with one another, hastening for forgiveness from your Lord] (p. 90).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [And march forth in the way (which leads) to forgiveness from your Lord] (p. 98).</p> <p>Ghali: [And vie in the race for forgiveness from your Lord] (p. 67).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Race each other for forgiveness from your Lord] (p. 59).</p> |
| 10 | <p>{يا بني آدم خذوا زينتكم عند كل مسجد}</p> <p>Sura Al-A raaf, verse 31.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [O Children of Adam! Look to your adornment at every place of worship] (p. 149).</p> <p>Arberry: [Children of Adam! Take your adornment at every place of worship] (p. 174).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Children of Adam! Take your adornment (by wearing your clean clothes) while praying and going around (the Tawaaf of the Ka bah] (p. 203).</p> <p>Ghali: [O Children of Adam! Adorn yourselves fully at every time of prayer] (p. 154).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Children of Adam! Wear fine clothing in every mosque] (p. 139).</p> |

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| 11 | <p>{ و إذا أدقنا الناس رحمة من بعد ضراء مستهم إذا لهم مكر في آياتنا }</p> <p>Sura Yoonus, verse 21.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [And when we cause mankind to taste of mercy after some adversity which had afflicted them] (p. 202).</p> <p>Arberry: [When we let the people taste mercy after hardship has visited them] (p. 227).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [And when we let mankind taste mercy after some adversity has afflicted them] (p. 226).</p> <p>Ghali: [And when we give the people a taste of mercy after adversity has afflicted them] (p. 211).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [When we let people taste mercy after hardship has afflicted them] (p. 193).</p> |
| 12 | <p>{و يقول الإنسان أنذا ما مت لسوف أخرج حيا }</p> <p>Sura Maryam, verse 66.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [and man saith: When I am dead, shall I forsooth be brought forth alive?] (p. 312).</p> <p>Arberry: [Man says, 'What, when I am dead shall I then be brought forth alive?'] (p. 336).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [And man (the disbelievers) says: "When I am dead, shall I then be raised up alive?"] (p. 391).</p> <p>Ghali: [And mankind says: "How shall I, when I am dead, be brought to life again?"] (p. 310).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Man says, 'when I am</p> |

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| | | dead, will I then be brought out again alive?'] (p. 291). |
| 13 | { و أرسلنا السماء عليهم مدرارا } Sura Al-An aam, verse 6. | Pickthall: [And we shed on them abundant showers from the sky] (p. 123). Arberry: [And how we loosed heaven upon them in torrents] (p. 149). Al-Hilali and Khan: [And we poured out on them rain from the sky in abundance] (p. 171). Ghali: [And we sent down for them abundant rains] (p. 128). Bewley and Bewley: [We sent down heaven upon them in abundant rain], (p. 113). |
| 14 | { و اسأل القرية التي كنا فيها } Sura Yoosuf, verse 82. | Pickthall: [Ask the township where we were] (p. 238). Arberry: [Enquire of the city wherein we were] (p. 263). Al-Hilali and Khan: ["And ask (the people of) the town where we have been] (p. 305). Ghali: [And ask the town where we have been] (p. 245). Bewley and Bewley: [Ask questions of the town in which we were] (p. 226). |
| 15 | { فليدع ناديه } Sura Al- Alaq, verse 17. | Pickthall: [Then let him call upon his henchmen!] (p. 724). |

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| | | <p>Arberry: [So let him call on his concourse!] (p. 344).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Then let him call upon his council (of helpers)] (p. 779).</p> <p>Ghali: [Let him then call his henchmen] (p. 597).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Let him call his attendants] (p. 625).</p> |
| 16 | <p>{أتأمرون الناس بالبر و تنسون أنفسكم و أنتم تتلون الكتاب أفلا تعقلون}</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 44.</p> | <p>Picthall: [While ye yourselves forget (to practice it)] (p. 11).</p> <p>Arberry: [And forget yourselves] (p. 34).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [And you forget (to practice it) yourselves] (p. 19).</p> <p>Ghali: [And neglect it yourselves] (p. 7).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [And forget yourselves] (p. 6).</p> |
| 17 | <p>{فتوبوا إلى بارئكم فاقتلوا أنفسكم}</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 54.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [And kill (the guilty) yourselves] (p. 12).</p> <p>Arberry: [And slay one another] (p. 35).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [And kill yourselves (the innocent kill the wrongdoers among you)] (p. 20).</p> <p>Ghali: [And kill the evildoers among you] (p. 8).</p> |

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| | | Bewley and Bewley: [And kill yourselves] (p. 7). |
| 18 | <p>{و إذا مسكم الضر في البحر ضل من تدعون إلا إياه}</p> <p>Sura Al-Israa<, verse 67.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [All unto whom ye cry (for succour) fail save Him (alone)] (p. 287).</p> <p>Arberry: [Then there go astray those on whom you call except Him] (p. 310).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Those that you call upon vanish from you except Him (Allah alone)] (p. 362).</p> <p>Ghali: [Those to whom you invoke other than Him fail you] (p. 289).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Those you call on vanish except for Him alone] (p. 270).</p> |
| 19 | <p>{ و اصنع الفلك بأعيننا }</p> <p>Sura Hood, verse 37.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Build the ship under our eyes] (p. 218).</p> <p>Arberry: [Make thou the Ark under our eyes] (p. 243).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [And construct the ship under our eyes] (p. 283).</p> <p>Ghali: [Build the ark by our care] (p. 225).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Build the ark under our supervision] (p. 208).</p> |
| 20 | <p>{و اجعل لي لسان صدق في الآخرين }</p> | <p>Pickthall: [And give me a good report in later generations] (p. 385).</p> |

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| | <p>Sura Ash-Shu araa<, verse 84.</p> | <p>Arberry: [And appoint me a tongue of truthfulness among the others] (p. 68).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [and grant me an honorable mention in later generations] (p. 466).</p> <p>Ghali: [and grant me descendants to speak the truth among the later generations] (p. 371).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [And make me highly esteemed among the later peoples] (p. 353).</p> |
| 21 | <p>{ لا تمدن عينيك إلى ما متعنا به أزواجاً منهم }</p> <p>Sura Al-Hijr, verse 88.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Strain not thine eyes toward that which We cause some wedded pairs among them to enjoy] (p. 263).</p> <p>Arberry: [Stretch not thine eyes to that We have given pairs of them to enjoy] (p. 286).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Look not with your eyes ambitiously at what We have bestowed on certain classes of them (the disbelievers)] (p. 332).</p> <p>Ghali: [Do not even look at the worldly wealth We have let some pairs of the unbelievers (men and women) to gain] (p. 266).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Do not direct your eyes longingly to what We have given certain of them to enjoy] (p. 248).</p> |
| 22 | <p>{ و إذا طلقتم النساء فبلغن أجلهن فلا }</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Place not difficulties in the way of</p> |

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| | <p>تعصلوهم أن ينكحن أزواجهن إذا تراضوا بينهم بالمعروف { Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 232.</p> | <p>their marrying their husbands] (p. 38). Arberry: [Do not bar them from marrying their husbands] (p. 60). Al-Hilali and Khan: [Do not prevent them from marrying their (former) husbands] (p. 58). Ghali: [Do not pose problems for them from their marrying their spouses] (p. 37). Bewley and Bewley: [Do not prevent them from marrying their first husbands] (p. 32).</p> |
| 23 | <p>{ و آتوا اليتامى أموالهم } Sura An-Nisaa<, verse 2.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Give unto orphans their wealth] (p. 76). Arberry: [Give the orphans their property] (p. 100). Al-Hilali and Khan: [And give unto orphans their property] (p. 110). Ghali: [And give the orphans their inheritance] (p. 77). Bewley and Bewley: [Give orphans their property] (p. 68).</p> |
| 24 | <p>{ ولو ترى إذ المجرمون ناكسوا رؤوسهم عند ربهم ربنا أبصرنا و سمعنا فارجعنا نعمل صالحا إنا موقنون } Sura Al-Sajdah, verse 12.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Couldst thou but see when the guilty hang their heads before their Lord] (p. 439). Arberry: [Ah, if thou couldst see the guilty hanging their heads before their Lord] (p. 118). Al-Hilali and Khan: [And if you only could see</p> |

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| | | <p>when the mujrimun (criminals, disbelievers, polytheists, sinners) shall hang their heads before their Lord] (p. 523).</p> <p>Ghali: [And if you could see the sinners lowering their heads before their Lord] (p. 416).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [If only you could see the evildoers hanging their heads in shame before their Lord] (p. 399).</p> |
| 25 | <p>فإن طلقها فلا تحل له من بعد حتى تنكح زوجا غيره}</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 230.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Until she hath wedded another husband] (p. 37).</p> <p>Arberry: [Until she marries another husband] (p. 60).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Until she has married another husband] (p. 57).</p> <p>Ghali: [Unless she consummates marriage with another husband with the intention of remaining married to him] (p. 36).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Until she has married another husband] (p. 32).</p> |
| 26 | <p>قال أحدهما إني أراني أعصر خمرا}</p> <p>Sura Yoosuf, verse 36.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [I dreamed that I was pressing wine] (p. 233).</p> <p>Arberry: [I dreamed that I was pressing grapes] (p. 257).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [I saw myself (in a dream)</p> |

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| | | <p>pressing wine] (p. 298).</p> <p>Ghali: [I dreamt that I was pressing grapes] (p. 239).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [I dreamt that I was pressing grapes] (p. 221).</p> |
| 27 | <p>{إنك إن تذرهم يضلوا عبادك و لا يلدوا إلا فاجرا كفارا}</p> <p>Sura Nooh, verse 27.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [And will beget none save lewd ingrates] (p. 658).</p> <p>Arberry: [And will beget none but unbelieving libertines] (p. 304).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [And they will beget none but wicked disbelievers] (p. 732).</p> <p>Ghali: [And will not beget any but wicked ungrateful ones] (p. 571).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [And spawn nothing but more dissolute kafirun] (p. 578).</p> |
| 28 | <p>{ و قولوا للناس حسنا }</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 83.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [And speak kindly to mankind], p.16.</p> <p>Arberry: [And speak good to men], p.38.</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [and speak good to people [i.e. enjoin righteousness and forbid evil, and say the truth about Muhammad]], p.25.</p> <p>Ghali: [Speak of good to the people], p.12.</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [And speak good words to people], p.11.</p> |

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| 29 | <p>{كتب عليكم القتال و هو كره لكم}</p> <p>Sura Al-Baqarah, verse 216.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Though it is hateful unto you] (p. 35).</p> <p>Arberry: [Though it be hateful to you] (p. 57).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Though you dislike it] (p. 53).</p> <p>Ghali: [And you are averse to it] (p. 34).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Even if it is hateful to you] (p.29).</p> |
| 30 | <p>{أو يصبح ماؤها غورا فلن تستطيع له طلبا}</p> <p>Sura Al-Kahf, verse 41.</p> | <p>Pickthall: [Or some morning the water thereof will be lost in the earth] (p. 298).</p> <p>Arberry: [Or in the morning the water of it will be sunk into the earth] (p. 321).</p> <p>Al-Hilali and Khan: [Or the water thereof (of the gardens) becomes deep-sunken (underground)] (p. 374).</p> <p>Ghali: [Or its water will sink into the earth] (p. 298).</p> <p>Bewley and Bewley: [Or morning finds its water drained into the earth] (p. 279).</p> |

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